






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LOS ANGELES

John Wood

3

Vol.



When I employ myself upon a paper of morality, I generally consider how I may recommend the particular virtue which I treat of, by the precepts or examples of the ancient heathens; by that means, if possible, to shame those, who have greater advantages of knowing their duty, and therefore greater obligations to perform it, into a better course of life: besides that, many among us are unreasonably disposed to give a fairer hearing to a pagan philosopher, than to a christian writer.

ADDISON's *Works*, Vol. III. p. 193.

The following Pieces, by the Author of this Book, may be had either bound together in One Volume, or single.

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E R R A T A.

PAGE 9. line 3. in the note, for *irripiat* read *arripiat*. p. 10. l. 5. for *storonger* read *stronger*. — p. 87. Greek motto, 2d line, for *τῆς* read *τῆ*. — p. 98. l. 9. for *agravated* read *aggravated*. — p. 111. l. 1. in the note, for *Δακεδαίμονι* read *Λακεδαίμονι*. — p. 126. l. 1. in the note, for *ισχυρον* read *ισχυρον*. — p. 160. l. 6. for *They* read *There*. — p. 220. l. 6. for *unconstrained* read *unrestrained*. — p. 223. l. 3. for *it's* read *its* without an apostrophe. — p. 254. l. 1. in the note, for *concenfuram* read *consenfuram*. — p. 267. l. 5. for *becaufe* read *as*. — p. 284. last line, for *nither* read *neither*. — p. 300. l. 5. for *again* read *against*. — p. 302. l. 26. for *ordered* read *order*.

LETTERS

AND

TRACTS

ON THE

CHOICE of COMPANY

AND

OTHER SUBJECTS.

The SECOND EDITION.



by Robert Bolton

LONDON:

Printed for J. WHISTON and B. WHITE, in *Fleet-street*;
and R. and J. DOBSLEY, in *Pall-mall*.

MDCCLXII.

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MDCCLXXII.



TO THE

Earl of HARDWICKE.

B
1561
B62 l
1762

My LORD,

 WHEN You have contributed so much to ease me of the *cares of life*, You have a right to know, how far I have been employed in the proper *business* of it.

I wish that I could have given Your LORDSHIP an *account* of this entirely to your satisfaction: You would, perhaps, have had a somewhat *better* than what you now receive, had I enjoy'd the same degree of *health*, that I have of *leisure*.

My *intention*, however, you will find in my *attempt*; and if there be any merit in the *one*, I am sure that

A 2

you

iv DEDICATION.

you will be disposed to transfer some share of it to the *other*.

An address to your LORDSHIP, on this occasion, in the usual style, would as ill suit your *Inclinations*, as it doth my *Age* and *Profession*. We are both of us on the confines of *Eternity*, and should therefore alike make Truth our care---that Truth, which duly influencing our practice will be the security of our *Eternal Happiness*.

Distinguished by my obligations to Your LORDSHIP, I would be so by my acknowledgment of them: I would not be thought to have only then *owned* them, when they might have been *augmented*. Whatever testimony I gave of Respect to You, when in the *highest civil Office* under your Prince, I would express the same, when You have resigned it; and shew as strong an attachment to the Lord HARDWICKE,

as

D E D I C A T I O N. v

as I ever did to the Lord Chancellor.

Receive, therefore, a *tribute of thanks*, the *last* which I am ever likely in this manner to pay.—

But I am hastening to my *grave*, with a prospect, which must be highly pleasing to me; unless divested of all just regard to those, who survive me.

From a KING, whose solemn declaration it has been, that he hath the cause of *Religion* and *Virtue* at heart, and whose *Practice* gains entire credit to his *Professions*, whilst he has such Counsellors as Your LORDSHIP, how much have we to *hope*!

And if that *Hope* cannot but be confirmed by *Prayer*, every Lover of his Country will most earnestly and devoutly pray---That our great expectations may be fully answer'd---That a Spring, which promises the fairest fruit, may have the advancing

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vancing year productive of it--That as experience has taught us the sad consequences of *Faction*, it may as fully convince us of those not to be less dreaded ones of *Irreligion*---- That united as we are in the *love* of our *Sovereign*, we may be so in what is equally necessary to *his*, and to our *own*, *happiness*, in a just concern for the progress of *Virtue*---- in our care to extend the influence of that *true Piety*, from which *Virtue* hath its only sure support.

Supplicating these *Blessings* for his *Country*, may *He* leave the *World*, who, whilst he continues in it, must, if he retains any sense of *Desert*, be,

My LORD,

With the utmost respect and gratitude,

YOUR LORDSHIP'S most obliged,

Most humble and obedient Servant.



P R E F A C E.


 F the following pieces had the same *recommendation* from the manner, in which the subjects of them are treated, as they have from the importance of those subjects, there would be no need of an Apology for their publication.

Nothing, certainly, ought to be more the care of every man, than to make himself of some use to his Species. If to be so but in a very small degree, is all the hope, which an obscure person must entertain ; that hope should not be defeated by his negligence—he should do his best—his *Endeavours*, how little success soever may attend them, will not fail to recommend him to the common Parent, whilst they correspond to his *Abilities*.

Much, I grant, has been already said on all the points, on which I here treat : But on every moral point much has been said ; which, yet no one, I am persuaded, will

will think a reason, why he should decline offering his thoughts to the public, on any thing that concerns its Morals. The very same things, express'd in a different style—or placed in a different light—or enforced in a manner more suitable to the prevailing taste, compose by far the *greatest part* of the *Books*, which have been *best* received.

It is the benefit of the *Young*, which these letters and tracts chiefly consult; furnishing, it is hoped, some remarks not unworthy of their attention; and which, when engaging it, will convince them, that when they come to the use of *Reason*, they have something else to mind, besides the pleasures of *Sense*.

It has been endeavour'd, that the advice here offered may clearly appear founded on the principles of right reason: but lest there should be any failure either in the Writer's argument, or in the Reader's apprehension of its force; care has been taken, to shew in the *most material* articles, what support they have from the authority of those excellent persons, whose wisdom their own, and all succeeding, times have concurred to applaud.

The

The *Letters on the Choice of Company* seem entitled to the first place in these *Miscellanies*; as on that choice the influence of any right observation in them chiefly depends.

An attempt to persuade the generality of mankind to think for themselves, might truly be pronounced a very wild one: But where I should idly say—Think for yourself; I might properly say——Be careful whom you suffer to think for you—Do not let those direct *your reason*, who make no use, or the worst use, of their *own*.

Women, indeed, take Rakes for their husbands, in hope, as they pretend, to reclaim them; but none of our sex, whom I meet with, allege such a plea for making them their companions. The most which seems expected by any one virtuously educated, when he enters into a familiarity with the Vitious, is, that his attachment to their persons will never induce him to imitate what is wrong in their practice. How ill grounded such an expectation is, the following Letters will, if I mistake not, fully prove.

Some time after my writing them, I met with *Keyssler's Travels*, the first Volume of which, p. 217, furnishes an instance of what may be feared even for the most commendably disposed, and the most wisely instructed, when they make a wrong choice of the persons with whom they associate, which very well deserves to be here inserted.

“ It is with the greatest pleasure I mention young Prince EUGENE *de Soissons*.
 “ All those qualifications and endowments that can procure love and esteem shine conspicuous in this young Prince. A graceful person, the most engaging affability and sweetness of temper, a quick understanding, an heroic ardour, a skill in the Sciences and other parts of polite literature, which is the more extraordinary in a Prince of fifteen years of age, justify the exalted hopes conceived of him. He shews a strong inclination to a military life, and is already inuring himself to it, so that commonly a bare board serves him for a pillow.———The King has taken the greatest care of his education, and suffer'd him to be ignorant

“ rant of no branch of knowledge which
 “ may contribute to his future advance-
 “ ment. To keep him out of the way of
 “ public diversions and other dissipations,
 “ he has hitherto resided at a distance from
 “ Court, having apartments at the Riding
 “ Academy: there he gives himself up to
 “ the study of the Sciences with such ap-
 “ plication and intenseness, that he scarce
 “ came to Court once in a week, nor ap-
 “ peared at any public diversions.—

“ ———The apartments of the Prince and
 “ his excellent Tutor are full of a philoso-
 “ phical apparatus and mathematical in-
 “ struments; the construction and use of
 “ which the Prince has gained a perfect
 “ knowledge of, as it were by way of di-
 “ version. Nothing gives him greater sa-
 “ tisfaction than to explain every thing to
 “ strangers of curiosity, who happen to
 “ visit him. ————— The young

“ Prince allows himself no other amuse-
 “ ments, but such as improve, as well as
 “ divert, the mind; and is as fond of ma-
 “ thematical problems and philosophical
 “ experiments, as too many young Gentle-
 “ men are of such diversions as tend to

“ alienate their minds from any intense ap-
“ plication, and render them unable to
“ bear the least hardship.”

How great things were to be expected from a Prince of such endowments—so disposed to the worthiest pursuits—so closely applying himself to them—making so happy a progress in them! What could not but be expected from him, when he was both under the care of a Nobleman distinguished as much by his Science as his Station, and under the instruction of an Ecclesiastic, an excellent Scholar and a very wise Man!

Alas! every pleasing expectation form'd of him proved in the event vain. Bad examples found him unable to withstand them. When the *Vicious* were his *companions*, their *Manners* were no longer his *abhorrence*. By associating with them, he soon became as bad as the worst of them. The Letter which I have quoted, so much commending this Prince, appears to be written about the end of the year 1729: He served in the campaign on the *Rhine* in 1734, was then the reverse of what *Keyssler* repre-

represents him—lost his virtue, and with it his life.

I have given the second place in this collection to the Tract on *Intemperance in Eating*; as the reproach, which we have long since incurred with respect to the quantity of our food, may now receive a sad addition from the extravagant expence which we are at, in the kinds of it.

The price, formerly, of an elegant dinner is now that of a Dessert—What would provide half a dozen plain dishes, we now spend in rendering more palatable a single one.—The wages of a foreign Cook, whose nastiness should as much disgust, as his poisonous skill terrify, us, are those of five or six Servants of our own country, whom we might usefully employ.

You wonder, says a *Roman* Writer about the time of the height of the *Roman* luxury, at the number of the Diseases among us: consider the number of our Cooks. The increase of the former was the necessary consequence of an encouragement that increased the latter. The principal business of Cookery, as an Art, is, to deceive

us in such a manner, as will make it pleasing to us to destroy ourselves.— Its business is to counteract Nature—to invite us to eat when we are not hungry—to create an appetite which it is safest for us to be without—to give us that relish of our food, which we should only seek from exercise or abstinence—to render us unmindful how abundantly our natural wants have been already supplied—to make even a fresh meal agreeable to us, when our Vessels are yet loaded with the preceding.

In considering how much our health suffers by this species of Intemperance, I may appear to have meddled with the business of a Profession, in which I cannot but be unskilled. My plea here must be — That as every Physician will think it reasonable to inform himself, what errors in Religion may endanger his happiness in a future state; so every Ecclesiastic, and, indeed, every man, may fairly be allowed to enquire, what errors in Diet may either shorten the continuance of his present existence, or lessen its comforts; may occasion either a speedy death, or a painful life.

It is highly fitting, that he, whose enquiry it has for many years been, what symptoms attend the several kinds of diseases to which the human body is subject, and what methods of treating them have been most successfully pursued, should be thought the best qualified to remove them : But it is not less fitting, that All who are subject to those disorders should know — how they are most likely to be escaped — what neglect of ourselves will bring the most distressing of them upon us, and render the skilfullest of his Profession unable to relieve us.

An ingenious Gentleman of the Faculty giving the character of a person whom he did not think *devout*, though the writer of a Book of *Devotion*, said, That *he had put all his Devotion into his Book*.

They who see the feeble frame, which I with so much difficulty support, may be tempted to judge of *my Temperance*, as this Gentleman did of *his neighbour's Devotion* ; or else to think Temperance not very wisely prescribed by one, whom it has so little benefited.

But were it to be considered, for how many years a constitution has been upheld, which seemed originally unable to withstand the very slightest shock, there would not appear any ground to treat the infirmities of a person of such an advanced age, as proofs, either, that he did not speak in character when he *recommended Temperance*, or so much discredited it, that he should not expect to make Converts to it, by what he could say in its recommendation.

Of the pieces in this small collection, that on *Drinking to excess* will, probably, be look'd upon as the least seasonable.

But, Since it is chiefly the Discountenance shewn this Vice, some years past, by those in the highest posts among us, which has been its Restraint—— Since we may justly think the forbearance of it to be in Many rather from a compliance with Fashion, than from a regard to Duty—— rather from their seeing that the *Great* do not practise it, than from their knowing the inducements which *All* have to detest it—— Since there is not, perhaps, even now any part of the Kingdom, in which some are
not

P R E F A C E. xvii

not to be found, who are much less sober than their good sense ought to make them, and who do not too frequently subject themselves to as vile a transformation, as the *Circean* cup could produce——Since, further, though it may be customary with very few of any Rank to affect, what Sir *J. More* called the praise of a Brewer's Horse, that of bearing a great quantity of liquor; yet as various sorts of wines are not less essential to an elegant table, than a variety of food; and the *sure effect* of them both, is, to make us unmindful when we have reached the bounds of Temperance——Since, I say, this is the present state of the Sobriety of our Gentry, I cannot think it an useless employment, to search after those arguments, which may be likeliest to convince the younger part of them, how much it was for their Ancestors praise, that they wanted not the inflammatory draught to raise either their courage or their spirits, either to promote their mirth or alleviate their fatigue; and how amiable All will appear, of whom this is truly the character.

Agesi-

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Agefilaus, when ask'd—What the *Lacedæmonians* had gained by the Laws of *Lycurgus*? answer'd, A Contempt of Pleasure. A Lesson, the usefulness of which seems not likely to be learn'd by us, 'til it will be too late, I fear, to profit by being taught it—'til we experience the Evils consequent on Pleasure so eagerly pursued.

The Essay upon this subject has been drawn up three times the number of years for which we are advised to confine our writings to our closets; and it is now published, not, indeed, with the hope that it will induce Any to divert their *attention* from the *Siren's* Song which has already engaged it; but from an apprehension, that it may contribute to give some few a just sense of the Danger, to which they have not yet exposed themselves. *Alterations* many I would have made in it, could they have been *Amendments*; but — *Cupidum — Vires deficiunt!*

My Decay is now such, that it is with what I write as with what I act; I see in it the faults, which I know not how to amend.

Church-

Churchmen and Old men are under these great disadvantages, when they speak of life as given us for a quite different purpose, than to pass it in schemes of Mirth and Diversion, that the One are thought only to suit their language to their Profession, and the Other to their Weakness. But, whatever can be objected to the advice of *such persons*—whatever can be said to lessen its weight; they, certainly, in the present case, speak but the very same language with those, to whom no exception of a like nature can be made—whose sentiments have a general deference paid them.

It would be easy to produce Poets, Historians, Philosophers, the ablest Generals, the wisest Statesmen, the most renowned Princes concurring in their Dissuasives from the several gratifications, on which our People of Fashion are so intent—from acting, as if we were born only to consume the produce of the earth, and to give our days as much Mirth and Amusement as fancy and folly can afford them.

I don't know any topic, on which more numerous passages might be collected from
the

the best antient writers, than—on *Pleasure*—on the unbecoming part that we act in abandoning ourselves to it.

Even in the Poet, who expresses so much complaisance towards a *Lydia*, a *Chloe*, a *Phyllis*, a *Glycera*, &c. and who, by the praises he gives, shews with what relish he drank, *Chian*, *Lesbian*, *Falernian*, *Cæcuban*, &c. wine, we meet with Instructions, to which if the Men of Fortune among us would attend, the employment of their time would be the very reverse of what we every where at present see it.

“ What is right and becoming engrosses
“ his search. He is uneasy, when he loses
“ the time which he might have employ’d
“ in actions alike advantageous to the Poor
“ and the Rich, and the neglect of which
“ is alike hurtful to the Young and to the
“ Old.

“ He considers *Homer*, as proposing, in
“ *Ulysses* an excellent pattern of wisdom
“ and virtue ; as inviting us, by such an
“ example, to resist those pleasures, in
“ which we cannot indulge ourselves, but
“ we quit our Rank in the Creation, and
“ sink into that of Beasts.

“ He

“ He would have us shake off Sloth—
 “ apply ourselves before the day breaks to
 “ what is worthy of us, and will be of
 “ real use to us, sure that, if we fail here-
 “ in, great disquiet will be the consequence.
 “ His language is—Despise pleasure—Con-
 “ sider it as dearly bought, when your ease
 “ will be its purchase.—Dare to be wise.
 “ —To delay acting rightly is as absurd,
 “ as it would be to stop at the River we
 “ are to pass, ’till the water is run off,
 “ which will continue running to remotest
 “ ages.

“ He glories in the Parent, whose espe-
 “ cial care it had been to preserve his Vir-
 “ tue—who had kept him from many
 “ faults; and whose advice though he has,
 “ in some instances, neglected to follow,
 “ he yet hopes that such failure will, at
 “ length, be in no small degree corrected.
 “ He is not wanting to himself, either when
 “ taking his walk, or retired to his cham-
 “ ber—He *then* considers, how it will be
 “ right for him to proceed, what course it
 “ will be most for his benefit to take—
 “ He *then* turns his thoughts on the
 “ *misconduct* of this or that person of his
 “ ac-

“ acquaintance, and asks himself, how im-
 “ prudent he should be, if he were to act
 “ in the same manner? He regards it as
 “ wrong, to think any Happy, but the wise
 “ and virtuous.” &c. &c. &c.

The Letter on *Public Worship* was written under very great concern from an account of the indecent neglect of it, by a Gentleman, whom his friends considered as likely to be a blessing to his Country: Such, the Poet's excellent Instructors—*Longa ætas, liber Amicus, Consilium proprium*, may yet make him; Such, I am persuaded, he will be, When it is not any man's practice, but his own Reason that guides him—When he becomes convinced, that there are None, whose examples it will be more absurd and dangerous to follow, than those of his Acquaintance, either who rank themselves among the Learned, or who are called Great. In order to counteract the force of these, it was judged expedient to shew, what different Patterns former ages afford in the persons most celebrated for their Knowledge or their Rank—what sentiments of Piety they have left us—the part they took
 in

in supporting a reverence of the Deity, by joining in public acts of it.

These particulars will, I trust, appear fully shewn.

I cannot, indeed, without the utmost indignation behold a Rabble of Pretenders to Science and Honour making their infamy their boast—taking pains to publish, how far they have divested themselves of those awful sentiments of the Supreme Being, which have been the most carefully expressed by the worthiest of mankind—by men, with whose *Characters* it is a reproach for one of a liberal education to be unacquainted, though the world has for so many Centuries been deprived of their *Persons*—whom, when we neglect to *imitate*, we do not fail to *applaud*; and of whose merit not to shew *esteem*, would be thought a clear proof, how ill we were entitled to it. The large addition, that might be made to what will occur in its proper place on their religious sentiments, cannot be unknown to any, who are at all conversant with the writings of the Antients.

A very

A very few observations on this head it may not be improper to insert here.

Of the Seven Persons anciently distinguished by the title of Wise, and several of whose maxims are transmitted to us, we have, from Six, lessons of Piety; such as—“Honour, Worship, the Gods—Whatever Good you do, ascribe it to the Gods—Assert every where their existence—Think that they see all things——It is so far from being possible to conceal from them the Ill you do, that you cannot conceal from them your very thought of doing it—Cultivate Piety.”

Nor was this the language of speculative men. There is only one of those here referred to, who came under the denomination of a Philosopher; and surely no man ever better deserved it: The wisdom so considerable in the rest was discovered in their civil prudence, in their political capacity; it was the wisdom of the Statesman, or Prince, or Legislator.

The doctrine of *Pythagoras* was, That as God is Lord of all things, we should apply to him for whatever is good for us, and
be

be careful to do the things, with which he will be pleased.

The life of *Socrates* is said to have been a life of Prayer.

As it has been observed of the writings of *Plato*, that they throughout tend to give us worthy conceptions of the Deity ; it may be as truly remarked of *Xenophon*, that he describes his Hero, *Cyrus*, as under the strongest influence of the Principles of Religion. He even introduces him appealing to his *Soldiers*, as *knowing*, “ that in all
“ his undertakings, whether of less or
“ greater moment, his first care was, to
“ address himself to Heaven.”

Such is the language that an *Officer*, alike famous for his literary and military accomplishments, puts into the mouth of one, whom he proposes as a pattern to the *Great*—as a model, on which the *Prince* ought to be formed, who would have his *Worth* suit his *Station*.

I must not forget, that I am writing a Preface, and shall therefore only add what a *Greek* writer says of the *Romans*—That their affairs were kept in such order, by their

xxvi P R E F A C E.

great care for Religion. POLYB. Lib. VI.
P. 497.

Most ardently is it my wish, that this may one day be truly said of my Countrymen! But, alas, how unpromising of such an event are some present appearances!

The large military force, which the restless ambition of a powerful neighbour obliges us to have always in readiness for our defence, must, necessarily, in the manner in which it is now disposed of, be utterly ruinous of our morals.

A late able Writer thus expresses himself — “ What I lament is, to see the sentiments of the Nation so amazingly reconciled to the prospect of having a far more numerous body of regular Troops kept up, after the Peace, than any true Lover of his Country, in former times, thought could be allowed, without endangering the Constitution. Nay, so unaccountably fond are we become of the military Plan, that the erection of Barracks, which twenty years ago would have ruined any Minister, who should have ventured to propose it, may be proposed

P R E F A C E. xxvii

“ posed safely by our Ministers now-a-days,
 “ and, upon trial, be found to be a fa-
 “ vourite measure with our Patriots, and
 “ with the Public in general.”

I am by no means qualified to speak to the expediency of keeping up, even in the time of Peace, *a far more numerous body of regular Troops than what a Lover of his Country would formerly have thought dangerous to the Constitution.* But of this I am certain, that no Lover of his country can have his residence, where Soldiers are quartered, without wishing them at some distance from it. Oaths he would hear as familiar to their mouths, as any of the terms of ordinary discourse—The success of lewd Intrigues he would find to be the customary topic of Conversation—He would know, that al-
 lowance is given to be absent from all public worship, on one part of the Lord's day, and he would perceive a call to it on the other either very carelessly observed, or wholly neglected.

When there has not been, in a parish abounding in public houses, a *single one*, I think, in which a Soldier was not quarter'd,

xxviii P R E F A C E.

I have not seen a Soldier, on a *Sunday*, at Church.

I have been an eye-witness of the men entering the Church at one Door, and instantly going out of it at another.

Nor is it to be expected, but that the Licentiousness of the Soldiers should exceed in other towns, what it is in that, in which I am resident; as here any very great irregularity would be so likely to come to the notice, and have the reproof, of a General Officer, of whose most amiable manners I always with great pleasure speak.

Suffice it here to say, he has as many friends as neighbours: All Sects and Parties he unites in the esteem of him; and would unite the whole Nation in an approbation of the largest military force, *even in time of Peace*, were He to be imitated by those, who composed it.

I am particularly concerned thus to mention this worthy Nobleman; as he, when representation has been made to him of the Soldiers non-attendance on the public worship, has most readily interposed, and by his interposition removed the cause of complaint.

But,

But, really, it is not more dangerous to the Morals of *Others*, that the Soldiery should be disposed of as they now are, than it is to their *Own*.

The Idleness, in which they live—the *weak women*, to whom they get such easy access—the *very bad women*, often under the same roof with them—the intoxicating liquor, sold at a low price, in every house, in which they are lodged—the artifices, by which their Host can so conveniently tempt them to a debauch with it—the secrecy, with which their guilt can be attended, render it next to impossible, that gross immorality should not prevail among them.

The apprehension, that, by separating the Soldiers from their fellow-subjects, our liberty would be endanger'd, is just as reasonable, as a Physician's fear to prescribe bleeding in a high inflammatory fever, lest a tendon should be injured. In both cases, the greatest immediate hurt is sustained, and a danger is apprehended, which is quite remote—which any degree of care would prevent, and which is not to be supposed, when a sure evil of such a magnitude is to be obviated.

The

The loss of *Liberty* is to be feared from nothing so much, as from the loss of *Virtue* — is, indeed, the unavoidable consequence of it. Slaves to their own Passions will be readily such to their Prince's will——They are to be bought by any, who will come up to their Price.—When we make no scruple of doing *the worst actions to gratify our lusts*; it is not to be thought that we should scruple to obey the *most unjust command* of Him, who will supply us with the means of *gratifying them*.—

Common Soldiers in every State have the least share of the liberty enjoy'd in it, and daily feel that they have so: they are only to be made good Citizens, by being made good Men. Let no other sense of Duty be inculcated on them, than that towards their Officers, (and with what care and zeal is this continually inculcated!) what must be the consequence, but their regarding no WORD, except that of COMMAND? This will be thought to license any action, how contrary soever to the Word of God, or to the Voice of Reason, and howsoever mischievous to the Peace of the Nation, or ruinous to its Liberty.

I know

P R E F A C E. xxxi

I know not what can be more obvious than the Danger, in which we should be from 20,000 able-bodied Men, quarter'd among us—well armed—well disciplined—but without property or virtue—with no check on their consciences—with nothing to lose but a life, which for six-pence a day they frequently hazard.

I would separate the soldiers from their fellow-citizens, not that they might be alienated from them, or be induced to think, that they have not a common Interest with them; but that they might be better fitted to serve them—that they might be made more happy themselves, and more useful to others—that their health and their morals might be better preserved—that they might have fewer temptations to vice, or, if not to be hindered from contracting Guilt, might be restrained from spreading it.

I have been for so many years an eye-witness of the extreme hurt, done by the present method of billeting Soldiers, that I cannot but most earnestly wish myself able to represent this evil in such a manner, as might give those a just sense of it, who have the power to remedy it.

The

xxxii P R E F A C E.

The last piece in this collection is a Letter, written towards the end of the year 1737, or in the beginning of 1738, but never sent to the honourable person, for whom it was intended; and I have lately seen such proofs given by him of his Abilities, very little after the time when I was thus addressing myself to him, as have fully convinced me, how prudent a step I took in suppressing Advice to one, from whom I might, with so much Advantage, have received it.

Should I be asked, why that, which has been so long suppressed, is now published; I can truly say, because there were those, whose opinion it was, that what I thought needless to a particular person, might be of use to others. And where there is a prospect of being able, *in any instance*, to serve the cause of Religion and Virtue, I hope, that it will always appear to me a sufficient inducement not to decline the attempt.

L E T T E R



LETTERS

ON THE

CHOICE of COMPANY.

Οἷς δὲ ομιλῶν ἡδεται κακοῖς ἀνὴρ,
Οὐ πωποτ' ἠρωτήσα, γινώσκων οἷ
Τοιοῦτος ἐστὶν οἷσπερ ἡδεται ξυγῶν.

Si quis malorum pascitur confortio,
Inquirere ultra parco, compertum hoc habens,
Talem esse quemque quali amicitia utitur.

EURIP.

LETTERS

CHOICE OF COMPANY.

1847.



LETTER I.

S I R,

S you are now no longer under the eye of either a parent, or a governor, but wholly at liberty to act according to your own inclinations; your friends cannot be without their fears, on your account; they cannot but have some uneasy apprehensions, lest the very bad men, with whom you may converse, should be able to efface those principles, which so much care was taken at first to imprint, and has been since to preserve, in you.

The intimacy, in which I have, for many years, lived with your family, suffers me not to be otherwise than a *sharer* of their concern, on this occasion; and

4 *On the Choice of Company.*

you will permit me, as such, to lay before you those considerations, which, while they shew you your danger, and excite your caution, may not be without their use in promoting your safety.

That it should be the endeavour of our parents, to give us just apprehensions of things, as soon as we are capable of receiving them; and, in our earlier years, to stock our minds with useful truths—to accustom us to the use of our reason, the restraint of our appetites, and the government of our passions, is a point, on which, I believe, all are agreed, whose opinions about it you would think of any consequence.

* From a neglect in these particulars, you see so many of one sex, as much Girls at

* *Natura tenacissimi fumus eorum quæ radibus annis percipimus; ut sapor, quo nova imbuas, durat; nec lanarum colores, quibus simplex ille candor mutatus est, elui possunt. QUINCTIL. Lib. I.*

Καθολικὴ ἀπειργασίη προσοικεῖ, &c. In universum malorum consuetudine prohibendi sunt pueri: nam affricatur illis aliquid inde vitii. Atque hoc etiam Pythagoras monuit suis præceptorum involucris.—*Non gusta quibus nigra est cauda.* Hoc significat, non consuescendum cum hominibus ob malitiam nigris. *PLUT. de lib. Ed.*

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Sixty, as they were at Sixteen—their follies only varied—their pursuits, though differently, yet equally, trifling; and you thence, likewise, find near as many of the other sex, Boys in their advanced years—as fond of feathers and toys in their riper age, as they were in their childhood—living as little to any of the purposes of Reason, when it has gained its full strength, as they did when it was weakest. ^a And, indeed, from the same source all those vices proceed, which most disturb and distress the world.

When no pains are taken to correct our bad *inclinations*, before they become confirmed and fixed in us; they acquire, at length, that power over us, from which we have the worst to fear—we give way to *them* in the instances where we see plainest, how grievously we must suffer by our compliance—we know not how to resist *them*, notwithstanding the obvious ruin which

^a Non pueritia in nobis, sed, quod est gravius, puerilitas remanet: Et hoc quidem pejus est, quod auctoritatem habemus senum, vitia, puerorum; nec puerorum tantum, sed infantium. SEN. Epist.

6 *On the Choice of Company.*

will be the consequence of our yielding to them.

I don't say, that a right *education* will be as beneficial, as a wrong one is hurtful: the very best may be disappointed of its proper effects.

Though the tree you set be put into an excellent soil, and trained and pruned by the skilfullest hand; you are not, however, sure of its thriving: Vermin may destroy all your hopes from it.

When the utmost care has been taken to send a young man into the world well principled, and fully apprised of the reasonableness of a religious and virtuous life; he is, yet, far from being temptation proof—he even then may fall, may fall into the worst both of principles and practices^a; and he is very likely to do so, in the place

^a Sumuntur a conversantibus mores. Et ut quædam ad contactus corporis vitia transiliunt, ita animus mala sua proximis tradit. Ebriosus convictores in amorem vini traxit. Impudicorum cœtus fortem quoque & filicium virum emolliit.—Eadem, ex diverso, ratio virtutum est, ut omne, quod secum habent, mitigent. Nec tam valetudini profuit utilis regio & salubrius cœlum, quam animis parum firmis in turba meliorem versari. Quæ res quantum

On the Choice of Company. 7

where you are, if he will associate with those who speak as freely as they act; and who seem to think, that their understanding would be less advantageously shewn, were they not to use it in defence of their vices.

That we may be known by our company, is a truth become proverbial.* The ends we have to serve may, indeed, occasion us to be often with the persons, whom we by no means resemble: or, the place, in which we are settled, keeping us at a great distance from others, if we will converse at all, it must be with some, whose manners we least approve. But when we have our choice—when no valuable interest is promoted by associating with the corrupt—when, if we like the company of

possit, intelliges, si videris feras quoque convictu nostri mansuescere; nullique immani bestię vim suam permanere, si hominis contubernium diu passa est. Retunditur omnis asperitas, paulatimque inter placida dediscitur. *SEN. de Ira, Lib. III. cap. vii.*

* *Quintilian* having mentioned some proverbial expressions, and among others this—*Pares cum paribus facillime* (or, as some MSS. maxime) *congregantur*, adds—*Neque enim durassent hæc in æternum, nisi vera omnibus viderentur.* *Lib. V.*

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the wise and confiderate, we may have it; that we then court the one, and shun the other, seems as full a proof, as we can well give, that, if we avoid vice, it is not from the sense we have of the amiableness of virtue.

Had I a large collection of books, and never looked into any that treated on grave and useful subjects, that would contribute to make me wiser or better; but took those frequently, and those only, into my hands, that would raise my laughter, or that would merely amuse me, or that would give me loose and impure ideas, or that inculcated atheistical or sceptical notions, or that were filled with scurrility and invective, and therefore could only serve to gratify my spleen and ill-nature; they, who knew this to be my practice, must, certainly, form a very unfavourable opinion of my capacity, or of my morals.^a If nature had given me a good understanding, and much of my time passed in reading; were I to read nothing but what was tri-

^a —Studio mores convenienter eunt.

OVID.

On the Choice of Company. 9

fling, it would spoil that understanding, it would make me a Trifler: And though formed with commendable dispositions, or with none very blameable; yet if my *favourite authors* were—*such* as encouraged me to make the most of the *present hour*, not to look beyond *it*, to taste every pleasure that offered itself, to forego no advantage, that I could obtain—*such* as gave vice nothing to fear, nor virtue any thing to hope, in a future state; you would not, I am sure, pronounce otherwise of those writers, than that they would hurt my natural disposition, and carry me *lengths of guilt*, which I should not have gone, without this encouragement to it.

Nor can it be allowed, that *reading* wrong things would thus affect me, but it must be admitted, that *bearing* them would not do it less. ^a *Both* fall under the head of *Conversation*; we fitly apply that term

^a Τῇ μὲν κακίᾳ, &c. Vitiis, multæ partes corporis, multaque loca aditum spatiumque per se ad animam penetrandi præbent. Unica virtuti, qua adolescentes irripiat, ansa aures sunt, siquidem puræ sint, & jam inde ab initio adulatoriarum corruptelarum vacuæ, intactæque a pravis sermonibus servantur. Itaque Xenocrates aurium muni-

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alike to *both*; and we may be said, with equal propriety, to converse with books, and to converse with men. The impression, indeed, made on us by what we hear, is, usually, much stronger than that received by us from what we read. That which passes in our usual intercourse is listened to, without fatiguing us: Each, then, taking his turn in speaking, our attention is kept awake: We mind throughout what is said, while we are at liberty to express our own sentiments of it, to confirm it, or to improve upon it, or to object to it, or to hear any part of it repeated, or to ask what questions we please concerning it.

Discourse is an application to our eyes, as well as ears; and the one organ is here so far assistant to the other, that it greatly increases the force of what is transmitted to our minds by it. The air and action of the speaker gives no small importance to

menta pueris potius quam athletic applicari jubebat. PLUT.
de Auditione.

Τὰ ὦτα οὐ μὴ παντὶ, &c. Aures tuas ne cuivis sermoni
præbe: malus enim sermo malorum operum dux est.

EPICHRM. apud STOB. 278.

his

On the Choice of Company. II

his words: the very tone of his voice adds weight to his reasoning; and occasions that to be attended to throughout, which, had it come to us from the pen or the press, we should have been asleep, before we had read half of it.

That bad companions will make us as bad as themselves, I don't affirm. When we are not kept from their vices by our principles, we may be so by our constitution; we may be less profligate than they are, by being more cowardly: But what I advance as *certain* is, That we cannot be safe among them—that they will, in some degree, and may in a very great one, hurt our morals. You may not, perhaps, be unwilling to have a distinct view of the reasons, upon which I assert this.

I will enter upon them in my next.

I was going to write Adieu, when it came into my thoughts, that though you may not be a stranger to the much censured doctrine of our countryman *Pelagius*—a stranger to his having denied *Original Sin*; you may, perhaps, have never heard how
he

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he accounted for the depravity, so manifest in the whole of our race—He ascribed it to *Imitation*. Had he said, that Imitation makes some of us very bad, and most of us worse than we otherwise should have been; I think he would not have passed for an Heretic.

I am, &c.

L E T T E R



LETTER II.

SIR,

I Promised you, that you should have the reasons, why I think that there is great danger of your being hurt by vitious acquaintance. The first thing I have here to propose to your consideration is, what I just mentioned at the close of my last—our aptness to imitate.

For many years of our life we are forming ourselves upon what we observe in those about us. We do not only learn their phrase, but their manners. You perceive among whom we were educated, not more plainly by our idiom, than by our behaviour. The cottage offers you a brood, with all the rusticity and savageness of its grown inhabitants. The civility and courtesy, which, in a well ordered family, are constantly seen by its younger members,
fail

fail not to influence their deportment ; and will, whatever their natural *brutality* may be, dispose them to check its appearance, and express an averfeness from what is rude and disgusting. Let the descendant of the meanest be placed, from his infancy, where he perceives every one mindful of decorum ; the marks of his *extraction* are soon obliterated ; at least, his carriage does not discover it : And were the heir of his *Grace* to be continually in the kitchen or stables, you would soon only know the young Lord by his cloaths and title : In other respects, you would judge him the son of the groom or the scullion.

Nor is the disposition to imitate confined to our childhood ; when this is past, and the man is to shew himself, he takes his colours, if I may so speak, from those he is near—he copies their appearance^a—he seldom is, what the use of his reason, or

^a Πλατωνος απομιμνισθαι φασι, &c. Familiares aiunt Platonis curvitatē imitatos, & balbutiē Aristotelis, & Alexandri regis colli inflexionem, inque dicendo vocis asperitatem. PLUT. *de Ad. & Am. Diff.*

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what his own inclinations, would make him.^a

Are the opinions of the Generality, in most points, any other, than what they hear advanced by this or that person high in their esteem, and whose judgment they will not allow themselves to question? You well know, that one could not lately go into company, but the first thing said was ---- You have, undoubtedly, read ---- What an excellent performance it is! The fine imagination of its noble author discovers itself in every line. As soon as this noble author seriously disown'd it, all the admiration of it was at an end. Its merit, with those who had most commended it, appeared to be wholly the name of its supposed writer. Thus we find it throughout. It is not *what* is written, or said, or acted, that we examine; and approve or condemn, as it is, in itself, good or bad: Our concern is, who writes, who says, or

^a Non ad rationem, sed ad similitudinem, vivimus.

SEN. *de Vit. beat.*

Incendent libidines tuas adulterorum sodalitia. Si velis vitiis exui, longe a vitiorum exemplis recedendum est.

SEN. Ep. 104.

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does it; and we, accordingly, regard, or disregard it.

Look round the kingdom? There is, perhaps, scarce a village in it, where the seriousness or dissoluteness of the Squire, if not quite a driveller, is not more or less seen in the manners of the rest of its inhabitants. And he, who is thus a pattern, takes his pattern—fashions himself by some or other of a better estate, or higher rank, with whose character he is pleased, or to whom he seeks to recommend himself.*

In what a short space is a whole Nation metamorphosed! Fancy yourself in the middle of the last century. What grave faces do you every where behold! The most dissolutely inclined suffers not a libertine expression to escape him. He who

* Ut cupiditatibus Principum, & vitiis, infici solet tota civitas; sic emendari & corrigi continentia.—Non tantum mali est peccare Principes (quamquam est magnum hoc per seipsum malum) quantum illud, quod permulti imitatores Principum existunt. Nam licet videre, si velis replicare memoriam temporum, qualescumque summi civitatis viri fuerunt, talem civitatem fuisse: quæcumque mutatio morum in Principibus extiterit, eandem in populo secuturam. Cic. de Leg. L. III.

least regards the practice of virtue, assumes its appearance.

None claim, from their stations, a privilege for their vices. The greatest strangers to the *influence* of Religion observe its *form*. The Soldier not only forbears an oath, but reproves it; he may possibly make free with your goods, as having more grace than you, and, therefore, a better title to them; but you have nothing to fear from his lewdness, or drunkenness.—

The Royal Brothers at length land—The Monarchy is restored. How soon then is a grave Aspect denominated a puritanical; Decorum, preciseness; Seriousness, fanaticism! He, who cannot *extinguish* in himself *all sense* of Religion, is industrious to conceal his having *any*—*appears* worse than he *is*—would be thought to favour the crime, that he dares not commit. The lewdest conversation is the politest. No representation pleases, in which Decency is consulted. Every favourite Drama has its Hero a Libertine—introduces the Magistrate, only to expose him as a knave, or a cuckold; and the Priest, only to describe him a profligate or hypocrite.

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How much greater the power of fashion is, than that of any laws, by whatsoever penalties enforced, the experience of all ages and nations concurs in teaching us. We readily imitate, where we cannot be constrained to obey ; and become by Example, what our Rule seeks in vain to make us.

So far we may be all truly styled Players, as we all personate—borrow our characters^a—represent some other—act a part—exhibit those who have been most under our notice, or whom we seek to please, or with whom we are pleased.

As the Chameleon, who is known
To have no colours of his own ;
But borrows from his neighbour's hue
His white or black, his green or blue ;
And struts as much in ready light,
Which credit gives him upon sight,
As if the Rainbow were in tail
Settled on him, and his heirs male :
So the young Squire, when first He comes
From country school to *Will's* or *Tom's* ;

^a Nemo errat uni sibi, sed dementiam spargit in proximos, accipitque invicem. Et ideo in singulis vitia populorum sunt. SEN. Ep. 94.

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And equally, in truth, is fit
To be a Statesman, or a Wit ;
Without one notion of his own,
He saunters wildly up and down ;
Till some acquaintance, good or bad,
Takes notice of a staring lad,
Admits him in among the gang :
They jest, reply, dispute, harangue ;
He acts and talks as They befriend him,
Smear'd with the colours which They
lend him.

Thus, merely, as his fortune chances,
His Merit or his Vice advances.

PRIOR.

I am, &c.



L E T T E R III.

S I R,

MY last endeavoured to shew you, how apt we are to imitate. Let me now desire you to consider the disposition you will be under to recommend yourself to those, whose company you desire, or would not decline.

Conversation, like marriage, must have consent of Parties. There is no being intimate with him, who will not be so with you; and, in order to contract or support an intimacy, you must give the pleasure, which you would receive. This is a truth, that every man's experience must force him to acknowledge: We are sure to seek in vain a familiarity with any, who have no interest to serve by us, if we disregard their humour.

In

In Courts, indeed, where the Art of pleasing is more studied than it is elsewhere, you see people more dexterously accommodat- ing themselves to the turn of those, for whose favour they wish^a; but, wherever you go, you, almost constantly, perceive the same *end* pursued by the same *means*^b, though there may not be the same adroit- ness in applying them. What a proof have you in your own neighbourhood, how effectual these means are!

Did you ever hear *Charles* — tell a good story — make a shrewd observation — drop

^a Εἰ Συρακούσας πασι, &c. Ferunt Syraculis, cum eo venisset Plato, ac Dionysius infano philosophiæ studio ex- arisset, Regiam pulveris plenam fuisse ob multitudinem geometrica tractantem. Postquam Plato gratia excidit, Dionysiusque, philosophia valere iussa, rursus se vino, nugis, libidinique & intemperantiæ, quasi præcipitans, de- dit; consertim universos, velut in Circes ædibus transfor- matos, inscitia, oblivio, fatiditasque occupavit. *PLUT. de Adul. & Am. discr.*

^b Ἀλκιβιάδης Ἀθηναίη μετ' ἄλλους, &c. Alcibiades Athenis diætaria jaciebat, equos alebat, vitamque facetam & grati- osam agebat: ad vivam cutem Spartæ radebatur, palliatus ibat, frigidaque lavabatur. Idem in Thracia militabat ac potabat: ubi ad Tissaphernem ventum est, mollitiæ & luxu atque arrogantia utebatur: hocque modo omnes demulce- bat, eorum se moribus studiisque adsimilans. *PLUT.*

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an expression, which bordered either on wit or humour? Yet he is welcome to all tables—he is much with those, who have wit, who have humour, who are, really, Men of Abilities. Whence is this, but from the approbation he shews of whatever passes? A story he cannot *tell*, but he has a laugh in readiness for every one he *bears*: by his admiration of wit, he supplies the want of it; and they, who have *capacity*, find no objection to the meanness of *his*, whilst he appears always to think as they do. Few have their looks and tempers so much at command as this Man; and few, therefore, are so happy in recommending themselves; but as in *his way* of doing it, there is, obviously, the greatest likelihood of success, we may be sure that it will be *the way* generally taken.

Some, I grant, you meet with, who by their endeavours, on all occasions, to shew a superior discernment, may seem to think, that to gain the favour of any one, he must be brought to their sentiments, rather than they adopt his; but I fear these persons will be found only giving too clear a proof, either how absurdly self-conceit sometimes operates,

operates, or how much knowledge there may be, where there is very little common sense.

Did I, in describing the creature called MAN, represent him as having, in proportion to his bulk, more brains than any other animal we know of; I should not think this description false, though it could be proved that *some* of the Species had scarce any brains at all.

Even where favour is not particularly sought, the very civility, in which he, who would be regarded as a well-bred man, is never wanting, must render him unwilling to avow the most just disapprobation of what his companions agree in acting, or commending. He is by no means to give disgust, and, therefore, when he hears the worst principles vindicated, and the best ridiculed; or when he sees what ought to be matter of the *greatest shame*, done without *any*; he is to acquiesce, he is to shew no token, that what passes is at all offensive to him.

Consider yourself then in either of these situations—desirous to engage the favour of

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the bad man, into whose company you are admitted—or, only unwilling to be thought by him deficient in good manners; and, I think, you will plainly see the danger you should apprehend from him—the likelihood there is, that you should at length lose *the abhorrence* of his crimes, which, when with him, you never express.

Will you ask me, why it is not as *Probable*—that you should reform your vicious acquaintance, as that they should corrupt you? Or, why may I not as well suppose—that they will avoid speaking and acting what will give you offence, as that you will be averse from giving them any—that they will consult your inclinations, as that you will theirs?

To avoid the length, which will be equally disagreeable to both of us, I will only answer—Do you know any instance, which can induce you to think this *Probable*? Are not you apprised of many instances, that greatly weaken the Probability of it?

The vast disproportion, which there is between the numbers of the serious and the dissolute, is so notorious, as to render it

un-

unquestionable—that the influence of the latter far exceeds the influence of the former—that a vicious man is much more likely to corrupt a virtuous, than to be reformed by him. ^a

An answer of the same kind I should have judged satisfactory ; if, with respect to what I had urged in my former Letter, you questioned me—why the readiness to imitate those, with whom we are much conversant, might not as justly encourage you to *hope*, when you associated with the less sober, that they might be won to your regularity ; as occasion you to *fear*, that you should be brought to join in their excesses? The Good have been for so long a space

^a Hæc ipsa magis pertinaciter hærent, quæ deteriora sunt. Nam bona facile mutantur in pejus: nunc quando in bonum verteris vitia? QUINCTIL. Lib. I.

—————Dociles imitandis

Turpibus ac pravis omnes sumus ; & Catilinam
Quocunque in populo videas, quocunque sub axe :
Sed nec Brutus erit, Bruti nec avunculus usquam.

JUV. Sat. XIV.

Omne tempus Clodios, non omne Catones feret. Ad deteriora faciles sumus, quia nec Dux potest, nec Comes deesse : & res etiam ipsa sine Duce, sine Comite procedit. Non primum iter est tantum ad vitia, sed præcepta, &c.

SEN. Ep. 97.

losing

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losing ground among us, and the Bad gaining it ; and these are now become such a prodigious multitude ; that it is undeniable, how much more apt we are to form ourselves on the manners of those, who disregard their duty, than on theirs, who are attentive to it.

You will here be pleased to remark, that I don't consider you as setting out with any reforming views—as conversing with the *immoral*, in order to dispose them to reasonable pursuits ; but that I only apply to you, as induced to associate with them from the easiness of their temper, or the pleasantry of their humour, or your common literary pursuits, or their skill in some of your favourite amusements, or on some such-like account : and then, what I have observed may not appear a weak argument, that they are much more likely to hurt you, than you are to benefit them.

I will close my argument and my Letter, with a passage from a very good Historian, ^a which will shew you the sense of one

^a DIODOR. SIC. Bib. Lib. XII. Sect. 12.

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of the ablest of the ancient Legislators on my present subject.

This writer, mentioning the Laws which Charondas gave the *Thurians*, says—"He enacted a Law with reference to an Evil, on which former Lawgivers had not animadverted, that of keeping bad company. As he conceived that the morals of the Good were sometimes quite ruined by their dissolute acquaintance—that Vice was apt, like an infectious disease, to spread itself, and to extend its contagion even to the best disposed of our Species—In order to prevent this mischief, he expressly enjoined, that none should engage in any intimacy or familiarity with immoral persons—he appointed that an Accusation might be exhibited for keeping bad company, and laid a heavy fine on such as were convicted of it."

Remember Charondas, when you are disposed to censure the caution suggested by,

Dear Sir,

Your, &c.

L E T-



LETTER IV.

S I R,

SIR *Francis Walsingham*, in a Letter to Mr. *Anthony Bacon*, then a very young man, and on his travels, expresses himself thus—"The danger is great that we are
 " subject to, in lying in the company of
 " the worser sort. In natural *bodies*, evil
 " airs are avoided, and infection shunned
 " of them, that have any regard to their
 " health.....There is not so *probable* a
 " reason for the corruptions, that may grow
 " to the *mind* of One, from the *mind* of An-
 " other ; but the *danger* is far *greater*, and
 " the *effects*, we see, more *frequent*: for
 " the number of evil-disposed in mind is
 " greater than the number of sick in bo-
 " dy.....Though the well-disposed
 " will remain some good space without
 " cer-

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“ corruption, yet *Time*, I know not how,
“ worketh a wound into him.
“ Which weakness of ours considered, and
“ easiness of nature, apt to be deceived,
“ look’d into; they do best provide for
“ themselves, that *separate themselves*, as
“ far as they can, from the Bad, and
“ draw as nigh to the Good, as *by any*
“ *possibility* they can attain to.” *

To what I have already said, in proof that we should thus *separate ourselves*, I shall now add two further reasons for our doing it: 1. The wrong inclinations, the proneness to violate some or other part of our duty, which we all find in ourselves. 2. The power which Custom hath, to reconcile us to what we, at first, most dreaded.

Need I tell you, that our natural depravity has not only been the theme of Christian writers; but that the most eminent Heathen Authors—Poets, Historians, Philosophers, join in confessing it?

* *Memoirs of the Reign of Q. Elizabeth*, by Dr. Birch, Vol. I. p. 13.

Where,

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Where, alas! is the man, who has not his wrong tendencies to lament? Whom do you know able to conceal them, to prevent a clear discovery of them in his practice?

According as we are liable to act amiss, we, certainly, must be in more or less danger from associating with those, who either will seek to draw us into guilt—or will countenance us in it—or will diminish our abhorrence of it. Some danger from such company there must be even to him, whose *inclinations* are least faulty; since they may be made worse—they may produce bad actions, the repetition of which would form bad habits; and nothing could be so likely to heighten any depravity of disposition, and carry it to the most fatal lengths of misconduct, as a familiarity with those, who have no dread of guilt, or none that restrains them from complying with the temptations they meet with to guilt.

You may, perhaps, think, that you could be in no danger from any companion, to whose excesses you found not in yourself the least propensity: but believe me, my
Friend,

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Friend, this would by no means warrant your safety.

Though such a companion might not induce you to offend in the very same way, that he doth; he would, probably, make you the offender, that you otherwise never would have been. If he did not bring you to conform to his practice, would he not be likely to insinuate his principles? His disregard to *his duty* would tend to render you indifferent to *yours*: and, while he lessened your general regard to virtue, he might make you a very bad man, though you should continue wholly to avoid his particular crimes.

* The unconcernedness, with which he gave his worst inclinations their scope, could hardly be day after day observed, without making you less solicitous to restrain your own wrong tendencies, and strongly urging you to a compliance with them.

^a Affiduitate quotidiana & consuetudine oculorum assuescunt animi: neque admirantur, neque requirunt rationem earum rerum, quas semper vident.

Cic. *de Nat. Deor.* Lib. II.

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2. The danger there is in conversing with the Immoral will be yet more apparent; if you will, next, attend to the power of Custom in reconciling us to that, which we, at first, most dreaded.

Whence is it, that veteran troops face an enemy, with almost as little concern as they perform their exercise? The man of the greatest courage among them felt, probably, in the first battle wherein he was, a terror that required all his courage to surmount. Nor was this terror, afterwards, overcome by him, but by degrees; every succeeding engagement abated it: The oftener he fought, the less he feared: By being habituated to danger, he learned, at length, to despise it.

An ordinary swell of the Ocean alarms the youth who has never before been upon it; but he, whose *fears* are now raised, when there is nothing that ought to excite them, becomes soon without *any*, even when in a situation, that might justly dismay him: He is calm, when the storm is most

On the Choice of Company. 33

most violent; and discovers no uneasy apprehensions, while the vessel, in which he sails, is barely not sinking.

You cannot, I am persuaded, visit an hospital—survey the variety of distress there—hear the complaints of the sick—see the sores of the wounded, without being yourself in pain, and a sharer of their sufferings.

The constant attendants on these poor wretches have no such concern: With dispositions not less humane than yours, they do not feel the emotions, that you would be under, at this scene of misery; their frequent view of it has reconciled them to it—has been the cause, that their minds are no otherwise affected by it, than yours is by the objects ordinarily before you.

From how many other instances might it be shewn, that the things, which, at their first appearance, strike us with the greatest terror, no sooner become familiar, than they cease to discompose us? Let, therefore, our education have been the carefullest and wisest; let there have been

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used therein all the means likeliest to fix in us an abhorrence of vice; we, yet, cannot be frequently among those, who allow themselves in it, and have as few scruples about the concealment of any crime they are disposed to, as about its commission, without beholding it with abundantly less uneasiness than its first view occasioned us.

When it is so beheld; when what is very wrong no more shocks us—is no longer highly offensive to us; the natural and necessary progress is to a still farther abatement of our aversion from it: And what is of force enough to conquer a strong dislike, may be reasonably concluded well able to effect some degree of approbation^a. How far this shall proceed, will, indeed, depend, in a good measure, upon our temper, upon our constitutional tendencies, upon our circumstances: but surely we are become bad enough, when it is not the consideration of what is amiss in any practice, that with-holds us from it—when we only avoid it, because it is not agreeable

^a Quod exemplo fit, id etiam jure fieri putant.

Cic. Ep. L. IV. Ep. 3.

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to our humour; or, because the Law punishes it; or because it interferes with some other criminal gratification, which better pleases us.

I begun this with an extract from a Letter of *Walsingham*: I will end it with one from a Letter of *Grotius*, when Ambassador in *France*, to his Brother, concerning his Son, whom he had recommended to that Gentleman's care.

After having expressed his wishes, that the young man might be formed a complete Advocate, he concludes thus---“ Above
“ all things I intreat you to cultivate those
“ seeds of knowledge, sown by me in
“ him, which are productive of Piety;
“ and to recommend to him, for companions,
“ such persons, as are themselves
“ careful to make a proficiency therein.”

GROT. Ep. 426.

I am, &c.

^a His concern about the persons, with whom his Son contracted an intimacy is again expressed, Let. 429.



L E T T E R V.

S I R,

WHEN I ended my last, I continued in my chair, thinking of the *Objections* which might be made to what I had written to you. The following then occurred to me.

That, when we are in possession of truth, from fair examination and full evidence, there can be very little danger of our being induced to quit it, either by repeatedly hearing the weak objections of Any to it, or by remarking them to *act* as wrongly as they *argue*—That, as in *Mathematics* the proposition, which we had once demonstrated, would always have our assent, whomsoever we heard cavilling at it, or ridiculing our judgment concerning it: so in *Morals*, when once a due consideration of the
essen-

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essential and unchangeable differences of things hath rendered us certain of what is right and our duty; we can never be made less certain thereof, whatever errors, in judgment or practice, we may daily observe in our associates, or daily hear them absurd enough to defend.—That, when we not only plainly *perceive* the practice of Virtue to be most becoming us—to be what the nature and reason of things require of us; but actually *feel*, likewise, the satisfaction which it affords, the solid pleasure which is its inseparable attendant; there can be *no more ground to suppose*, that our having continually before us the follies and vices of any would lead us to depart from what we know to be fittest, and have experienced to be best for us, than there can be to *believe*, that a man in his wits would leave the food, which his judgment approved and his palate relished, for another sort, which he saw, indeed, pleasing to his companions, but which he was certain would poison them.

How little weight there is in this kind of arguing, I think every one might be convinced, who would attend to his own

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Practice, who would consider the *numerous instances* in which he cannot but condemn it—in which he cannot but acknowledge it contrary to what his present welfare requires it should be.

Let us think the most justly of our duty, and shun, with the greatest care, all who would countenance us in a *departure* from it; we still shall find *that departure too frequent*—we shall experience it so, even when it is truly lamented; and when, to avoid it, is both our wish and our endeavour. And if the influence of truth may receive such hindrance from our *natural depravity*; from this *depravity*, even when we have kept out of the way of all, who would encourage us to favour it; there, surely, must be an high degree of probability, that we shall be yet less mindful of our obligations, when we are not only prompted by our own appetites to violate them, but moved thereto by the counsel and example of those, whose conversation best pleases us; and whose opinions and actions will, therefore, come with a more than ordinary recommendation to us.

The

The assent which we give, upon sufficient evidence, to *moral* truths, could no more be unsettled by ridicule and sophistry, than that which we give to *mathematical* truths, did our minds always retain the same disposition with respect to the one, that they do, as to the other.

With regard to the latter, we are never willing to be deceived—we always stand alike affected towards them : Our *conviction* about them was obtained, *at first*, upon such grounds, as must *always* remain our inducements to preserve it : No lust could be gratified, no interest served, by its acting less forcibly upon us : In its defence the credit of our understanding is greatly concerned. And how vain must ridicule and sophistry be necessarily thought, where their only aim is, that we should acknowledge a superior discernment in those persons, whose opposition increases our contempt of their *ignorance*, by making a plainer discovery of it ?

As for *moral* truths, They are often disagreeable to us—When we have had the

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fullest *evidence* of them, we want not, occasionally, the inclination to overlook it : If, under *some circumstances*, we are ready to acknowledge *its force* ; there are *others*, when we will not give it any attention. Here fancy and hope interpose : A *governing passion* allows us only a faint view of, or wholly diverts our notice from, whatever should be our inducement to restrain it ; and suffers us to dwell on nothing, but what will justify, or excuse, us in giving way to it. Our reluctance to admit, that we have not *judged* as we ought to have done, is strangely abated, when we thereby are set at liberty to *act* as we please.

When the endeavour is to laugh us, or to argue us, out of those principles that we, with much *self-denial*, adhere to ; we shall but feebly oppose its success. He has a strong party on his side within our bosoms, who seeks to make us quit *opinions*, which are still controuling our *affections*. If we are not secure from acting contrary to our *duty*, what cogent proofs soever we have of its being such, and what satisfaction soever we have had in its discharge ; we are highly concerned to avoid every *temptation* to offend :

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offend: and it, undoubtedly, is a very strong one, to *bear* continually what is likeliest to remove the fear of indulging our appetites; and continually to *see*, that they who apply to us *act* as they *advise* — allow themselves in the liberties, they would have us to take; and are under none of the checks, which they prompt us to throw off.^a

Though what we did not relish, and what we thought would speedily destroy us, we might not eat, when our *Companions* shewed themselves fond of it, and pressed us to taste it; yet, if we apprehended *no immediate danger* from their meal — if we were eye-witnesses of its being attended with *none* — if they were continually expressing their high delight in it, and repeating their assurances, that all, either our indifference towards, or dislike of it, was only from prejudice and prepossession; we, very probably, should at length yield, and quit both our disgust of their repast, and

^a — *Monstrata diu veteris trahit orbita culpæ.*

Juv. Sat. XIV.

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our dread of its consequences. And if this might ensue, when we were invited to partake of that, which was less agreeable to our palates; what should be feared, when our company tempted us to *that*, which we could be pleased with, and were only withheld from by such an *apprehension of danger*, as nothing could sooner remove, than our observing those, with whom we most conversed, to be without it?

Reason is, certainly, always on the side of duty. Nor is there, perhaps, any man, who, when he seriously considers what is best for him to do, will not purpose to do that, which is right. But, since we can act without consideration in the most important articles, and nothing is less likely to be considered, than what we find quite customary with others—what we see them act without remorse or scruple; when we are, day after day, eye-witnesses of our associates allowing themselves in a wrong practice, persisting in it without expressing the least dread of its Consequences; it is as absurd to think, that our moral feeling should not be injured thereby, as it is to suppose, that

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our hands would preserve the same softness, when they had been for years accustomed to the oar, which they had when they first took it up ; or, that hard labour would affect us as much when inured to it, as when we entered upon it.


I will, for the present, take my leave of you with an *Italian* Proverb, and an *English* one exactly answerable to it——

Dimmi con chi tu vai, sapro quel che fai.

Tell me with whom thou goest, and I'll tell thee what thou doest.

I am, &c.

LETTER



L E T T E R VI.

S I R,

I Know not what I can add on the present subject of our correspondence, that may be of greater service to you than the following short relation.—I may not, indeed, be exact in every particular of it, because I was not at all acquainted with the *Gentleman*, whom it concerns ; and because many years have passed since I received an account of *him* : but as my information came from persons, on whose veracity I could depend, and as what they told me much affected me when I heard it, and has, since, been very often in my thoughts ; I fear that the melancholy description, which you will here have of human frailty, is but too true in every thing material therein.

At

At the first appearance of —— in Town, nothing, perhaps, was more the topic of conversation, than his merit. He had read much : What he had read, as it was on the most useful subjects, so he was thoroughly master of it ; gave an exact account of it, and made very wise reflections upon it. During his long residence at a distance from our Metropolis, he had met with few, to whom he was not greatly superior, both in capacity and attainments : yet this had not in the least disposed him to dictate, to be positive and assuming, to treat Any with contempt or neglect.

He was obliging to all, who came near him ; talked on the subjects which they best understood, and which would be likeliest to induce them to take their full share of the conversation.

They, who had spent every winter near the *Court*, saw nothing in his behaviour, that shew'd how far he had lived from *it* — nothing which was less suitable to any civility, that could be learned in *it*.

His

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His manners were only less courtly, in their simplicity and purity. He did not, often, directly reprove the *libertine discourse* of his equals; but would recommend himself to none, by expressing the slightest approbation of *such discourse*: He shew'd it did not please him, though he declined *saying* so.

He forbore that invective against the manners of the age, which could only irritate; and thought that, at his years, the fittest censure he could pass on them, would be to avoid them. It seemed, indeed, his particular care, that he might not be represented either as a Bigot, or a Cynic; but yet, as he knew how to defend his principles, so he shew'd himself, on every proper occasion, neither afraid nor ashamed to engage in their defence.

His conversation was among *persons* of his own *Rank*, only so far as Decorum required it should be: *Their* favourite topics were so little to his taste, that his leisure hours, where he could have his choice, were passed among those, who had the most learning and virtue, and, whether distinguished,

or

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or not, by their ancestors worth, would be so by their own.

He had high notions of his duty to his country; but having seen what self-interest-
edness, at length, shew'd itself, where he
had heard the strongest professions of pa-
triotism; it made him very cautious with
whom he engaged, and utterly averse from
determining of any as friends to the Public,
merely because they were opposers of the
Court.

No one judg'd more rightly of the hurt
that must ensue, from irreligion spreading
itself among the common people; and,
therefore, where his example was most re-
marked, and could be most efficacious, he
took particular care, that it should promote
a just reverence of the Deity.

Thus did *A. A.* set out in the world, and
thus behaved, for some years, notwith-
standing the bad examples he had every
where before him, among those of his own
station. In one of the accomplishments of
a Gentleman (though, surely, one of the
very meanest of them) he was thought to
excel; and many fine speeches were made
him

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him upon that account. They were but too much regarded by him; and, gradually, drew him often into the company, that he would have despised, had he heard less of his own praise in it. The compliments so repeatedly paid him by the frivolous reconciled him, at length, to them. As his attachment to them got ground, his seriousness lost it. The Patriot was no more—The zeal he had for the morals of his countrymen abated.—

The tragical conclusion of his Story, let those tell you, who would not feel that concern at the relation of it, which I should do: This you certainly may learn from it—That, as the constant dropping of water wears away the hardest stone, so the continual *solicitations* of the vicious are not to be withstood by the firmest mind—All, who are in the way of them, will be hurt by them—Wheresoever they are used, they will make an impression—He only is secure from their force, who will not hazard its being tried upon him.^a

^a Magna pars sanitatis est hortatores insanix reliquisse, & ex isto cœtu invicem noxio procul abiisse.

In what you have hitherto received from me, I have argued wholly from *your own dispositions*, and endeavoured to shew you, from thence, the danger of having bad companions: See now your danger from *their dispositions*. And, first, let these persons be considered only, in general, as partial to their notions and practices, and eager to defend them.

Whatever our *persuasion* or *conduct* is, we are usually favourable to it; we have our plea for it; very few of us can bear, with any patience, that it should be judged irrational: The approbation of it is a compliment to our understanding, that we receive with pleasure; and to censure it, is such a disparagement of us, as doth not fail to disgust us. I will not say, there are *None* to be found, that give themselves little or no concern, who think or acts as they do; but it is certain, that, ordinarily, we are desirous to be joined in the cause we espouse — we are solicitous to vindicate and spread our opinions, and to have others take the same courses with us. Should I allow you to be as intent on this, as any of your acquaint-

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ance are; yet, pray, consider what you may expect, when you stand alone, or when a majority is against you — when each of them relieves the other in an attack upon you — when this attack is, day after day, repeated—when your numerous opponents join in applauding, or strengthening, or enlivening their several objections to your sentiments; and in treating whatever you can urge in your defence, as absurd, or weak and impertinent — when your peace can only be purchased by your silence — when you find, that there is no hope of bringing those you delight to be with into your opinions, that they confirm each other in opposition to you, and that you can only be agreeable to them, by adopting their maxims and conforming to their manners.

It is next to be considered, what you may fear from an intimacy with the immoral, when they must look upon themselves to be *reproached* by such of their acquaintance, as will not concur with them in their excesses. They cannot but do this; because all who seek either to make them alter their manners, or to weaken their influence upon others,

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others, charge them with what is, really, the highest *reproach* to them; and because they are sensible, that the arguments likeliest to be used by any one for his not complying with them, are grounded on the *mischief* of their conduct, or on its *folly*.

Regard then yourself, as in their place.

Reflect how you would behave towards the man, whose opinion of you was—That you acted either a very criminal or a very imprudent part:^a Reflect, I say, how you would behave towards the person thus judging of you, if you wished to preserve a familiarity with him, but yet was resolved to persist in your notions and practice. You, certainly, would try every method to remove his distaste of them: You would colour them as agreeably, as you possibly could: You would spare no pains to weaken every objection, he could have to them—you would, in your turn, attack his maxims and manners; you would seek to

^a ὁποῖοι οἱ τὰ βέλτιον ζητοῦντες, &c. Suspecti sunt qui meliora quærun, quique amicorum peccatis offendi & ea moleste ferre videntur. Quæ res & Dionem Dionysio, & Salmium Philippo, & Ptolemæo Cleomenem invisum fecit atque perdidit. PLUT. *de Ad. & Am. discr.*

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convince him, upon what slight grounds he preferred them to yours—you would apply to every artifice, that could give them the appearance of being less defensible, or that could incline him to overlook what might be urged in their defence.

And if this might naturally be supposed the part you would act towards others; you ought to expect that they, in the same circumstances, would behave alike towards you. But can you think it prudent to let them try, with what success they may proceed? Would not caution be your most effectual security? Would it not be the wisest method of providing for your safety, to keep out of the way of danger?

You are, further, to look upon those, from associating with whom I would dissuade you, as extremely solicitous to be kept in countenance. The vicious well know, to how many objections their con-

^a Ελασσω κακα παρχεσιν, &c. *Pauciora mala contingunt hominibus ab inimicis, quam amicis. Inimicos enim cum metuant, ab eis cavent: Amicis vero aperti sunt, unde periculis exponuntur, & insidiis ipsorum facile capiuntur.*

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duct is liable: They are sensible, to what esteem *good Morals* are entitled, what *praise* they *claim*, and what they, in the most corrupt times, *receive*.

Virtue is so much for the interest of mankind, that there can never be a general agreement, to deny all manner of applause to the practice of *it*: Such numbers are made sufferers by a departure from *its* rules, that there are few crimes, which meet not with an extensive censure.

You have long since learn'd it to be the language of Paganism itself, That

^a “ *All, who act contrary to what the reason of things requires — who do what is hurtful to themselves or others, must stand self-condemned:*” and you cannot want to be informed, in what light they are seen by those, who do not share their guilt. The endeavour, therefore, of such men, while they are without any purpose of amend-

^a Nulla major poena nequitiae est, quam quod sibi displicet. SEN. *de Ira*, Lib. III.

Unus effectus est vitii displicere sibi. SEN. *de Tranquil. Anim.* c. 2.

Se iudice nemo nocens absolvitur. JUV. Sat. XIII.

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ment, will, unquestionably, be, to make their cause as specious as possible, by engaging Many in its defence ; and to silence censure, by the danger, that would arise from the numbers it would provoke. The motives to this endeavour, when duly reflected on, will fully satisfy us, with what zeal it must be accompanied ; and it may well, therefore, alarm all, on whom its power is likely to be tried — may well induce them to consider seriously, what they have to fear from it, how much their virtue may suffer by it.

I will conclude this with a short story of the Poet *Dante*, for which *Bayle* quotes *Petrarch*. Among other visits made by *Dante*, after his banishment from *Florence*, one was to the then much-famed *Can*, Prince of *Verona*.

Can treated him, at first, with great civility ; but this did not last : and by the little complaisance at length shewn the Poet, he plainly perceived that he ceased to be an acceptable guest.

Scholars,

Scholars, it seems, were not *Can's* favourites—he liked those much better, who studied to divert him; and Ribaldry was by no means the discourse, that least pleased him. Suspecting that this did not raise *Dante's* opinion of him, he one day took occasion to single out the most obnoxious of the libertine crew, that he entertained; and, after high praises given the man, turning to *Dante* he said, *I wonder* how it is, that this mad fellow is *beloved* by us All, as giving us the pleasure which, really, we do not find in your company, wise as you are thought to be.

Sir, answered the Poet, you would not *wonder* at this, if you considered, that our love of Any proceeds from their manners being suitable, and their dispositions similar, to our own.

I am, &c.



LETTER VII.

SIR,

I Have but one thing more to propose to your Consideration, as a dissuasive from associating with the vitious ; and it is—The way, in which they, ordinarily, seek to corrupt those, with whom they converse.

The *Logic* of the immoral contributes but little to increase their numbers, in comparison of what they effect by *raillery* and *ridicule*. This is their *strength* ; they are sensible of its being so ; and you may be assured that it will be exerted against you.* There is nothing that cannot be jested with ;

* Οὐ γὰρ μόνον αἰσχρῶς, &c. Non enim duntaxat, quod apud Phocylidem est—Qui vult esse probus, falli hunc persæpe necesse est : sed & derideri oportet sæpe, & ignominiam ferre, & falsæ dicta, & scurriles insectationes.

PLUT. de Aud.

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and there is nothing that we, universally, bear worse, than to be made the jest of Any.

What reasoning on moral subjects may not have its force evaded by a man of wit and humour; and receive a turn, that shall induce the less considerate to slight it, as weak and inconclusive? The most becoming practice—that which is most our duty, and the importance of which to our present welfare is most evident, a lively fancy easily places in a ridiculous view, and thereby brings it into an utter neglect.

That reverence of the Deity, which the best both ancient and modern writers have so strongly recommended—which the worthiest men in every age have so carefully expressed—which any observation of nature, any attention to our own frame, fails not to inculcate, is yet, by being represented under the garb of Superstition or Fanaticism, seen among us to such disadvantage, that many, our military Gentlemen especially, appear to take a pride in shewing themselves divested of it.

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Conjugal fidelity, though of such moment to the peace of families—to their interest—to the prosperity of the commonwealth, that, by the laws of the wisest and best regulated States, the severest punishment has been inflicted on the violation of it, is, nevertheless, by the levity, with which some have treated it, so much, at present, slighted, that the *Adulterer* is well received: Women, who would think it the grossest affront to have their virtue questioned, who affect the character of the strictest observers of Decorum, shun *him* not—shew *him* the utmost complaisance. Whatever dishonour, in this case, falls on any, it accrues wholly to the injured person.

Can you assign a better reason, why the intemperate, among the meaner people, have so prodigiously increased their numbers, than the banter they use towards such, as they meet with disposed to sobriety,—the mockery, with which they treat it,—the songs and catches, with which they are so plentifully provided, in derision of it?

I cannot give you the very terms of Lord *Shaftesbury*, as I have not his Works; but
I think

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I think I may be certain there is an observation in them to this effect—That, *had the Enemies to Christianity exposed its first Professors not to wild Beasts, but to Ridicule; their endeavours to stop its progress might have had very different success from what they experienced.*

Had the wit of man been only concerned in the spreading that *Religion*, I believe the conjecture well founded. But this success could no more have affected the truth of that *Religion*, than it lessens the worth of a public spirit, of honesty, of temperance, that so many have been laughed out of them—that the jest made of them has occasioned their being so rare among us.

The author of the *Beggars Opera* gives the true character of his *Newgate* tribe, when he exhibits them ludicrous on all pretences to virtue, and thus hardening each other in their crimes. It was the most effectual means to keep up *their* spirits under *their* guilt, and may well be judged the likeliest method of bringing *others* to share it.

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The Duke of Buckingham, says a late Writer, had the art of turning persons or things into ridicule, beyond any man of the Age. He possessed the young King [Charles II.] with very ill principles, both as to Religion and Morality, and with a very mean opinion of his Father, whose stiffness was, with him, a subject of raillery. It is elsewhere observed, That, to make way for the ruin of the Lord Clarendon, He often acted and mimicked him in the King's presence, walking stately with a pair of bellows before him, for the purse, and Colonel Titus carrying a fire-shovel on his shoulder, for the mace; with which sort of banter and farce the King was too much delighted.

Such are the impressions, to the disparagement of the best things, and of the best men, that may be made by burlesque and buffoonry: They can destroy the efficacy of the wisest precepts, and the noblest examples.

The Monarch here spoken of may, perhaps, be thought as ill-disposed, as the worst of his favourites; and rather humoured, than corrupted, by the sport they made with all that

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that is, ordinarily, held serious. Were this admitted to be true of him—Were we to suppose his natural depravity not heightened by any thing said or done before him, in derision of virtue or the virtuous: yet the effects of his being accustomed to such representations may be looked upon as extremely mischievous; when we may, so probably, attribute to them the loose he gave to his natural depravity—the little decorum he observed—that utter carelessness to save appearances, whence so much hurt ensued to the morals of his people, and whereby he occasioned such distraction in his affairs, so weakened his authority, so entirely lost the affections of the best of his subjects; and whence that he did not experience still worse consequences, may be ascribed to a concurrence of circumstances, in which his prudence had no share.

The weakness of an argument may be clearly shewn—The arts of the sophister may be detected, and the fallacy of his reasoning demonstrated—To the most subtle objections there may be given satisfactory

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answers: But there is no confuting raillery—the acutest Logician would be silenced by a *Merry Andrew*.

It is to no manner of purpose, that we have *Reason* on our side, when the *Laugh* is against us: and how easy is it, by playing with our words—by a quibble—by the lowest jest, to excite that *Laugh*!

When the company is disposed to attack your principles with drollery, no plea for them is attended to; the more serious you shew yourself in their defence, the more scope you give to the mirth of your opponents.

How well soever we have informed ourselves of the motives to a right conduct, these motives are not attended to, as often as we act: our ordinary practice is founded on the impression, that a former consideration of them has made; which impression is very liable to be weakened—wants frequently to be renewed in the same way, that it was at first produced.

When we continually hear our virtue banter'd as mere prejudice, and our notions
of

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of honour and decorum treated, as the sole effects of our pride being dexterously flattered—When our piety is frequently subjecting us to be derided as childishly timorous, or absurdly superstitious; we soon know not how to persuade ourselves, that we are not more scrupulous than we need to be; we begin to question, whether, in settling the *extent* of our *obligations*, we have sufficiently consulted the *imperfections* of our *nature*—whether our *judgment* is without its bias from our *fears*.

Let our seriousness be exhibited to us in that odd figure, which wit and humour can easily give it; we shall be insensibly led to judge of it, according to its appearance, as thus overcharged; and under the disadvantage, in which it is shewn us: We shall, first, seem unconcerned at the greater liberties, that others take, and, by degrees, proceed to take the very same ourselves.

The person, whom we most highly and justly honoured, if the buffoonry of our companions were constantly levelled at him, would soon have his worth overlooked by us; and, though we might not be brought
to

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to think of him as contemptibly, as they appeared to do; our reverence of him would, certainly, at length abate, and both his advice and example have much less influence upon us.

Of this you shall have an instance in my next.

I will here only add what *Jamblichus* mentions as practised by *Pythagoras*, before he admitted any into his School——He enquired, “Who were their Intimates”——justly concluding, that they, who could like bad companions, would not be much profited by his instructions.

I am, &c.

* De Vit. Pyth. c. 17.

LETTER



LETTER VIII.

SIR,

WHAT follows will discharge the promise, which I made you at the conclusion of my last.

S. was the Oracle of his County: To whatever point he turned his thoughts, he soon made himself master of it. He entered, indeed, so early upon business, that he had little time for books; but he had read those, which best deserved his perusal, and his memory was the faithful repository of their contents.

The helps, that he had not received from reading, he had abundantly supplied the want of, by observation and conversation.

The compass of his knowledge was amazing. There was scarce any thing, of

F

which

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which one in his station ought to be informed, wherein he appeared to be ignorant. Long experience, great sagacity, a ready apprehension, a retentive memory, the resort to him of all sorts of people, from whom any thing could be learned, and an intimacy with some of the worthiest persons of every profession, enabled him to speak on most points with such justness and copiousness, as might induce you to conclude, upon first being with him, that the topic, on which his discourse turned, was what he had particularly and principally attended to. Though he owned himself never to have so much as look'd into the writings of Atheists or Deists; yet, from the promiscuous company he had been obliged to keep, and the freedom, with which all spoke their sentiments to him, there was not, perhaps, a material objection to the Christian Religion, of which he was not apprised, and which he had not well considered.

Sensible of his strength, and ever desirous to use it in the best of causes—in the service of that truth, which operates on men's practice, and would, if attended to, rectify it

it throughout; he did not discourage the most free speakers: He calmly and willingly heard what they could say against his faith, while they used reason and argument; but drollery and jest he failed not, though with great good humour, to reprove, as a species of misrepresentation—as a sure evidence, that truth was not sought—as an artifice, to which none would apply, who were not conscious of their weakness, who did not despair of supporting their notions by rational proofs.

Virtue and true Religion had not, perhaps, an abler Advocate than this Gentleman; but whatever service his tongue might do them, his manners, certainly, did them far greater: He convinced you of their *excellency*, by exhibiting to your senses their *effects*——he left you no room to question how amiable they were, when it was from *their* influence upon him, that *he* so much engaged your esteem and affection; he proved undeniably, how much they should be our *care*, by being himself an instance, how much they contributed to our *happiness*.

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Never, certainly, did Piety fit easier upon any man—Never, perhaps, was any man more esteemed by the very persons, between whose practice and his there was the widest difference.

The superior talents he discover'd, and his readiness to employ them for the benefit of All, who applied to him, engaged alike their admiration and their love.

The obligations, conferred by *Him*, obtained the height of complaisance towards his *Son*. Invitations were made the Youth from all quarters; and there was not a young man of any figure near him, who was not introduced to him, and directed to pay him particular civility. They, who sought to attach him closest to them by consulting his humour, were never without their arguments for *licensing* it. “ True it
“ was, this or that *pursuit* might not be to
“ the taste of his *Father*; but neither did
“ it suit his years—When he was a *Young*
“ *Man*, he, undoubtedly acted, as *One*; he
“ took the diversions, allowed himself in
“ the gratifications, to which Youth in-
“ clines: No wonder that he should now

“ cen-

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“ censure what he could not relish—that
“ he should condemn the draught, which
“ his head could not bear, and be indiffe-
“ rent to the features, which he could not
“ distinguish without his spectacles.”

When this kind of language had abated the reverence, due to so excellent an instructor, the Buffoon interposed still further to weaken his influence; gave an air of affectation to his decorum—of hypocrisy to his seriousness—of timorousness to his prudence—of avarice to his wise œconomy—burlesqued the *advice*, that he might be supposed to give, the arguments with which he was likely to support *it*, and the reproof he would naturally use, when he did not see a disposition to follow *it*.

Soon as the young man had attained the age, at which the Law supposes us *sufficiently discreet*, he expressed a most earnest desire to have an opportunity of appearing *so*. Repeated promises were made, that if a proper Allowance was settled on him, and leave given him to chuse a place of abode, there should not be the least mismanagement; the income assigned him should answer every article of expence.

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The Son's importunity was seconded by the fond Mother's, and their joint solicitations prevailed. The Youth was now accessible, at all times, to the most profligate of his acquaintance: And one part of their entertainment, usually, was, to set his excellent Father's maxims and manners in the most disadvantageous light. This failed not to bring on a disregard to both—so entire a disregard to them, that the whore and the card-table took up all the hours, which the bottle relieved not.

Thus fell the heir of one of the worthiest of our countrymen!—It was to no purpose, that such an admirable example had been set him by the person, he was most likely to regard—that such particular care had been taken to reason him into a discharge of his duty—that he had been present, when the most subtile Advocates for Irreligion either were silenced, or induced to acknowledge their principles to be much less defensible, than they had hitherto thought them. None of the impressions of what had been done for him, or said to him, or had passed before him, could hold out

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out against Ridicule; it effaced every trace of them, and prepared him to be as bad, as his worst companions could be inclined to make him. How great a neglect of him ensued! They who had laugh'd him out of the reverence due to his parent's worth, rendered him soon despised by All, whose esteem could profit or credit him; and he died in the 70th year of his constitution, when but in the 25th of his age.

I am, &c.



L E T T E R IX.

S I R,

MY last gave you a melancholy instance of the hurt, done by *Ridicule* to the heir of a most worthy man, not many miles from you, What influence it had towards the condemnation of Him, to whom the Epithet of *Divine* might, perhaps, be more properly applied, than to any one, who ever lived under the sole guidance of Reason, has long, you know, been matter of dispute. I will only observe, concerning the Comic Writer's *Ridicule of Socrates*—

I. That, when such a representation could be made of so *Excellent* a person, it demonstrates, that no degree of *worth* can secure *Any person* from an attempt to destroy his credit; and that they, whose
capa-

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capacities fully enable them to discern this *worth*, may be its spitefullest enemies, and bend their wits to disparage it——

2. That, when such a representation could be made by a man of good parts, with any confidence of success, it is, further, an evidence of the probability, that the highest and most just reputation may suffer from Ridicule, and that it may bring into contempt what is entitled to the greatest esteem and honour——

3. That if the *Athenians* were so well pleased ^a with the means, used to lessen the character of this Ornament, not only to his country, but his species, as to render the interposition of a powerful party in the State necessary, to prevent the Poet's abuse from meeting with all the success, he promised himself in it ^b; we are fully taught, what may be the pernicious effects of ingenious drollery—how much it may weaken

^a *Ακρομα εδοξεν ηδιστον, &c.* Hæ nebulae visæ illis acroama suavissimum; & Poetam plausu tanto prosequabantur, quanto nunquam antea.

ÆLIAN. Var. Hist. Vol. I. p. 102.

^b Alcibiadis factio obstitit, quo minus vinceret Aristophanes. Scholia in *πρωτῳ*, *Nubium*, apud ΚΥΗΝ.

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the force of any instruction, or of any example. —

Where violent methods are pursued, in order to withdraw us from any religious *practice* or *opinion*; they who thus oppose it shewing thereby, that *they* look upon *it* as somewhat of great importance, teach *us* to do the same; and often increase our attachment to *it*—render us more earnest about *it*, than we, otherwise, should have been. But where such *practice* or *opinion* is treated as a matter of jest—where it meets with all the slight, that scoffing and laughter can express, we scarcely know how to preserve our regard to it, as a thing of much consequence; and from esteeming it of little moment, we easily proceed to judge it of none at all.

The *force* that is offered us, on account of our persuasion, either occasions such an aversion from him, who applies to it, as prevents his having any influence upon us; or engages us in so careful an attention to the grounds, upon which we formed our judgment, as fixes us in the resolution not to alter it. But when all passes under the appearance of good humour—when only
mirth

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mirth and pleasantry are exerted against us, we neither contract that hatred towards those, by whom we are thus treated, which will be our security from any bad impressions they can make upon us; nor are we excited to any examination of our *principles*, that can confirm us in *them*. The freedom which our companions use, in sporting with what we have hitherto revered, will tempt us to conclude, that its importance is far from being obvious; nor, indeed, can it fail, unless our minds have a more than ordinary firmness, to raise at length some doubt in us, whether we have not been too fanciful or too credulous. And as—

“*The woman, who deliberates, is lost,*” we may fear the man will be so likewise, who suffers himself to question, how well founded his seriousness is, merely because his associates are continually deriding it.

Would you not, industriously, keep out of the way of those, who had power to torture you, and whom you knew ready to do it; if you would not be guided by them, but was determined to think and act, as your own reason should direct? Believe me, Sir, the
Scoffer

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Scoffer should be as much shunned by the friend to virtue, as the Inquisitor by the friend to truth.

Whoever would attain or preserve a just sense of his duty, should have as little intercourse as possible with those who would discourage sincerity—who would oppose it, either by the faggot, or the fair, ^a of *Smithfield*. A very uncommon resolution is required to be steady to the principles, from avowing which we must expect to be the Heroes in a farce; though we need not apprehend that it will make us Victims to the flames.

What *your* temper may be, I cannot affirm; but I really think that, with great numbers, Drollery is not only a species of persecution, but the most dangerous kind of it: they would as soon be scourged, as mocked; be burthened with the cross, as habited with the purple. You can scarcely be enough aware of the risk you run from being jested with, as a Visionary or a Bigot—as one of much whim, or very little penetration.

^a *Bartholomew Fair*, during which Plays and Farces were formerly, from morning to night, the entertainment of the Populace.

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But enough of the inducements, that
vicious companions would be under to cor-
rupt you, and the means they would use
to do it.

The care you should take, in the choice
of your company, will be the subject of but
one Letter more from

X L E T T E R

Your, &c.

A L E I have to add, on what has
lately been the subject of my cor-
respondence with you, will be contained
in this Letter. I will not lengthen it by
apologizing for it.

Might I suppose you to be fortified by a
right disposition, a wide education, good
sense, and a thorough knowledge of the prin-
ciples of the practice enjoined by your
Religion, that every attempt to corrupt
your morals would miscarry; this must
however, you would be sure to find from
being much in the company of vicious men,
that you would be less careful to become
company with them—you would be less
willing to fill your obligations, than you
other

L E T



LETTER X.

SIR,

ALL I have to add, on what has lately been the subject of my correspondence with you, will be contained in this Letter. I will not lengthen it, by apologizing for it.

Might I suppose you so fortified by a right disposition, a wise education, good sense, and a thorough knowledge of the reasonableness of the practice enjoined by your Religion, that every attempt to corrupt your morals would miscarry; this hurt, however, you would be sure to find from being much in the company of vicious men, that you would be less careful to become *eminently virtuous* — you would be less careful to fulfil your obligations, than you other-

otherwise would be. While you saw *others* so much worse than yourself; you would not consider, how much better you ought to be, than you at present are.—While *their* gross faults were avoided, you would not consider, how much there is in *you*, that ought to be amended.

We measure what is, in any way, commendable, by comparing our share of it with that of our neighbour: we don't regard in what degree, as to itself, we possess the Good, but in how greater a degree it is possessed by us, than by others.

Among a very ignorant people, a scholar of the lowest form will pass, both in their and his own judgment, for an adept.

You would, I am sure, pronounce of any Gentleman, who kept mean company, that there was little hope of his ever acting a part, which would greatly credit him: While he loved to be chiefly with those, who would own, and do homage to, his superiority; you would think him by no means likely to cultivate much real worth. And were it to be said, that you should make such a judgment of him,

not

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not because of any impression he would receive *from his companions*, but because of the disposition he shewed in the choice of *them*; I should be glad to know, how that man must be thought affected towards Religion and Virtue, who could be willingly present, where he was sure, that they would be grossly depreciated. Whoever could bear a disparagement of them, must have so little sense of their worth, that we may justly conclude him ill prepared for resisting the attempt, to deprive them wholly of their influence upon him. And, therefore, we may as fitly determine, from the disposition evidenced by him, who keeps *bad* company, what his morals will at length be; as we can determine from the turn of mind, discovered by one who keeps *mean* company, what his figure in the world is likely to be.

Those among us, whose capacities qualify them for the most considerable attainments—who might raise themselves to an equality with the heroes in literature, of the last Century, sit down contented with the superiority they have over their contemporaries—acquiesce in furnishing a bare specimen

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cimen of what they could do, if their genius were roused, if they were to *exert* their abilities. They regard only the advantage they possess over the idle and illiterate, by whom they are surrounded ; and give way to their ease, when they may take it ; and yet appear as considerable in *their* times, as the learned men, we most admire, did in *their respective* ages.

How many could I mention, to whom Nature has been most liberal of her endowments, who are barely in the list of Authors, who have only writ enough to shew how much honour they would have done their country, had their application been called out, and if their names must have been no better known than those of their acquaintance, unless their diligence had equalled their capacity.

What is thus notoriously true of literary desert, is equally so of moral : The persons, to whom we allot a greater share of it, than has long been found in any in their stations, how have they their sense of right withheld from exerting itself, by the few they meet with disposed to animate them to any

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endeavour towards correcting the general depravity — by the connexions they have with such numbers, whose rule is their inclination — by that utter disregard to duty, which they see in most of those, with whom they have an intercourse.

Alas ! in the very best of us, a conviction of what becomes us goes but a little way, in exciting us to practise it. Solicitations to be less observant of it are, from some or other quarter, perpetually offering themselves ; and are by no means likely to be withstood, if our resolutions are not strengthened by the wise counsels and correspondent examples ^a of our associates.

“ Behold ! Young man——You live in
“ an age, when it is requisite to fortify the
“ mind by examples of constancy.”

This *Tacitus* mentions as the speech of the admirable *Thrasea* to the *Quæstor*, sent to tell him, he must die ; and by whom

^a Longum iter est per præcepta, breve & efficax per exempla. Zenonem Cleanthes non expressisset, si eum tantummodo audisset. Vitæ ejus interfuit, secreta perspexit ; observavit illum, an ex formula sua viveret. Plato & Aristoteles, & omnis in diversum itura sapientium turba, plus ex moribus quam ex verbis Socratis traxit. SEN. Epist.

he would have it remarked, with what composure he died.

Nor is it only when our virtue endangers our life, as was then the case, that such examples are wanted. Wherever there is a prevailing corruption of manners; they, who would act throughout the becoming part, must be animated to it by what they hear from, and see in, others, by the patterns of integrity, which they have before them.

We are easily induced to judge some deviation from our rule very excusable; and to allow ourselves in it; when our thoughts are not called off from our own ^a weakness

^a Quid est hoc, Lucili, quod nos alio tendentes alio trahit; & eo, unde recedere cupimus, impellit? Quid colluctatur cum animo nostro, nec permittit nobis quicquam semel velle? Fluctuamus inter varia consilia: nihil libere volumus, nihil absolute, nihil semper. Stultitia, inquis, est, cui nihil constat, nihil diu placet. Sed quomodo, aut quando, nos ab illa revellemus? Nemo per se satis valet, ut emergat: oportet manum aliquis porrigat, aliquis educat. SEN. Ep. 52.

Nulla res magis animos honesta induit, dubiosque & in pravum inclinantes revocat ad rectum, quam bonorum virorum conversatio. Paulatim enim descendit in pectora: & vim præceptorum obtinet, frequenter audiri, aspici frequenter, &c. SEN. Ep. 94.

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and the general guilt: But while we are conversant with those, whose conduct is as unsuitable, as our own, to that of the multitude; we are kept awake to a sense of our obligations—our spirits are supported—we *feel* the courage that we *behold*—we see what can be done by such as share our frail nature; and *we* are ashamed to *waver*, where *they persevere*.

Aristotle^a considers Friendship as of three kinds; One arising from Virtue, Another from Pleasure, and Another from Interest; but justly determines, that there can be no true friendship, which is not founded in Virtue.

The friendship contracted from pleasure, or profit, regards only the pleasure or profit obtained thereby; and ceases, when these precarious motives to it fail: but that, to which Virtue gives birth, not having any accidental cause — being without any dependence on humour or interest — arising wholly from intrinsic worth, from what we are in ourselves, never fluctuates, operates steadily and uniformly, remains firm

^a Ethic. L. VIII. c. 3.

and

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and uninterrupted, is lasting as our lives. That which is the essential qualification of a *friend*, should be the chief recommendation in a *companion*. If, indeed, we have any concern for real worth; with whom should we be more desirous to converse, than with those, who would accompany us, and encourage us, in the pursuit of it?

The same Writer, mentioning the use, that Friends are of to us in every part of life, remarks the benefit, which young men find from them to be — “ That they keep
“ them in their Duty.”

Had he thought, that any thing could have been urged more in behalf of Friendship; he, undoubtedly, would have observed it. And when such is the language of so able an Instructor, and of one who guided himself in his instructions only by the certain, the present advantage, that would attend a conformity to them; the lesson we have here for the choice of company must appear worthy the notice even of those, who will have no other Guides, but Reason and Nature.

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If to keep us steady to our Duty be the best office, that can be done us——If they, who are our friends, will be thus serviceable to us——If the virtuous alone can be our friends, our conversation should be chiefly with the virtuous ; all familiarity with the vicious should be avoided ; we should consider those, who would destroy our virtue, as our enemies——our very worst enemies, whilst endeavouring to deprive us of the greatest Blessing, that it is in our power to obtain.

I am, SIR, &c.



O N
I N
E A T I N G.

Poscis opem nervis, corpusque fidele senectæ :
Esto ; age. Sed grandes patinæ tucetaque crassa,
Annuere his Superos vetuere, Jovemque morantur.

PERS. Sat. II.

Εἰ ἀνθρώπῳ ὀλίγα ἐσθίει καὶ ὀλίγα πίνει, καὶ ὀλίγη
τέλῃ νόσον ἐπάγει. Si quis pauca edat & pauca
bibat, nullum ei morbum adfert. HIPPOCRATES *de Morb.*
L. IV. Sect. 5.



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INTRODUCTION

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O N

Intemperance in Eating.

S E C T. I.

THIS respects the quantity of our food, or the kind of it: If, in either of these, we have no regard to the hurt it may do us, we are guilty of Intemperance.

From transgressing in the quantity of our food a speedier mischief ensues, than from doing so in the quality of it^a: and therein we never can transgress, without being directly admonished of it, by our very constitution. Our meal is never too large, but heaviness comes on—the load on our sto-

^a Cibi, licet sint saluberrimi, nimia assumti in quantitate, magis sanitatem affligunt, quam intemperati, quando parçiori modo assumuntur. HOFFM.

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mach is our instant tormentor ; and every repetition of our fault a caution to us, that we do not any more thus offend. A Caution, alas, how unheeded by us! *Cramm'd like an Englishman*, was, I find, a proverbial expression in *Erasmus's* days ^a—above two hundred years ago.

An error barely in the kind of our aliment gives us, frequently, no present alarm ; and, perhaps, but a very slight one, after we have, for some years, continued in it. In the vigour of youth, scarce any thing we eat appears to disagree with us : we gratify our palate with whatever pleases it ; feeling no ill consequence, and therefore fearing none.^b The inconveniences, that we don't yet find, we hope we shall always escape ;

^a *Haud scio unde natum sit hoc vulgatissimum apud Gallos proverbium, ut, cum hominem vehementer cibo distentum velint intelligi, dicant, Tam satur est, quam Anglus. ERASM. Adag. Chil. 2.*

^b It is a safer conclusion to say—I *have found hurt by this, therefore I will not continue it* ; than this—I *find no offence of this, therefore I may use it*. For, Strength of Nature in Youth covers many excesses, which are owing a man till his Age. Discern the coming on of Years, and venture not to continue the same things always : for there is no defying Age. BACON'S ESS.

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or we then propose to ourselves a restraint upon our appetite, when we experience the bad effects of indulging it.

With respect to the quantity of our food; that may be no excess in one man, which may be the most blameable in another: What would be the height of gluttony in us, if of a weak and tender frame, may be, to persons of much stronger constitutions, a quite temperate meal. The same proportions of food can, likewise, never suit such, as have in them dispositions to particular diseases, and such, as have no evils of that nature to guard against: Nor can they, further, suit those, who are employed in hard labour, and those, who live wholly at their ease—those, who are frequently stirring and in action, and those, whose life is sedentary and inactive. The same man may, also, in the very same quantity, be free from, or guilty of, Excess, as he is young or old ^a—healthy or diseased ^b—as he accustoms his body to fatigue, or to repose.

^a Ciborum quantitas senibus minor esse debet, quam aliis ætatibus. RIVER.

^b Infirmus homo parum alimenti desiderat. HOFFM.

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The influence, that our food has upon our health, its tendency to preserve or to impair our Constitution, is the measure of its temperance or excess.

It may, indeed, so happen, that our diet shall be, generally, very sparing, without allowing us any claim to the virtue of temperance; as when we are more desirous to save our money, than to please our palates, and, therefore, deny ourselves at our own table, what we eat with greediness, when we feed at the charge of others, as, likewise, when our circumstances not permitting us, ordinarily, to indulge our appetite, we yet set no bounds to it, when we have an opportunity of gratifying it.

He is the temperate man, whose health directs his appetite—who is best pleased with what best agrees with him—who eats, not to gratify his taste, but to preserve his life²—who is the same at every table, as at

² *Esse oportet, ut vivas; non vivere, ut edas.*

Cic. ad Her. L. IV.

Ελεγε τις μιν άλλος, &c. Aiebat [Socrates] alios homines vivere ut ederent, se ideo edere ut viveret.

DIOG. LAERT. 95.

Velleius Paterculus, speaking of *Julius Cæsar*, says—*Qui semper & somno & cibo in vitam, non in voluptatem, uteretur.* Lib. II. p. 41.

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his own—who, when he feasts, is not cloy'd; and sees all the delicacies before him, that luxury can accumulate; yet preserves a due abstinence amidst them.

The rules of temperance not only oblige us to abstain from what *now does*, or what we are sure *soon will*, hurt us: we offend against them, when we avoid not whatever has a *probability* of being hurtful to us. They are, further, transgressed by too great nicety about our food—by much solicitude and eagerness to procure what we most relish—by *frequently* eating to satiety.

We have a Letter remaining of an Heathen; who was one of the most eminent persons in an age distinguished by the great men it produced, in which he expresses how uneasy it made him, to be among those, who placed no small part of their happiness in an elegant table, and who filled themselves twice a day. ^a

In thus describing Temperance, let me not be understood to censure, as a failure therein, all regard to the food, that best

^a PLAT. Epist. 7.

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pleases us, when it is equally wholesom with other kinds—when its price is neither unsuitable to our circumstances, nor very great—when it may be conveniently procured—when we are not anxious about it—when we do not frequently seek after it—when we are always moderate in its use.

To *govern* our appetite is necessary; but, in order to this, there is no necessity, that we should always *mortify* it—that we should, upon every occasion, consider what is least agreeable to us.

Life is no more to be passed in a constant self-denial, than in a round of sensual enjoyments. We should endeavour, that it may not be, at any time, painful to us to deny ourselves what is improper for us; and, on that as well as other accounts, it is most fitting that we should frequently practise self-denial—that we should often forego what would delight us.^a But to do

^a Εξίνο & μικρόν, &c. Illud exiguum non est, appetitum posse inhibere, dum adhuc fruendi adest copia: minus enim absentia concupiscunt, qui adsueverunt abstinere præsenti-bus. PLUT. Sympos. 704.

————— Κρατεῖν δε ὀφείλο τὰν δε

Γαστρί μὲν πρᾶσις. ————— PYTHAG. Aur. Carm.

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this continually, I cannot suppose required of us; because it doth not seem reasonable to think that it should be our duty wholly to debar ourselves of that food, which our palate is *formed* to relish, and which we are sure may be used, without any prejudice to our virtue, or our health.

Thus much may suffice to inform us, when we incur the guilt of eating intemperately.

The dissuasives from it, that appear of greatest weight, are these :

It is the grossest abuse of the gifts of Providence.


It is the vilest debasement of ourselves.

Our bodies owe to it the most painful diseases, and, generally, a speedy decay.

It frequently interrupts the use of our nobler faculties, and is sure, at length, greatly to enfeeble them.

The straits to which it often reduces us, occasion our falling into crimes, which would, otherwise, have been our utter abhorrence.

S E C T.



S E C T. II.

TO consider, first, excess in our food as the grossest abuse of the gifts of Providence.

The vast *variety* of *creatures*, with which God has replenished the earth—the abundant provision, which he has made for many of them—the care, which he has taken that each species of them should be preserved—the numerous conveniences they administer to us—the pleasing change of food they afford us—the suitable food that we find, among their different kinds, to different climates, to our different ways of life, ages, constitutions, distempers ; are, certainly, the most awakening call to the highest admiration, and the gratefulest *sense*, of the Divine wisdom and goodness. This sense is properly expressed, by the due application of what is so graciously afforded us—by the application of it to those purposes

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poses, for which it was manifestly intended. But how contrary hereto is his practice, who lives as it were but to eat, and considers the liberality of Providence only as catering for his Luxury! What mischief this luxury doth us will be presently considered; and, in whatsoever degree it hurts us, we to such a degree abuse our Maker's bounty, which *must* design our good—which, certainly, is directed to our welfare. Were we, by indulging our appetites, only to make ourselves less fit for any of the offices of life, only to become less capable of discharging any of the duties of our station; it may be made evident, that, in this respect likewise, our use of the Divine beneficence is quite contrary to what it requires. He who has appointed us our business here—who, by our peculiar capacities, has signified to us our proper employments, thereby discovers to us, how far merely to please ourselves ^a is al-

^a *Victus cultusque corporis ad valetudinem referantur, & ad vires, non ad voluptatem. Atque etiam si considerare volumus, quæ sit in Natura excellentia & dignitas; intelligemus, quam sit turpe diffuere luxuria, & delicate ac molliter vivere; quamque honestum, Parce, Continenter, Severe, Sobrie. Cic. de Off. Lib. I.*

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lowed us; and that, if we do so, to the hindrance of a nobler work, it is opposing his intention; it is defeating the end of life, by those very gifts, which were bestowed to carry us on more chearfully towards it.

When my palate has a large scope for its innocent choice — when I have at hand what may most agreeably recruit my strength, and what is most effectual to preserve it; how great ingratitude and baseness shew themselves in the excess, which perverts the aim of so much kindness, and makes *that* to be the cause of my forgetting with what view I was created, which ought to keep me ever mindful of it! As the bounty of Heaven is one of the strongest motives to a *reasonable life*, how guilty are we if we abuse it to the purposes of a *sensual*! ^a Our crime must be highly aggravated, when the more conveniences our Maker has provided for us, we are so

^a Animus incorruptus, æternus, rector humani generis, agit, atque habet cuncta, neque ipse habetur. Quo magis pravitas eorum admiranda est, qui, dediti corporis gaudiis, per luxum atque ignaviam ætatem agunt; ceterum ingenium, quo neque melius neque amplius aliud in natura mortalium est, incultu atque fœcordia torpescere sinunt.

SALLUST. Bell. Jugurth.

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much the more unmindful of the task he has enjoined us—when by his granting us what may satisfy our appetite, we are induced wholly to consult it, and make ourselves slaves to it.

Let Intemperance in our food be next considered, as the shamefullest debasement of ourselves.

Life; as we have been wisely taught to consider it, *is more than meat.* Man could not be sent into the world but for quite different purposes, than merely to indulge his palate. He has an understanding given him, which he may greatly improve; many are the perfections, which he is qualified to attain; much good to his fellow-creatures he has abilities to do: and all this may be truly said of all mankind; all of us may improve our reason, may proceed in virtue, may be useful to our fellow-creatures. There are none, therefore, to whom it is not the foulest reproach, that their belly is their God—that they are more solicitous to favour, and thereby to strengthen, the importunity of their appetite, than to weaken and master it, by frequent resistance and re-

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straint. The reasonable Being is to be always under the influence of Reason; it is his excellence, his prerogative, to be so: Whatever is an hindrance to this degrades him, reflects on him disgrace and contempt. And as our reason and appetite are in a constant opposition to each other, there is no indulging the latter, without lessening the power of the former: If our appetite is not governed by, it will govern, our reason, and make its most prudent suggestions, its wisest counsels, to be unheeded and slighted.

The fewer the wants of any being are, we must consider it as so much the more perfect; since thereby it is less dependent, and has less of its happiness without itself. When we raise our thoughts to the Beings above us, we cannot but attribute to the higher orders of them, still farther removes from our own weakness and indigence, 'til we reach God himself, and exempt him from wants of every kind. *

* Εἶπας, ὦ Ἀνθρώπων, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, &c. Videris, O Antipho, felicitatem deliciis & divitiis metiri: ego autem, nul-

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Knowing thus what must be ascribed to natures, superior to ours, we cannot be ignorant, what is our own best recommendation; by what our nature is raised; wherein its worth is distinguished.

To be without any wants is the Divine prerogative; our praise is, that we add not to the number of those, to which we were appointed—that we have none we can avoid—that we have none from our own misconduct. In this we attain the utmost degree of perfection within our reach.

On the other hand, when fancy has multiplied our necessities——when we owe I know not how many to ourselves——when our ease is made dependent on delicacies, to which our Maker never subjected it——when the cravings of our Luxury bear no proportion to those of our natural hunger, what a degenerate race do we become!

lis quidem indigere rebus, divinum; paucissimis vero, illorum esse duco, qui quam proximi Superis sint.

XENOPH. de dict. & fact. Socr.

Ἀργούδους ἀπλῶς ὁ Θεός, &c. Liber est prorsus ab omni egestate Deus: ex humana virtute, quæ minime eget, ea demum absolutissima est & divinissima. *PLUT. 354.*

M. DACIER, in his Note on this passage, says, *Ce sont trois lignes toutes d'or.*

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What do we but sink our rank in the Creation !^a

He whose voraciousness prevents his being satisfied, 'til he is loaded to the full of what he is able to bear, who eats to the utmost extent of what he can eat, is a mere brute, and one of the lowest kind of brutes ; the generality of them observing a just moderation in their food—when duly relieved seeking no more, and forbearing even what is before them. But below any brute is he, who, by indulging himself, has contracted wants, from which nature exempted him ;^b who must be made hungry by art,

^a Miserrimos mortalium judicet, in quantiscunque opibus refulgebunt, ventri ac libidini deditos.

SEN. *de Ben.* Lib. VII.

Τὴν μὲν γαστριμαργίαν, &c. Eos qui gulositates,—lascivias cogitarint, nec ab illis rebus caverint, in asinorum genera, similitumque ferarum formam, indui verisimile est.

PLAT. *Phæd.* 81.

^b Τεχνην γὰρ καὶ νόσον. &c. Priscos (Ægyptios) aiunt ita luxuriam—atque deliciarum studium traduxisse, ut columnam quoque perhibitum sit Thebis in templo positam fuisse, in qua diræ imprecationes inscriptæ fuerint in Meinin Regem, qui primus Ægyptios a tenui, & opum pecuniæque non indigente, victus ratione deduxisset. Dicitur etiam Technatis, qui Bocchorem filium habuit, cum expeditionem in Arabas faceret, & impedimenta morarentur,

must

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must have his food undergo the most unwholsom preparations, before he can be inclined to taste it; only relishing what is ruinous to his health; his life supported by what necessarily shortens it. A part this, which, when acted by him, who has reason, reflection, foresight given him, wants a name to represent it, in the full of its deformity. With privileges so far beyond those of the creatures below us, how great is our baseness, our guilt; if those endowments are so far abused, that they serve us but to find out the means of more grossly corrupting ourselves!

I cannot quit this head, without remarking it to be no slight argument of the dishonour we incur by Gluttony, that nothing is more carefully avoided in all well-bred Company, nothing would be thought by such more brutal and rude, than the discovery of any marks of our having eat in-

obvio cibo suaviter usus, super toro somnum cepisse profundum, eaque re inductum, Meinin fuisse execratum, ac
—execrationem eam in columna incisam posuisse,

PLUT. *de Is. & Osir.* 354.

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temperately ^a—of our having exceeded that proportion of food, which is proper for our nourishment.



S E C T. III.

TO consider, further, excess in our food as hastening our death, and bringing on us the most painful diseases.^b

It is evident, that nothing contributes more to the preservation of life, than Temperance.^c

^a Καὶ νυν δὲ εἰς τὴν ἐμμενείαν μαρτυρία, Ἑ. c. Quin hoc etiam tempore testimonia extant & moderati eorum victus & laborum, quos cibi digerendi causa fuscipiunt. Turpe enim hac etiam tempestate apud Persas habetur exspuere,—& flatus videri plenos. XENOPH. *de Cyri Instit.* Lib. I.

^b Διογένης εἶπεν τῶν οἰκῶν, Ἑ. c. Diogenes dicebat, earum domorum in quibus copia alimenti, multos esse mures:—sic etiam corpora, quæ multum cibi capiant, morbos quoque multos asciscere. СТОВ.

Impotentia Gulæ non inepte generis humani Carnifex nuncupatur. HOFFM.

^c Ασκήσις ὑγίης, Ἑ. c. Valetudinem excolunt citra satietatem cibis vesci, & impigrum esse ad laborem.

HIPP. *de Morb. Vulg.* L. VI.

Ex-

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Experience proves it to be actually so; and the structure of the human body shews that it must be so.

They who describe the Golden Age, or the Age of Innocence, and near a thousand years of life, represent the customary food of it, as the plainest and most simple.

Whether animal food was at all used before the Flood, is questioned: we certainly find, long after it, that *Lot's* making a feast is described by his baking unleavened bread.

Abraham entertained those, whom he considered of such eminence, as that, to use the words of Scripture, *he ran to meet them from the tent-door, and bowed himself to the ground*; *Abraham's* entertainment, I say, of persons thus honoured by him, was only with a calf, with cakes of meal, with butter and milk.

Gideon's hospitality towards the most illustrious of guests shewed itself in killing a kid of the goats; and we read that *Jesse* looked upon this to be a present, which his Prince would not disdain.

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Perhaps my Reader would rather take a meal with some of the worthies of Profane History, than with those, whom the Sacred has recorded.

I will be his Introducer. He shall be a guest at an entertainment, which was, certainly, designed to be a splendid one; since it was made by *Achilles* for three such considerable Persons, as *Phœnix*, *Ajax*, and *Ulysses*; Persons, whom he himself represents as being, of all the *Grecian* chiefs, those whom he most honours.

He will easily be believed herein; for this declaration is scarce sooner out of his mouth, than He and his friends, *Patroclus* and *Automedon*, severally employ themselves in making up the fire—chopping the meat, and putting it into the pot——Or, if Mr. *Pope* be allowed to describe their Tasks on this occasion,

——*Patroclus* o'er the blazing fire
Heaps in a brazen vase three *chines* entire:
The brazen vase *Automedon* sustains,
Which *flesh of porket, sheep and goat* contains:

Achilles

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Achilles at the genial feast presides,
The parts transfixes, and with skill
divides.

— Mean while *Patroclus* sweats the fire to
raise ;

The tent is brighten'd with the rising
blaze."

But who is dressing the fish and fowls?
This feast, alas! furnishes neither. The
Poet is so very bad a Caterer, that he pro-
vides nothing of that kind for his Heroes on
this occasion ; or, on another, even for the
luxurious *Phæacians*. Such Samples these
of *Homer's* entertainments, as will gain en-
tire credit to what is said of them in *Plutarch*,
“ that we must rise almost hungry from
“ them.” *Symp. Lib. II. Qu. 10.*

Should the blind Bard be considered as a
Stroller—keeping low company, and there-
fore, in the Feasts he makes for the Great,
likely more to regard the quantity of the
food, which he provides for them, than the
kind of it: Would you rather be one of
Virgil's Guests, as he lived in an age, when
good eating was understood——conversed
with people of rank——knew what dishes
they

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they liked, and would therefore not fail to place such before them?

You shall then be the Guest of the *Roman* Poet.—Do you chuse beef, or mutton—would you be helped to Pork, or do you prefer Goat's-flesh? You have no stomach for such sort of diet. He has nothing else for you, unless *Polyphemus* will spare you a leg or an arm of one of the poor *Greeks* he is eating; or unless you will join the half-drowned Crew, and take a bit of the Stags, which are dressed as soon as killed; or unless you are a great lover of bread and apples, and in order to satisfy your hunger, will, in the language of *Ascanius*, eat your table.

Dido, indeed, gives *Æneas* and his companions a most splendid entertainment, as far as numerous attendants constitute one; but the Poet mentions nothing, that the Heroes had to eat, except bread; whatever else was got for them he includes in the general term *Dapes*; which, in other parts of the *Æneid*, is applied to all the coarse fare already mentioned.

As the Luxury of mankind increased, their lives shortened: The half of *Abraham's*

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ham's age became regarded as a stretch, far beyond the customary period. So in profane history we find, that when the arts of Luxury were unknown in *Rome*, its seven Kings reigned a longer term, than, afterwards, upon the prevalency of those arts, was compleated by its first twenty Emperors.

Such persons, indeed, among the ancients whose precepts and practice most recommended Temperance in diet, were eminent instances of the benefit accruing from it, in the health preserved, and long life attained, by it.

^a *Gorgias* lived 107 years.

^b *Hippocrates* reached, according to some writers, his 104th year, according to others his 109th.

Pythagoras, of whom it was observed, that he was never known to eat to satiety, lived to near 100 years; if *Jamblichus* may be credited. *D. Laertius* says, that accord-

^a See the Note ^a towards the end of this Section.

^b See p. 87, and the quotations from his piece *de Vict. Rat.* in the next Section, and the Note ^c at the beginning of Sect. 3.

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ing to most writers he was, when he lost his life, in his 90th year. Out of his school came *Empedocles*, who lived, as some say, to 109; and *Xenophilus*, who lived to above 105.

^a *Zeno* lived to 98: His disciple and successor *Cleanthes* to 99.

^b *Diogenes*, when he died, was about 90.

^c *Plato* reached his 81st year; and his follower ^d *Xenocrates* his eighty-fourth.

Lycurgus, the Lawgiver of the *Lacedæmonians*, who, when they obeyed his Laws, were not less distinguished by their ^e abstemiousness than by their fortitude,

^a See the Note * towards the end of Sect 5.

^b Among other instances, mentioned by *Diog. Laertius*, of the wisdom this Sage shewed in educating the children of *Xeniades*, one is—*Εν οίκῳ τε, &c.* Domi quoque ministrare illos debere docebat, cibo tenui ac vili contentos, ac aquæ potu. P. 330.

Εβρα πολλὰκις, &c. Clamabat sæpius, facilem hominum vitam a Diis datam esse, verum occultari illam a quærentibus mellita—& his similia. P. 337. *Τὴν γαστέρα, &c.* Ventrem vitæ Charybdim appellabat. P. 340.

^c See Sect. 1.

^d See Note † towards the end of Sect. 5.

^e *Plutarch* says of their Youth, *Εἰς τὰ συσσιτία, &c.* Ad convivia sicut ad ludum temperantiæ ventitabant. See likewise the Note † towards the end of Sect. 5.

lived

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lived to 85; and their King ^a *Agefilaus* took pay of *Tachos* at 80; afterwards assisted *Nectanebos*; and, having established him in his Kingdom, died, in his return to *Sparta*, at 84.

Cato, the Cenfor, is introduced by *Tully* ^b representing himself as, when in his 84th year, able to assist in the Senate—to speak in the assembly of the people, and to give his friends and dependents the assistance, which they might want from him.

Lucian introduces his Account of long-lived persons, with the observation, that it might be of use, as shewing that they, who took the most care of their Bodies and Minds, lived the longest, and enjoyed the best health.

^a Ηχθη την λεγομένην αγωγήν εν Δακιδαιμονί, σκληράν μιν εσάν τη διαίτη. PLUT. Vol. I. 596. He afterwards says of *Agefilaus*, that, at his return from *Asia*, In oculis fuit civium, ex vitæ & victu suspiciendus.—Non cœnam variavit, &c. 606. His contempt of delicate fare may be further seen, 616.

^b De Senectute, S. 10. *Plutarch* says of him, Την τε σωμαλ^ς εξιν αυτην και διαιτη σωφρονι—πανυ χρησικην ειχι, και προς ισχυν και προς υγίαν ομαλως συνισταν—υδωρ πινειν επι της τραπέζης, πλην ειποδ^ς διψητας περιθλιγας, οξ^ς κτησει.

To

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To come nearer to our own times : the discovery of a new world has confirmed the observations, furnished by the old ; that in those countries, where the greatest simplicity of diet has been used, the greatest length of life has been attained.

Of the ancient Inhabitants of *Virginia* we are told, “ That their chief dish was Maiz, and that they drank only water: That their diseases were few, and chiefly proceeded from excessive heats or colds.” *Atl. Geog.* Vol. V. p. 711. Some of them lived to upwards of 200 years.” PURCHAS, Vol. V. p. 946. “ The Sobriety of the ancient Inhabitants of *Florida* lengthen’d their lives in such sort, that one of their Kings, says *Morgues*, told me, He was three hundred years old ; and his father, whom he then shewed me alive, was fifty years older than himself.” PURCHAS, Vol. V. p. 961.

And if we now search after particular instances of persons, reaching to extreme old age ; it is certain, that we must not resort for them to courts and palaces ; to the dwellings of the great or the wealthy ; but
to

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to the cells of the ^a Religious, or to cottages; to the habitations of such, whose hunger is their sauce, and to whom a wholesome meal is a sufficiently delicate one.

Martha Waterhouse, of the Township of *North Bierley* in *Yorkshire*, died about the year 1711, in the 104th year of her age: Her maiden sister, *Hester Jager*, of the same place, died in 1713, in the 107th year of her age. They had both of them relief from the Township of *Bierley* nigh fifty years. *Abridgment of Phil. Transf.* by JONES, Vol. II. P. 2. p. 115.

Dr. *Harvey*, in his Anatomical Account of *T. Parr*, who died in the 153^d year of his age, says—that, if he had not changed his diet and air, he might, perhaps, have lived a good while longer. His diet was

^a *Sozomen*, having mentioned some particulars of several religious persons, who had retired from the world, and then taking notice of the advanced age of *Paul* the Hermit, who lived an hundred and thirteen years, adds, *Των άλλων δε των δηλωθειτων*——*Reliqui, quos supra memoravimus, Monachi fere omnes diu superstites vixere. Hist. Eccl. L. VI. c. 34.* *Monachi & Eremitæ, qui parce & sicco alimento pascebantur, fuerunt ut plurimum longævi.* BACON. *Hist. Vitæ & Mortis.*

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old cheese, milk, coarse bread, small beer and whey.

Dr. *T. Robinson* says of *H. Jenkins* the fisherman, who lived 169 years, that his diet was coarse and sour.

Dr. *M. Lister*, having mentioned several old persons of *Craven* in *Yorkshire*, says — The food of all this mountainous country is exceeding coarse. *Abr. of Phil. Trans.* by *LOWTHORP*, Vol. III. p. 307, &c.

Buchanan^a speaks of a fisherman in his own time, who married at 100, went out in his little fishing boat in the roughest weather at 140, and at last did not die of any painful distemper, but merely worn out by age. *Rer. Scot. Hist.* Lib. I. ad fin.

^a He says of the Inhabitants of the *Orcades* — In victu quotidiano multum è vetusta parsimonia adhuc vulgus retinet. Itaque perpetua corporis & animi sanitate fere omnes fruuntur. Rari morbis, plerique omnes senio solvuntur: plusque apud eos deliciarum ignorantia, quam apud alios medicorum ars & diligentia, ad salutem tuendam prodest. And a little after, speaking of the Inhabitants of the *Shetland Islands*, of one of which the long-lived fisherman was a native, he says — Victus ratio Hethlandicis eadem quæ Orcadensibus, nisi quod juxta copias domesticas paulo asperior.

Plutarch

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Plutarch mentions our Countrymen as, in his time, growing old at 120. To account for this, as he does, from their Climate, seems less rational, than to ascribe it to their way of living, as related by *Diodorus Siculus*, who tells us——That their diet was simple, and that they were utter strangers to the delicate fare of the wealthy.

In our several neighbourhoods we all of us see, that they who least consult their appetite, who least give way to its wantonness or voraciousness, attain, generally, to years far exceeding theirs, who deny themselves nothing they can relish, and conveniently procure.

Human life, indeed, being exposed to so many thousand accidents, its end being hastened by such a prodigious diversity of means, there is no care we can take of ourselves, in any one respect, that will be our effectual preservative; but, allowing for casualties and difference in constitutions, we every where perceive, that the age of those, who neglect the rules of temperance, is

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of a much shorter date than theirs, by whom these rules are carefully followed.^a

And if we attend to our structure, it must thence be evident that it cannot be otherwise.



S E C T. IV.

THE human body may be considered as composed of a great variety of tubes, in which their proper fluid is in a perpetual motion. Our health is according to the condition, in which these vessels and this fluid are.

The ruptured, or too relaxed, or too rigid state of the one; and the redundancy or deficiency, the resolved or viscid, the acescent or the putrescent state of the other, is a disorder in our frame. Whether our

^a Γοργίας ἠγωνίσθη, ποτὶ δαίτην, &c. Gorgias interrogatus, quonam usus genere *victus* in tantam senectutem progressus esset: Nihil unquam voluptatis gratia se aut *comedis*se aut fecisse dixit. STOB. 548.

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excess be in the quantity or quality of aliment, we must suffer by it, *in some or other of these ways.*

By the stomach being frequently loaded, that fulness of the vessels ensues, by which the fibres are weakened—the circulation becomes languid—perspiration is lessened—obstructions are formed—the humours become viscid and soon putrid.

In the progress to this last state, different diseases take place, according to the general strength or weakness of the solids, or according to the debility of some particular organ; according to the constitution of the air; according to our rest or motion; according to the warmth in which we keep, or the cold, to which we expose ourselves, &c.

Excess may be in the quantity of our food, not only when we eat so, as to burthen the stomach; but, likewise, when our meals bear not a just proportion to our labour or exercise.*

* *Est προδιαγνῶσις μὲν, &c. Est autem & præcognitio antequam ægrotent, & affectus corporum cognitio, utrum cibi labores, an cibos labores superent, an moderate inter*

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We are tempted to exceed in the quantity of our food, by the seasoning of it, or by the variety of it.

The stimulus of sauce serves but to excite a false appetite—to make us eat much more than we should do, if our diet were quite simple.

The effect is the same, when our meal is composed of several kinds of food: their different tastes are so many inducements to excess, as they are so many provocations to eat beyond what will satisfy our natural wants.^a

se habeant. Quodcunque enim superetur, ex eo morbi contingunt; ex mutua vero inter se æquabilitate, sanitas adest. HIPPOCR. *de Vict. Rat.* Lib. III.

^a Multos morbos multa fercula fecerunt. SEN. Ep. 95.

Homini cibus utilissimus simplex. Acervatio ciborum pestifera, & condimento perniciosior. PLIN. *Nat. Hist.* L. XI.

Tria mala eveniunt ob ciborum varietatem; nimium comeditur, minus coquitur, & minus perspiratur. SANCT. Sect. 3.

Plerique statuunt, victum simplicissimum esse optimum; & vix aliud magis ad morborum generationem facere, quam varietatem ciborum in una mensa. SENNERT. T. I.

Ciborum varietas sanitati noxiosissima est. RIVER.

Cibus censetur optimus ille qui simplicissimus. BOER. *Inst. Med.*

And

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And thus, tho' we were never to touch a dish, which had its relish from any the least unwholsom ingredient; tho' our diet were the plainest, and nothing came ever before us, that had any other elegance than from the season, in which it was brought to our table, or the place in which it appeared there; we yet might greatly hurt ourselves; we might be as intemperate, and as speedily destroy ourselves by our intemperance, with roast and boiled meat, as with fricassees and ragouts.

The quality of our aliment may be mischievous to us, either as universally prejudicial to the human *constitution*, or as unsuitable to our own; — unsuitable to the weakness of our whole frame, or to some

Ciborum varietas nimix aviditati apprime lenocinatur, & ad majorem satietatem invitat; eamque ob causam omnino studio ac ratione vitanda est. HOFFMAN.

To these authorities let me add that of our Countryman SYDENHAM: His advice here is, indeed, to persons subject to the Gout; but the reasons he assigns for such advice may induce us to consider it as of general use. Unica ciborum specie singulis partibus vescendum arbitror, cum varia ciborum genera simul ingesta plus ventriculo molestix facessunt, quam unicum, quod omnia ista quantitate exæquet. SYD, *de Pod.* 215.

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defect in the formation of a part of it, or to that taint we have in us, from the diseases or vices of our Parents.

We may be greatly prejudiced by the kind of our food, in many other ways; and we, ordinarily, are so, by not regarding what agrees with the climate, in which we are—what with the country we inhabit—what with the manner of life we lead.

From the great heat that spices occasion, and from the length of time they continue it, we may truly say, that their copious and daily use in food must be injurious to *all* constitutions.

So for salted meats, the hurt that may be feared from them, when they are our constant meals, is easily collected, from the irritation they must cause, in their passage thro' the body—from the injury, that must hence ensue to its finer membranes—from the numerous acrid particles, that must hereby be lodged in the pores of the skin, the obstructions which this must produce, and the large quantity of perspirable matter which will, therefore, be detained in, and, consequently, greatly foul, the blood ----
from

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from the dreadful symptoms, that attend a high degree of the scurvy; the relief of which by vegetables, by fresh meat, by liquids fittest to remove the effects of a muriatic cause, plainly shews them to be owing to such a cause.

Whatever has the haut-gout may be looked upon as consisting of such active particles, as cannot but make our frequent eating of it very dangerous—as must render it much fitter to be used as Physic, than as food.

From a mixture of meats, each of them wholsom in its kind, a bad chyle may be formed: and the rule in Physic is, That an error in the first digestion will not be mended in the second.

A delicate constitution is, speedily, either quite destroyed, or irrecoverably disordered, when the diet is not exactly adapted to it—is not such as least irritates, as least heats, as is most easily concocted, as soonest passes out of the body, and leaves the fewest impurities behind it there.

The

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The weakness, or the wrong formation, of a part of our frame is, generally, a call to the utmost care about our food ; and as our observing this may extend our life, even under either of those circumstances, as far as we could have hoped it would have been prolonged, if we had been without any such defect ; so our failure therein may, in a very short time, be fatal to us.

The most simple aliment will, perhaps, be unable to hinder our feeling, in some degree, the bad consequences of the diseases or irregularities of our parents : but how far they shall affect us, depends, very often, in a great measure, upon ourselves.

They may neither much contract the term, nor much interrupt the comfort, of life ; if we will make hunger our sauce, and, in every meal we eat, regard the distempers we inherit : but early, alas ! and heavy will our sufferings be, our years few and full of uneasiness ; when, without any such regard, our taste is directed by that of the sound and athletic—when the sollicitations

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tions of *appetite* lead us to forget the reasons we have to restrain it.

In this climate and country, where, for so many months in the year, the cuticular discharges are so small—where the air so often, so suddenly, and to so great a degree, varies its equilibrium, and where our vessels, therefore, are as frequently, as suddenly, and as greatly contracted or expanded—where fogs so much abound, and so much contribute to impair the elasticity of our fibres—to hinder the proper both secretions and excretions—to destroy the due texture of the blood, and vitiate our whole habit; it must be obvious, what we have to fear, when our aliment hurts us in the same way with our air—when the one heightens the disorder, to which we are exposed by the other.

An inattention to the nutriment fit for us, when we, seldom, use any exercise, or, always, very gentle—when our life is sedentary, either from the business by which we maintain ourselves, or from our love of ease, or from our literary pursuits, is perhaps, as fatal to us, as almost any instance of

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of wrong conduct, with which we can be chargeable. * By high feeding and little or no exercise, we are not only exposed to the most dangerous diseases, but we make all diseases dangerous: we make those so, which would, otherwise, be slight and easily removed—we do not only subject ourselves to the particular maladies, which have their rise wholly from luxury, but we render ourselves more liable to those, which have no connexion with it. We, then, are among the first, who are seized with the distempers, which the constitution of the air occasions—We are most apt to receive all those of the infectious kind—We take cold whence we might least fear it; and find its immediate consequence, a malignant or an inflammatory fever, or some other disease equally to be dreaded.

A writer in Physic of the first rank asserts, that our diet is the chief cause of all our diseases—that other causes only take effect from the disposition of our body, and the state of its humours.

* Οὐ δύναται εὐθὺς ἀνθρώπῳ ὑγιαίνειν, ἢ μὴ καὶ πόσιν.

HIPP. *de Vict. Rat.* L. I.

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There is, I am persuaded, much truth in this assertion. For, as in countries, where the inhabitants greatly indulge themselves^a, few die of old age; so where a strict temperance is observ'd, few die but of old age. We find, likewise, persons, as *Socrates* for instance^b, who, by their regular living, have preserved themselves from the infection of a disease, that has made the cruellest havock around them. We perceive, also, the restorers of health usually attempting its recovery by some or other discharge, by draining the body in some way or other. And if evacuation is the cure of our disorders, we may justly think, that repletion is their most general cause^c. But if this may admit of a dispute, which, I think, it hardly can do; yet is it on all hands agreed—that there are several distempers, to which few are subject but for want of self-denial in


^a Quid referam innumerabiles morbos, supplicia Luxuriæ? Immunes erant ab istis malis, qui nondum se deliciis solverant, qui sibi imperabant. SEN.

^b Εὐλακτοῦτε ὅτι καὶ τὴν διαίταν, &c. Adeo parce ac temperate vixit (*Socrates*) ut cum Athenas pestis sæpenumero vastaret, solus ipse nunquam ægrotaverit. DIOG. LAERT.

^c Πλησμονὴν ἡλπιε κενώσεις — τα σπαιτὰ τῶν σπαιτῶν ἐστὶν ἀνέμια. HIPPOCR. de Flatibus, & Apb. Sect. 2. 22.

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themselves, or their ancestors——that most of these distempers are of the painfullest sort; and that some of them are such as we for years lament, without the least hope of recovery; and under an absolute certainty, that the longer they continue upon us; the more grievously they will distress us; the acuteness of our sufferings from them will be constantly increasing.



S E C T. V.

LET me, also, consider intemperance in what we eat, as frequently interrupting the use of our nobler faculties; and sure, at length, greatly to enfeeble them^a. How long is it, before we are really ourselves, after our stomach has received its *full load*! ^b

^a Οὐδ' καὶ σαρκῶν ἐμερῆσι σῶμα μὲν ἰσχυρὸν ποιεῖσι--ψυχὴν δὲ ἀσθενεῖα. PLUT. *de Esu Carn.*

^b Confer sudantes, ructantes, refertos epulis, tanquam opimos boves: tum intelliges, qui voluptatem maxime sequantur, eos minime consequi, jucunditatemque victus esse in desiderio, non in satietate. *Tusc. Quæst.* L. V.

Under

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Under it, our senses are dull'd, our memory clouded, heaviness and stupidity possess us : Some *hours* must pass, before our vivacity returns, before reason can again act with its full vigour. The man is not seen to advantage, his real abilities are not to be discover'd, 'til the effects of his gluttony are remov'd, 'til his constitution has thrown off the weight that oppress'd it.

The hours preceding a plentiful meal, or those, which succeed its entire digestion, are, we all find, such, in which we are fittest to transact our affairs, in which all the acts of the understanding are best exerted.

How small a part of his time is, therefore, the luxurious man himself ! What between the length of his repasts — the space during which he is, as it were, stupified by his excess in them — the many hours of *sleep* that he wants to refresh, and of *exercise* to strengthen him ; within how small a compass is that portion of his life brought, in which his rational powers are fitly display'd !

* Ne mente quidem recte uti possumus, multo cibo & potione completi. *Tusc. Quæst.* L. V.

In

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In the vigour of youth, in the full strength of manhood, an uncontrouled gratification of appetite allows only short intervals of clear apprehension, of close attention, and the free use of our judgment: but if, either through an uncommonly firm constitution, or by spending all those hours in exercise, which are not passed at our tables or in our beds, we are enabled, notwithstanding such gratification, to reach a more advanced age; what a melancholy spectacle do we then frequently afford! our memory, our wit, our sense almost wholly destroyed—their remains scarce allowing a conjecture to be formed thence, what they have been—the ruins of the man hardly furnishing a trace of his former ornaments.

Most of those diseases, which luxury brings upon our bodies are, indeed, a gradual impairing of our intellectual faculties: the mind shares the disorder of its companion, acts as that permits, discovers a greater or less capacity, according to the other's more or less perfect state. And as the body, when dead, is totally unfit to be acted upon by the soul; so the nearer it is brought
to

to death by our gluttony, the more we increase its unfitness to display, by how noble a principle it is actuated — what the extent of those abilities is, which the bounty of our infinitely good and powerful Creator has afforded us.

It only remains that I consider, how ruinous the excess I am censuring is to our fortune; and to what a mean dependence, to what vile dishonest practices, it often reduces us.

There are few estates, that can bear the expence, into which what is called an elegant table will draw us. It is not only the price of what is set before us, that we are here to regard, but the waste that the *ministers* to our *luxury* occasion — their rapine — the example they set to all, who are concerned in our affairs, and the disqualification, under which we put ourselves to look into them.

He who is determined to please his palate at any price, infects not only those

^a Τῆς Βοιωτίας ημεας, &c. Bæotos nos Attici crassos, stupidos, stolidos maxime ob voracitatem appellaverunt.

PLUT. de Esu Carn.

about him with his extravagant turn ; but gives them opportunities of defrauding him, which are seldom neglected. His house is the resort of the worst of mankind ; for such they always are, whom a well-spread table assembles ; and who, by applauding the profuseness that feeds them, by extolling as proofs of a refined understanding, what are the surest marks of a weak one, or rather of the total want of one, hurry on the ruin, that was, otherwise, with too much speed advancing.

But small is their number, whom it concerns to be told, how a *large fortune* may be reduced : how the making *any* must be hindered, is the argument, in which the generality are interested. This hindrance is the sure, the undeniable consequence of giving way to our appetite. I have already observed, what hurt our very capacity often receives from it — to what a degree our intellect is at length impaired by it : I may, further, truly represent it as always indisposing us to that diligence, to that application, without which no science is to be master'd, no art learn'd, no business well

con-

conducted, no valuable accomplishment, of any kind, obtained.

Let us have our support, and seek the increase of our store, from our traffick, or from our labour; it is plain, that he who indulges himself less than we do, as he needs less to maintain him than we do, so he can sell, or can work, cheaper, and must, therefore, make those advantages, which we are not to expect; must by his lesser gains be, at length, enriched, while we, with our larger, shall be in a constant poverty.

A still worse effect of our luxurious turn I reckon those mean and base practices, to which it tempts us. When the plain meal, that our scanty circumstances, after a liberal and expensive education, furnish, cannot content us; and we must either live at another's table, or provide a chargeable entertainment at our own; we descend to the vilest flattery, the most servile complaisance; every generous sentiment is extinguished in us; we soon become fully convinced, that he, who will often eat at another's cost, must be subject to another's hu-

mours, must countenance him in his follies—and comply with him in his vices.

Let his favour at length exempt us from so dishonourable an attendance, by furnishing us with the means of having plenty at home : Yet what is plenty to the luxurious ? His wantonness increases with his income ; and, always needy, he is always dependent. Hence no sense of his birth or education, of honour or conscience, is any check upon him ; he is the mean drudge,

* The appellation of Parasite was at first honourable. To τὸ παρασίτη ὄνομα, ἔσ. Parasiti appellatio fuit olim & sancta & venerabilis. Polemon tradidit, nomen illud, nunc sordidum & infame, apud antiquos inveniri sanctum, & perinde ac si dixissent σκευον, id est, ccepulonem, Αἴν. Ε. VI. c. 6.

Εκατηνὸ δασίμονες οἱ Παρασίτοι τολ. Luc. de Par. 848. Et postea, Ταναλλον, ἔσ. Aliarum artium prava quædam ac vilia sunt initia : Parasiticæ vero origo plane generosa. 849.

But when it was found, that, either, the constant guest was only so far welcome, as he was throughout complaisant ; or that they, who loved to eat at another's cost, were always disposed to feed his vanity---would at any time purchase a meal, by paying the most servile homage to the most worthless wretch, who would provide them one : A Parasite then ceased to denote the Friend, who graced your table ; and only expressed the Man, whose vile flattery gained him admission to it.

the

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the abandon'd tool of his feeder, of whoever will be at the charge of gratifying his palate.

So, if our trade be our maintenance, as no fair gains can answer the expence, which what is called good eating occasions, we are soon led to indirect artifices, to fraudulent dealing, to the most tricking and knavish practices.

In a word, neither our health nor life, neither our credit nor fortune, neither our virtue nor understanding, have any security but from our temperance. † The greatest blessings, which are here enjoyed by us, have it for their source.

Hence it is that we have the *fullest* use of our faculties, and the *longest*.

Hence it is, that we fear not to be poor, and are sure to be independent.

Hence disease and pain are removed from us, * our decay advances insensibly, and the

† Λακωνι και Ρωμαιοις νομιμὴν, ἔσ. Lacedæmoniis & Romanis Lex erat, ne cui licitum esset obsonare quicquid, vel quantum, ipsi liberet: Nam civibus quum in aliis rebus temperantiam præceperunt, tum non minime in Mensa.

ÆLIAN. Var. Hist. L. III.

* Πεινὴν διδάσκει και μαθητὰς λαμβάνει· said of Zeno, who died in his 98th year, ἀνοσθὸν και ὑγιὲς διατελεσας, cum sine morbo sanusque semper vixisset. DIOG. LAERT.

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approaches of death are as gentle, as those of sleep.


Hence it is we free ourselves from all temptations to a base or ungenerous action.†

Hence it is that our passions are calm'd, our lusts subdued, the purity of our hearts preserved, and a virtuous conduct throughout made easy to us.^b

When it is made so—when by the ease, which we find in the practice of virtue, we become confirmed therein—render it habitual to us; we have then that qualification for happiness in a future state, which, as the best title to it, affords us the best grounds to expect it.

† Xenocrates, cum Legati ab Alexandro quinquaginta ei talenta attulissent ----- abduxit Legatos ad cenam in Academiam: iis apposuit tantum quod satis esset, nullo apparatu. Cum postridie rogarent eum, cui numerari juberet: Quid! vos hesternæ, inquit, cenula non intellexistis me pecunia non indigere? *Tusc. Quæst. L. V.*


^b Κακὸν ὁδεῖ φηταί, &c. Nihil innasce malum potest in homine qui sapientiæ fundamenta jecerit temperantiam & continentiam. *STOB. Serm. 5.*



Ο Ν
Ι Ν Τ Ε Μ Π Ε Ρ Α Ν C Ε
Ι Ν
Δ Ρ Ι Ν Κ Ι Ν Γ .

Ερωτώ γὰρ το τοιοῦτ', Ἀρὰ σφοδρότερας τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ θυμῶς καὶ ἐρωτὰς ἢ τῶν οἶνων ποσὶς ἐπὶτείνει ; ΚΛ. Πολυγέ.
ΑΘΗ. Τὶ δ' αὖτ' αἰσθήσεις, καὶ μνημῶς, καὶ δόξας, καὶ φρονησεις, πότερον ὡσαύτως σφοδρότερας ; ἢ παμπαν ἀπολείπει ταύτ' αὐτὸν, ἀν' ἀλάκορης τίς τῇ μετῇ γιγνῆναι ; ΚΛ. Ναι, παμπαν ἀπολείπει. ΑΘΗ. Οὐκὲν εἰς ταῦτ' ἀφικνεῖται τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξίῃ τῇ τότε, ὅτε νεῖ^ο ἢ παις. ΚΛ. Τί μὴν ; ΑΘΗ. Ἡκίστα ὅτε τότε αὐτῷ^ο αὐτῷ γιγνῶντο ἐγκρατῆς. ΚΛ. Ἡκίστα. ΑΘΗ. Ἀρ' ἐν ποτηροτάλῳ φαμὲν ὁ τοιῷτῳ ; ΚΛ. Πολυγέ.

PLAT. de Leg. L. I.



THE

ON

INTemperance

IN

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O N

Intemperance in Drinking.

S E C T. I.

THE arguments against Drunkenness, which the common reason of Mankind suggests, are these—

The contemptible figure, which it gives us :

The hindrance it is to any confidence being reposed in us, so far as our secrecy is concerned :

The dangerous advantage, which it affords the crafty and the knavish over us :

The bad effects, which it hath on our health :

The

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The prejudice, which our minds receive from it :

Its disposing us to many crimes, and preparing us for the greatest.

The contemptible figure, which Drunkenness gives us, is no weak argument for avoiding it.

Every Reader has found the *Spartans* mentioned, as inculcating Sobriety on their *Children*, by exposing to their notice the behaviour of their *Slaves* in a drunken fit. They thought, that were they to apply wholly to the Reason of the *Youths*, it might be to little purpose ; as the force of the arguments, which they used, might not be sufficiently apprehended, or the impression thereof might be soon effaced : but when they made them frequently eye-witnesses of all the madness and absurdities, and at length the perfect senselessness, which the immoderate draught occasioned ; the Idea of the *vile change* would be so fix'd in the minds of its beholders, as to render them utterly averse from its cause.

And

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And may we not justly conclude it to be from hence, that the offspring of the persons who are accustomed thus to disguise themselves, often prove remarkably sober? They avoid, in their *riper years*, their parent's crime, from the detestation of it, which they contracted in their *earlier*. As to most other vices, their debasing circumstances are not fully known to us, 'til we have attained a maturity of age, nor can be then, 'til they have been duly attended to: but in our very childhood, at our first beholding the effects of drunkenness, we are struck with astonishment, that a reasonable Being should be thus changed—should be induced to make himself such an object of contempt and scorn. And, indeed, we must have the man in the *utmost* contempt, whom we hear and see in his progress to excess; at first, teasing you with his contentiuousness or impertinence—mistaking your meaning, and hardly knowing his own—then, faltering in his speech—unable to get through an entire sentence—his hand trembling—his eyes swimming—his legs too feeble to support him; til, at length,

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length, you only know the human creature by his shape.

I cannot but add, that were one of any sense to have a just notion of all the silly things he says or does, of the wretched appearance, which he makes in a *drunken fit*, he could not want a more powerful argument against repeating his crime.

But as none of us are inclined to think ill of ourselves, we none of us will know, how far our vices expose us; we allow them excuses, which they meet not with from any but ourselves.

This is the case of All; it is particularly so with the drunken; many of whom their shame would undoubtedly reform, could they be brought to conceive, how much they did to be ashamed of.

Nor is it improbable, that it is this very consideration, how much drunkenness contributes to make a man the contempt of his wife—his children—his servants—of all his sober beholders, which has been the cause, that it has never been the reigning vice among a people of any refinement of manners :

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manners. No, it has only prevailed among the rude and savage, among those of grosser understandings, and less delicacy of sentiment. Crimes, as there are in all men, there must be in all nations; but the more civilized have perceived Drunkenness to be such an offence against common decency, such an abandoning one's self to the ridicule and scoffs of the meanest, that, in whatever else they might transgress, they would not do it in this particular; but leave a vice of such a nature to the wild and uncultivated—to the stupid and undistinguishing part of mankind—to those, who had no notion of propriety of character, and decency of conduct. How late this vice became the reproach of our countrymen, we find in Mr. Camden's Annals. Under the year 1581, he has this observation—
“ The *English*, who hitherto had, of all the
“ northern nations, shewn themselves the
“ least addicted to immoderate drinking, and

^a Drunkenness, says *Montaigne*, seems to me to be a gross and brutish vice. Some vices there are, wherein there is a mixture of knowledge, diligence, valour, prudence, dexterity and cunning; This is totally corporeal and earthly; ----- Other vices discompose the understanding, this totally overthrows it, and renders the body stupid.

“ been

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“ been commended for their sobriety, first
“ learn’d, in these wars in the *Netherlands*,
“ to swallow a large quantity of intoxi-
“ cating liquor, and to destroy their own
“ health, by drinking that of others.”

Some trace of our antient regard to sobriety, we may seem still to retain, in our use of the term, *Sot!* which carries with it as great reproach among us, as *Oivōcages* did among the *Greeks*.

There is a short story, in *Reresby's* Memoirs, very proper to be mentioned under this head.

The Lord Chancellor (*Jefferies*) had now like to have died of a Fit of the Stone; which he virtuously brought upon himself, by a furious Debauch of Wine, at Mr. Alderman *Duncomb's*; where he, the Lord Treasurer, and others drank themselves into that Height of Frenzy, that, among Friends, it was whisper'd, They had stripped into their Shirts; and that, had not an Accident prevented them, they had got upon a Sign-post, to drink the King's health; which was the subject of much Derision, to say no worse.

S E C T.



S E C T. II.

A Second Objection to Drunkenness is, that it hinders any confidence being repos'd in us, so far as our Secrecy is concern'd.

Who can trust the man, that is not master of himself? Wine, as it lessens our caution, so it prompts us to speak our thoughts without reserve*: When it has sufficiently inflam'd us, all the suggestions of prudence pass for the apprehensions of Cowardice; we are regardless of consequences; our foresight is gone, and our fear with it. Here then the artful person properly introducing the

* Ος δ'αν υπερβαλλη ποσει, &c.

Quicunque autem transilierit potus modum, non amplius ille

Sux ipsius linguæ potens est aut mentis.

Loquitur res vanas, quæ viris sobriis turpes videntur, Nihilque non audet perpeti, quum inebrietur.

Ante qui fuerat sapiens, tunc stultus est.

THEOGN.

subject

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subject, urging us to enter upon it—and, after that, praising, or blaming, or contradicting, or questioning us, is soon able to draw from us whatever information he desires to obtain.

Our discretion never outlasts our sobriety. Failings which it most concerns us to conceal, and which, when we are ourselves, we do most industriously conceal, we usually publish, when we have drank to excess. The man is then clearly seen^b, with all the ill nature and bad qualities, from which his behaviour, in his cooler hours, had induced

^a Quemadmodum musto dolia ipsa rumpuntur, & omne quod in imo jacet, in summam partem vis caloris eiecit: sic vino exaestuante, quicquid in imo jacet abditum effertur, & prodit in medium. Onerati mero quemadmodum non continent cibum vino redundante, ita ne secretum quidem: quod suum alienumque est, pariter effundunt. SEN.

Ὡςτε μὴ φαυλὸς, &c. Ut non inepte Æsopum ille increpaverit: Quid quæris, ridiculum caput, illas fenestras, per quas in alterius cogitationes alter potest inspicere? Vinum enim nos aperit ac ostentat, non sinens latere.

PLUT. *Symp.* L. II.

Τὸ ἐν καρδίᾳ τῶν ἡσυχῶν, &c. Quod est in corde Sobrii, id est in lingua Ebrii, ut proverbio fertur.

PLUT. *de Garrulitate.*

^b Omne vitium Ebrietas & intendit & detegit.-----Ubi possedit animum nimia vis vini, quicquid mali latebat emergit. Non facit ebrietas vitia, sed prodit. SEN.

his

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his most intimate friends to believe him wholly free. We must be lost to reflection, to thought, when we can thus far throw off our disguise. And what is it, but our thought and reflection, that can engage our secrecy in any instance—that can ever be a proper check upon our discourse—that enables us to distinguish what we may speak, and on what we ought to be silent? Do we cease to be in a condition to hide the deformities in ourselves, which we most wish to have concealed? On what point, then, is it likely that we should be reserv'd? Whose secrets can he keep, who so foully betrays his own?

It may, *thirdly*, be alledged against Drunkenness, that it gives the crafty and knavish the most dangerous advantage over us.

This vice puts us into the very circumstances, in which every one would wish us to be, who had a view to impose upon us, to over-reach us, or in any way to gain his ends of us.* When the repeated draught

* Of *Bonofus*, that reproach to our country, (for he was *origine Britannus*) of whom it was said, *Non ut vivat natus*

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has disordered us, it is then, that only by complying with our humour, and joining, to appearance, in our madness, we may be deluded into measures the most prejudicial to us, into such as are our own and our families utter undoing.* It is then that our purse is wholly at the mercy of our company; we spend—we give—we lend—we lose. What unhappy marriages have been then concluded! What ruinous conveyances have been then made! How secure soever we may apprehend ourselves from impositions of so very pernicious a nature; yet more or fewer we must have to fear from drunkenness, as the opportunities, which it gives, will constantly be watch'd by all, who have any design upon us: And if we are known frequently to disorder ourselves, all

est, sed ut bibat, the Historian observes---*Si quando legati Barbarorum undecunque gentium venissent, ipsis propinabat, ut eos incbriaret, atque ab his per vinum cuncta cognosceret. Ipse quantumlibet bibisset, semper securus & sobrius.* VOPISC.

* Tunc avidi matronam oculi licentur, graves produnt marito: tunc animi secreta proferuntur. Alii testamenta sua nuncupant: alii mortifera loquuntur, rediturasque per jugulum voces non continent, quam multis ita interemptis.
PLIN. Lib. XIV.

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in our neighbourhood, or among our acquaintance, who are of any seriousness and decency, will be sure to avoid us, and leave us wholly to those, who find their account in associating with us ; who, while they can make us their property, will be, as often as we please, our companions.

A *fourth* argument against Drunkenness is its bad effects upon our health.* Every act of it is a *fever* for a time : and whence have we more reason to apprehend *one* of a longer continuance, and of the worst con-

^a Quamvis calorem aliqualem *vinum* in transitu imperiat, certissimum est tamen fermenta corporis ab eo subjugari, & avocari spiritus naturales atque fugari : unde est, si bene conjicio, quod Bibaces Podagra, Paralyſis, Hydrope, aliisque morbis frigidis perimuntur. Adde quod jugis & immodica vini ingurgitatio corpus, ad instar corporum sceminarum, emollit laxatque. SYDEN.

Omnis generis liquida spirituosae copiosius sumpta partibus sulphureis inflammabilibus non modo intestinam, calidam, & expansivam in sanguine commotionem efficiunt, sed & systolen cordis & omnium impellentium vasorum augendo fluidorum progressum per universum corpus accelerant.----- Auctiori sic facto sanguinis circulo, & crescente aestu, humida & subtilior sanguinis portio, quæ secundum naturam triplo major quam solidi esse debet, plus justo consumitur ; nutritio hinc perditur, partes elanguescunt, & sanguis intemperatus, imo ad coagulum valde pronus, evadit.

HOFFMAN.

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sequence? Our blood thus fired, none can be sure, when the disorder raised in it will be quieted, whether its inflammatory state will admit of a remedy: In several thousands it has been found incapable of any; and what has so frequently happened to *others*, may justly be considered as likely to befall *us*. By the same absurd reliance on a good constitution, thro' which *they* were deceived, *we* may be so likewise.

But supposing the mere fever fit wearing off with the drunken one; how fatal would it prove to be then seized with a distemper of the infectious kind, that was at all malignant! This has often been the case; and when it has been so, the applications of the most skilful have been intirely vain.

Let our intemperance have nothing instantly to dread; for how short a space can it be in such security? The young debauchee soon experiences the issue of his misconduct--soon finds his food disrelished, his stomach weakened, his strength decayed, his body wasted. In the flower of his youth, he often feels all the infirmities of extreme old age; and when not yet in the middle

middle of human life, is got to the end of his own.

If we have attained to manhood, to our full vigour, before we run into the excess, from which I am dissuading ; we may, indeed, possibly be many years in breaking a good constitution : but then, if a sudden stroke dispatch us not ; if we are not cut off without the least leisure given us to implore the mercy of heaven ; to how much uneasiness are we, generally, reserved—what a variety of painful distempers threaten us ! All of them there is very little probability we should escape ; and under which soever of them we may labour, we shall experience its cure hopeless, and its severity the saddest lesson, how dear the purchase was of our former mirth.

There are, I grant, instances, where a long-continued Intemperance has not prevented the attainment of a very advanced age, free from disorders of every kind. But then it is to be considered how rare these instances are ; that it is not, perhaps, one in a thousand, who escapes thus ; that of those, who do thus escape, the far

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greater part owe their preservation to hard working, or to an exercise as fatiguing, as any of the more laborious employments. So that if either our frame be not of an unusual firmness, or we do not labour for our bread, and will not for our health; we cannot be of their number, who have so much as a chance, that they will not shorten their lives by their excess. And when we have this chance, we are to remember, how very little we can promise ourselves from it. We are liable to all the diseases, which, in the ordinary course of things, are connected with Intemperance; and we are liable to all those, from which even Sobriety exempts not; but in this latter case, we have, by no means, the same to hope with the sober, who are easily recovered of what proves mortal to the intemperate.

SECT.



S E C T. III.

TO consider, *firstly*, the unhappy effect of Drunkenness upon our minds.

Every time we offend in it, we are first Madmen, and then Idiots: we first say, and do, a thousand the most ridiculous and extravagant things, and then appear quite void of sense. By annexing these constant inconveniences to drinking immoderately, it seems the design of a wise Providence to teach us, what we may fear from a habit of it---to give us a foretaste of the miseries, which it will at length bring upon us, not for a few hours alone, but for the whole remainder of our lives. What numbers have, by hard drinking, fallen into an incurable distraction! And who was ever for many years a sot, without destroying the quickness of his apprehension, and the strength of his memory? What mere dri-

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vellers have some of the best capacities become, after a long course of excess!

As we drink to raise our spirits, but, by thus raising, we weaken them; so whatever fresh vigour our parts may seem to derive from our wine, it is a vigour which wastes them; which, by being often thus called out, destroys its source, our natural fancy and understanding. 'Tis like a man's spending upon his principal: he may, for a season, make a figure much superior to *his*, who supports himself upon the interest of his fortune; but is sure to be undone, when the other is unhurt.

We meet with, as I have already observed, instances, where an extraordinary happiness of constitution has prevented its entire ruin, even from a course of drunkenness of many years continuance: but I much question, whether there are any instances, that such a course has not been remarkably prejudicial to a good capacity. From all the observations, which we can make on the human frame, it may be fairly supposed, that there are no such instances---that it is not reasonable to think

we

we can be, for many years inflaming our brains, without injuring them—be continually disordering the most delicate parts of our machine, without impairing them. A lively imagination, a quick apprehension, a retentive memory, depend upon parts in our structure, which are much more easily hurt, than such, whose sound state is necessary for the preservation of mere life: and therefore we perceive those several faculties often entirely lost, long before the body drops. The Man is very frequently seen to survive himself—to continue a living creature, after he has, for some years, ceased to be a rational one. And to this deplorable state nothing is more likely to bring us, than a habit of Drunkenness; as there is no vice, that more immediately affects those organs, by the help of which we apprehend, reason, remember, and perform the like acts.

What, *sixthly*, ought to raise in us the utmost abhorrence of Drunkenness is, the consideration of the many crimes, to which it disposes us. He, through whose veins the inflaming potion has spread itself, must
be

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be under a greater temptation to lewdness, than you can think him in any other circumstances : and from the little reasoning, of which he is then capable, as to the difference of the two crimes, would hesitate no more at Adultery than Fornication.

Thus, also, for immoderate anger, contention, scurrility and abuse, acts of violence, and the most injurious treatment of others ; they are all offences, into which Drunkenness is most apt to betray us ; so apt to do it, that you will scarcely find a company drinking to excess, without many provoking speeches and actions passing in it—without more or less strife, before it separates.* We even perceive the most gentle and peaceable, the most humane and civilized, when they are sober, no sooner intoxicated, than they put off all those commendable qualities, and assume, as it were, a new nature—a nature as different from their former, as the most untractable and fiercest of the brute kind are, from the

* Crebræ ut inter vinolentos rixæ, raro conviciis, sæpius cæde & vulneribus transiguntur. TACIT. *de Mor. &c.* Germ. c. 22.

most accomplished and amiable of our own.^a

To some vices drunkenness *disposes* us; and,

Lastly, lays us open to more, and certainly to the greatest. It lays us, indeed, open to *most vices*—by the power, which it gives all sorts of *temptations* over us; and by putting us into a *condition*, in which the *rash* and *pernicious suggestions* of others have an especial influence upon us—in which, a profligate companion is enabled to direct us, almost as he pleases.

It gives all sorts of *temptations* power over us, by disqualifying us for consideration; and by extinguishing in us all regard to the motives of prudence and caution.

^a Obstantem malis conatibus verecundiam Ebrietas removet.----- Tunc libidosus ne cubiculum quidem expectat, sed cupiditatibus suis, quantum petierint, sine dilatione permittit----- tunc petulans non linguam, non manum continet. Crescit insolenti Superbia, Crudelitas sævo, Malignitas livido.-----Fere vinolentiam Crudelitas sequitur; violatur enim exasperaturque sanitas mentis. Quemadmodum difficiles faciunt oculos diutini morbi, etiam ad minimam radii solis offensionem; ita ebrietales continuæ efferant animos. SEN. Ep. 83.

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It makes us ready to follow the *rashest* counsels of our companions ; because, not allowing us to reason upon them, and incapacitating us for the government of ourselves, it, of course, leaves us to the guidance of those, with whom we are most pleased—of those, who give into our excesses.

It, certainly, lays us open to the *greatest* crimes ; because, when we are thoroughly heated by the spirituous draught, we then like what is daring and extravagant^a— we are then turned to bold and desperate undertakings ; and that, which is most licentious, carries then with it the appearance of an attempt, suiting a courageous and undaunted mind. Hence rapes, murders, acts of the utmost inhumanity and barbarity have been *their acts* ; who, when sober, would have

^a Nox, & Amor, Vinumque nihil moderabile suadent ;
Illa pudore vacat ; Liber Amorque metu.

OVID.

Ne quis modici transfiliat munera Liberi,
Centaurea monet cum Lapithis rixa super mero
Debellata ; monet Sithoniis non levis Evius :
Cum fas atque nefas exiguo fine libidinum
Discernunt avidi.----- HOR. Lib. I. Od. 18.

detested

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detested themselves, if such crimes could have entered their *thoughts*.

It may, perhaps, be of use to observe here, what censure has been passed on drunkenness by those, who had only the light of reason for their guide.

It was the saying of one of the wiser Heathen, That a wise man would *drink* wine, but would be sure never to be made *drunk* by it.^a Another of them condemns wine, as betraying even the prudent into imprudence.^b The advice of a third is, Avoid drinking company: if you accidentally come into it, leave it before you cease to be sober; for, when that happens, the mind is like a *chariot*, whose driver is thrown off: As it is then sure to be hurried away at random, so are *we*, when our reason is gone, sure to be drawn into much

^a Οἰνωθησεσθαι μεν, ἢ μεθυσθησεσθαι δε.

ZEN. apud LAERT. 439.

^b Οἷον καὶ φρονέοντα εἰς ἀφροσύνας ἀναβάλλει.

STHEN. apud ATHEN. Lib. X.

----- Οἷον γὰρ ἀνῶγει
 Ηλίο, ος τ' ἐφεικε πολυφρονα περὶ μάλ' αἰεσσαι
 Καὶ δ' ἀπαλόν γελασαι, καὶ τ' ὀρχησασθαι ἀνηκεν
 Καὶ τὴ ἐπ' ὅσον προσηχεν ὅπερ τ' ἀρξήεν αμεινον ΟD. ξ..

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guilt.^a We have one calling Drunkenness the *study of madness*^b; another, a *voluntary madness*.^c He who was asked, how a person might be brought to a dislike of wine? answered, By beholding the indecencies of the drunken.^d

^a ISOCRAT. ad NICOC.

^b Πυθαγορας ελεγε την μεθην μανας ειναι μελετην. STOB. 165.

^c Nihil aliud est Ebrietas quam voluntaria insania. SEN.

^d Αναχαρσις ερωτηδεις, &c. DIOG. LAERT. 66.

I have, in the former Tract, taken notice of the coarse fare, which *Homer* provides for his Heroes: It may not be amiss to remark here, from *Athenæus*, what lessons of sobriety he furnishes --- what his care is to dissuade from drinking to excess. This, indeed, may appear deserving to be more particularly insisted upon, since from the praises which he gives wine he was thought not to have been sparing in the use of it.

The boast that *Aeneas*, heated by liquor, had made of his willingness to fight with *Achilles*, was urged to engage him in a combat, which would have been fatal to him, but that---

The King of Ocean to the fight descends,
Thro' all the whistling darts his course he bends;
Swift interpos'd between the warriors flies,
And casts thick darkness o'er *Achilles'* eyes.

ILIAD, Book XX.

In the Third Book of the *Odyssey*, the discord of the *Greeks*, at a Council called to deliberate about their return, the Poet ascribes to their drunkenness.

Sour with debauch a reeling tribe they came,

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The discountenance, which Drunkenness received among the *Romans*, will be hereafter taken notice of.

With ireful taunts each other they oppose,
'Til in loud tumult all the *Greeks* arose.
Now different counsels ev'ry breast divide,
Each burns with rancour to the adverse side.

In Book the Ninth of the *Odysse*. *Polyphemus* is represented as having his sight destroyed, when he was drunk, by a few of those, whose joint force was not, with respect to his, that of a Child.

-----He greedy grasp'd the heavy bowl,
Thrice drained, and pour'd the deluge on his soul.
.
-----Then nodding with the fumes of wine
Dropt his huge head, and snoring lay supine.
.
Then forth the vengeful instrument I bring;
Urg'd by some present God, they swift let fall
The pointed torment on the visual ball.

In Book the Tenth, The self-denial of *Eurylochus* preserved him from the vile transformation, to which the Intemperance of his companions subjected them.

Soon in the luscious feast themselves they lost,
And drank oblivion of their native coast.
Instant her circling wand the Goddess waves,
To Hogs transforms them, and the Sty receives.

In the same Book the tragical end of *Elpenor* is thus described :

----- A vulgar Soul,
Born but to banquet, and to drain the bowl.

Among

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Among the *Greeks*, by a Law of *Solon*,^a if a chief Magistrate made himself drunk, he was to be put to death. By a Law of *Pittacus*,^b a double punishment was inflicted upon such who, when drunk, had committed any other crime. They were

He, hot and careless, on a turret's height
With sleep repair'd the long debauch of night :
The sudden tumult stirr'd him where he lay,
And down he hasten'd, but forgot his way ;
Full headlong from the roof the sleeper fell,
And snapp'd the spinal joint, and wak'd in Hell.

The drunkenness of *Eurytion*, one of the *Centaurs*, is fatal to him, and to the whole race. OD. B. XXI.

The great *Eurytion* when this frenzy stung,
Pirithous' roofs with frantic riot rung :
His nose they shorten'd, and his ears they slit,
And sent him sober'd home, with better wit.
Hence with long war the double race was curs'd,
Fatal to All, but to th' Aggressor first.

Antinous, who had reproached *Ulysses* as made insolent by wine, dies himself with the intoxicating bowl in his hands. OD. Book XXII.

.
High in his hands he rear'd the golden bowl.
Ev'n then to drain it lengthen'd out his breath ;
Chang'd to the deep, the bitter draught of death.
Full thro' his throat *Ulysses'* weapon past,
And pierc'd the neck. He falls, and breathes his last.

^a DIOG. LAERT, 35.

^b DIOG. LAERT. 48.

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those, by whose Laws he, who drank any greater quantity of wine than was really necessary for his health, suffer'd death.

Thus much as to *their* sentiments on drinking to excess, who had only the light of Nature to shew them its guilt.



S E C T. IV.

LET me, in the next place, suggest such cautions, as ought to be observed by him, whose desire it is to avoid Drunkenness.

Carefully shun the company, that is addicted to it.

Do not sit long among those, who are in the progress towards excess.

If you have often lost the command of yourself, when a certain quantity of liquor has been exceeded, you should be sure to keep yourself always much within that quantity.

M

Make

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Make not strong liquor necessary to your refreshment.

Never apply to it for ease, under cares and troubles of any kind.

Know always how to employ yourself usefully, or innocently to amuse yourself, that your time may never be a burden upon you.

In the first place, Do not associate with those, who are addicted to Drunkenness. This I lay down as a rule, from which it is scarce possible to depart, and keep our sobriety. No man, not the steadiest and wisest of men, is proof against a bad example continually before him. By frequently *seeing* what is wrong, we, first, lose our abhorrence of it, and, then, are easily prevailed with to do it. Where we like our company, we are insensibly led into their manners. It is natural to think we should endeavour to make ourselves agreeable to the persons, with whom we much converse; and you can never make yourself more agreeable to any, at least as a companion, than when you countenance their conduct by imitating it. He who
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associates with the Intemperate, and yet refuses to join in their excesses, will soon find, that he is look'd upon as condemning their practice ; and, therefore, that he has no way of continuing them his friends, but by going into the same irregularity, in which they allow themselves. If his chearfulness, his facetiousness, or wit, endear him to them, and render them unwilling to quit an intercourse with one so qualified to amuse them ; all their arts will be tried to corrupt his sobriety : Where he lies most open to temptation will be carefully watch'd ; and no method left unattempted, that can appear likely to make him regardless of his duty. But who can reckon himself safe, when so much pains will be used to ensnare him ? Whose virtue is secure, amidst the earnest endeavours of his constant companions to undermine it ?

Another caution which I have laid down is, Never sit long among those, who are in the progress towards excess. The expediency of this advice will be acknowledged, if we consider how difficult it is to be long upon our guard—how apt we are to forget

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ourselves, and then to be betrayed into the guilt, against which we had most firmly resolved.

In the eagerness of our own discourse, or in our attention to that of others, or in the pleasure we receive from the good humour of our companions, or in the share we take of their mirth, we may very naturally be supposed unobserving, how much we have drank—how near we are got to the utmost *bounds* of sobriety : These, under the circumstances I have mentioned, may easily be passed by us, without the least suspicion of it—before we are under any apprehension of our danger.

As in disputes, one unadvised expression brings on another, and after a few arguments both sides grow warm, from warmth advance to anger, are by anger spurr'd on to abuse, and thence, often, go to those extremities, to which they would have thought themselves incapable of proceeding : so is it when we sit long, where what gives the most frequent occasion to disputes is before us—where the *intoxicating draught* is circulating ; one invites us to more—our spirits

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
rits rise—our wariness declines--from cheerfulness we pass to noisy mirth—our mirth stops not long short of folly—our folly hurries us to a madness, that we never could have imagined likely to have been our reproach.

If you have often lost the command of yourself, where a certain quantity of liquor hath been exceeded ; you should be sure never to approach that quantity — you should confine yourself to what is much short of it. Where we find that a reliance upon our wariness, upon the steadiness and firmness of our *general resolutions*, has deceived us, we should trust *them* no more ; we should confide no more in *those precautions*, which have already proved an insufficient check upon us. When I cannot resist a temptation, I have nothing left for my security but to fly it. If I know that I am apt to yield, when I am tempted ; the part I have then to act is, to take care that I may not be tempted. Thus only I shew myself in earnest ; hereby alone I evidence, that my duty is really my care.

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We have experienced, that we cannot withdraw from the company we like, exactly at such a point of time--we have experienced, that we sometimes do not perceive, when we have got to the utmost bounds of temperance--we have unhappily experienced, that when it has been known to us, how small an addition of liquor would disorder us, we then have so far lost the power over ourselves, as not to be able to refrain from what we thus fully knew would be prejudicial to us. In these circumstances, no way remains of securing our sobriety, if we will resort to any place where it is at all hazarded, but either having our stint at once before us, or confining ourselves to that certain number of measured draughts, from whence we are sure we can have nothing to fear. And he, who will not take this method--he who will rest in a general intention of sobriety, when he has seen how often that intention has been in vain, how often he has miscarried, notwithstanding it; can never be considered as truly concerned for his past failings, as having seriously resolved not to repeat them. So far as I omit any due precaution against
a crime,

a crime, into which I know myself apt to be drawn, so far I may justly be regarded as indifferent towards it; and so far all my declarations, of being sorry for and determined to leave it, must be considered as insincere.



S E C T. V.

NEVER make any quantity of strong liquor *necessary* to your refreshment. What occasions this to be a fit caution is, That if the quantity we cannot be without is, in the beginning, a very moderate one, it will, probably, soon increase, and become, at length, so great as must give us the worst to fear. The reason, why it is thus likely to be increased, is, that a small draught, by the habitual use of it, will cease to raise our spirits; and therefore, when the design of our drinking is in order to raise them, we shall at length seek to do it by

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a much larger quantity of liquor, than what was wanted for that purpose at first.

It seems to be, further, proper advice on this subject, That we should never apply to strong liquor for ease, under cares, or troubles, of any kind. From fears, from disappointments, and a variety of uneasinesses, none are exempt. The inconsiderate are impatient for a speedy relief; which as the spirituous draught affords, they are tempted to seek it from thence.

But how very imprudent they must be, who would by such means quiet their minds, is most evident. For, is any real ground of trouble removed, by not attending to it—by diverting our thoughts from it? In *many cases*, the evil we would remedy by not thinking upon it is, by that very course, made much more distressing, than it otherwise would have been; nay, sometimes, quite remediless. In *all cases*, the less heated our brain is, and the greater calmness we preserve, the fitter we are to help ourselves; the fitter we are to encounter difficulties, to prevent our being involved

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volved in them; or, if that cannot be, to extricate ourselves speedily from them.

The ease, which liquor gives, is but that of a dream: when we awake, we are again ourselves; we are in the same situation as before, or, perhaps, in a worse. What then is to be the next step? Soon as the stupifying effects of one draught are gone off, another must be taken; the sure consequence of which is, that such a habit of drinking will be contracted, as we shall vainly endeavour to conquer, though the original inducement to it should no longer subsist. To guard against this, as it is of the utmost importance to all of us, so the only certain way is, by stopping in the very first instance; by never seeking, either under care or pain, relief from what we drink, but from those helps, which reason and religion furnish; the only ones, indeed, to which we can wisely resort in any straits; and which are often found capable of extricating us, when our condition seems the most desperate.

A prudent man should never desert himself. Where his own efforts avail him not,
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the care of an over-ruling Providence may interpose, and deliver him. But to borrow support against our troubles from liquor, is an entire desertion of ourselves; it is giving up our state, as an undone one—it is abandoning our own discretion, and relinquishing all hopes of the DEITY's assistance.

Lastly, Know always, how you may usefully employ, or innocently amuse, yourself. When Time is a burden upon us, when we are at a loss how to pass it, our cheerfulness of course abates, our spirits flag, we are restless and uneasy: Here then we are in the fittest disposition, and under the strongest inducements, to resort to what we know will enliven us, and make our hours glide away insensibly. Besides, when we cannot tell what to do with ourselves, it is natural we should seek for those, who are as idle as ourselves; and when such company meet, it is easy to see what will keep them together; that drinking must be their entertainment, since they are so ill qualified for any other.

Idleness has been not unfitly term'd, the Parent of all vices: but none it more frequently

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quently produces than Drunkenness; as no vice can make a greater waste of our time, the chief thing about which the idle are solicitous. On the other hand, he who can profitably busy, or innocently divert, himself, has a sure resort in all humours—he has his spirits seldom depressed; or, when they are so, he can, without any hazard, recruit them—he is so far from seeking a correspondence with such, as are always in a readiness to engage in schemes of intemperance and riot, that he shuns them; his amusements, quite different from theirs, occasion him to be seldom with them, and secure him from being corrupted by them.

This we may lay down as a most certain truth, That our virtue is never safe, but when we have *proper diversions*. Unbent we sometimes must be; and when we know not how to be so in an innocent way, we soon shall be in a guilty. But if we can find full entertainment in what is free from all reproach, in what neither has any thing criminal in it, nor can lead us into what is criminal; then, indeed, and only then, can we be thought in little danger, and not likely to yield to the bad examples surrounding us.

S E C T.



S E C T. VI.

BUT let me consider what the Intemperate say in their excuse.

That any should frequently put themselves into a condition, in which they are incapable of taking the least care of themselves—in which they are quite stupid and helpless—in which, whatever danger threatens them, they can contribute nothing towards its removal—in which they may be drawn into the most shocking crimes—in which all they hold dear is at the mercy of their companions; the excess, I say, which causes us to be in such a situation, none seem disposed to defend: but what leads to it, you find numbers thus vindicating, or excusing.

They must converse—They must have their hours of cheerfulness and mirth—When they are disorder'd, it happens before

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fore they are aware of it—A small quantity of liquor has this unhappy effect upon them—If they will keep up their interest, it must be by complying with the intemperate humour of their neighbours---Their way of life, their business, obliges them to drink with such numbers, that it is scarcely possible they should not be sometimes guilty of excess.

To all which it may be said, That, bad as the world is, we may every where, if we seek after them, find those, whose company will rather confirm us in our sobriety, than endanger it. Whatever our rank, station, profession or employment may be, suitable companions for us there are ; with whom we may be perfectly safe, and free from every temptation to excess. If these are not in all respects to our minds, we must bear with *them*, as we do with *our condition* in this world ; which every prudent person makes the best of ; since, let what will be the change in it, still it will be liable to some objection, and never, entirely, as he would wish it. In both cases we are to consider, not how we shall rid
our-

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ourselves of all inconveniences, but where are likely to be the fewest : and we should judge *that set of acquaintance*, as well as *that state of life*, the most eligible, in which we have the least to fear, from which our ease and innocence are likely to meet with the fewest interruptions.

But mirth, you say, must sometimes be consulted. Let it be so. I would no more dissuade you from it, than I would from seriousness. Each should have its season, and its measure : and as it would be thought by all very proper advice, with respect to seriousness, “ Let it not proceed to melancholy, to moroseness, or to censoriousness ;” it is equally fit advice, with regard to mirth, “ Let wisdom accompany it : Let it not transport you to riot or intemperance : Do not think you can be called merry, when you are ceasing to be reasonable.”

Good humour, cheerfulness, facetiousness, which are the proper ingredients of mirth, do not want to be called out by the repeated draught : it will rather damp them, from the apprehension of the disorder

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der it may soon produce. Whenever we depart from, or endanger, our innocence, we are laying a foundation for uneasiness and grief; nor can we, in such circumstances, be *merry*, if we are not void of all *thought* and *reflection*: and this is, undoubtedly, the most *melancholy* situation, in which we can be conceived, except when we are undergoing the punishment of our folly. The joy, the elevation of spirits proper to be sought after by us, is that alone, which can never be a subject of remorse, or which never will embitter more of our hours than it relieves. And when this may be obtain'd in such a variety of ways, we must be lost to all common prudence, if we will apply to none of them; if we can only find *mirth* in a departure from *sobriety*.

You are, it seems, overtaken, before you are aware of it. This may be an allowable excuse for three or four times, in a man's life; oftener, I think, it cannot be. What you are sensible may easily happen, and must be extremely prejudicial to you, when it does happen, you should be *always aware of*. No one's virtue is any farther his praise, than

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than from the care he takes to preserve it. If he is at no trouble and pains on that account, his innocence has nothing in it, that can entitle him to a reward. If you are truly concerned for a fault, you will necessarily keep out of the way of repeating it; and the more frequent your repetitions of it have been, so much the greater caution you will use for the future.

Many we hear excusing their drunkenness, by the small quantity which occasions it. A more trifling excuse for it could not be made. For if you know how small a quantity of liquor will have that unhappy effect, you should forbear that quantity. It is as much your duty to do so, as it is his duty to forbear a greater quantity, who suffers the same from it, which you do from a lesser. When you know that it is a crime to be drunk, and know likewise what will make you so; the more or less, which will do this, is nothing to the purpose—alters not your guilt. If you will not refrain from two or three draughts, when you are sure that drunkenness will be the consequence of them; it cannot be thought, that any mere
regard

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regard to sobriety keeps you from drinking the largest quantity whatsoever. Had such a regard an influence upon you, it would have an equal one; it would keep you from every step, by which your sobriety could suffer.

As to supporting an interest, promoting a trade, advantageously bargaining for ourselves, by drinking more than is convenient for us; they are, for the most part, only the poor evasions of the insincere, of those who are willing to lay the blame of their misconduct on any thing, rather than on what alone deserves it—rather than on their bad inclinations.

Civility and courtesy, kind offices, acts of charity and liberality will both raise us more friends, and keep those we have firmer to us, than any quantities of liquor, which we can either distribute or drink: and as for mens trade or their bargains, let them always act fairly—let them, whether they buy or sell, shew that they abhor all tricking and imposition—all little and mean artifices; and I'll stake my life, they shall never have reason to object, that, if they

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will *always* preserve their *sobriety*, they must lessen their *gains*.

But were it true, that, if we will resolve never to hazard intoxicating ourselves, we must lose our friends, and forego our present advantage ; they are inconveniences, which, in such a case, we should chearfully submit to. Some pains must be taken, some difficulties must be here encountered ; if we will have any reasonable ground to expect happiness in a future state. Of this even common sense must satisfy us.

Credulous as we are, I think it impossible, that any man in his wits would believe me, if I were to tell him, That he might miss no opportunity of bettering his fortune—that he might remove any evil he had to fear, by whatsoever method he thought proper—that he might throughout follow his inclinations, and gratify his appetites ; and yet rest assured, that his death would be but the passage to great and endless joys. I know not, to whom such an assertion would not appear extremely absurd : notwithstanding which, we, certainly, do not act, as if there were any absurdity

furdity in it, when we make what is evidently our duty give way to our convenience; and rather consider, how profitable this or that practice is, than how right. That, therefore, Sobriety, added to other parts of a virtuous conduct, may entitle us to the so much hoped for reward, we must be sober, under all sorts of discouragements. It rarely, indeed, happens, that we meet with *any*; but to resist the *greatest* must be our resolution, if we will recommend ourselves to the Governor of the Universe — if we will hope for his favour.



S E C T. VII.

THUS much with regard to drunkenness, so far as it is committed by intoxicating ourselves — by drinking, 'til our reason is gone: but as there is yet another way, in which we may offend in it, *viz.* by drinking more than is proper for our

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refreshment; I must on this, likewise bestow a few observations*.

When we drink more than suffices to recruit our spirits, our passions are heightened, and we cease to be under the influence of that calm temper, which is our only safe counsellor. The next advance beyond refreshment is to that mirth, which both draws many unguarded speeches from us, and carries us to many indiscreet actions—which wastes our time, not barely while we are in the act of drinking, but as it unsettles our heads, and indisposes us to attention, to business,---to a close application in any way. Soon as our spirits are raised beyond their just pitch, we are for schemes of diversion and pleasure; we are unfit for serious affairs, and therefore cannot entertain a thought of being employed in them.

Besides, as according to the rise of our spirits, their fall will, afterward, be; it is most probable, that when we find them thus sunk, we shall again resort to what

* *Αναξ περιος οινος, &c.* Semper malum est vinum, quod multum est.

PHILEM. Frag.

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we have experienced the remedy of such a complaint ; and thereby be betrayed, if not into the excesses, which deprive us of our reason, yet into such a habit of drinking, as occasions the loss of many precious hours —impairs our health —is a great misapplication of our fortune, and a most ruinous example to our observers. But, indeed, whence is it to be feared, that we shall become downright sots — that we shall contract a habit of drinking to the most disguising excess ; whence, I say, is this to be feared, if not from accustoming ourselves to the frequent draughts, which neither our thirst ---nor fatigue ---nor constitution requires : by frequently using them, our inclination to them is strengthened ; ^a 'til at length we cannot prevail upon ourselves to leave our cup, while we are in a condition to lift it.

These are objections, in which all are concern'd, whose refreshment, from what they drink, is not their rule in it ; but to men of moderate fortunes, or who are to

^a Hæc necessitas vitium comitatur, ut bibendi consuetudo augeat aviditatem. PLIN. l. 14.

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make their fortunes, other arguments are to be used : these persons are to consider, that even the lesser degree of intemperance, now censured, is generally their utter undoing, thro' that neglect of their affairs, which is its necessary consequence. When we mind not our own business, whom can we think likely to mind it for us? Very few, certainly, will be met with, *disposed* and *able* to do it ; and not to be both, is much the same, as to be neither. While we are passing our time with our chearful companions, we are not only losing the advantages, which care and industry, either in inspecting our affairs, or pursuing our employment, would have afforded us ; but we are actually consuming our fortune—we are habituating ourselves to a most expensive idleness—we are contracting a disinclination to *fatigue* and *confinement*, even when we must become sensible of their necessity, when our affairs must run into the utmost confusion without them. And we, in fact, perceive that, as soon as the scholar, or trader, or artificer, or whoever it is, that has the whole of his maintenance to gain, or has not much to spend, addicts himself only to this lower degree of

intem-

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intemperance—accustoms himself to sit long at his wine, and to exceed that quantity of it which his relief demands, he becomes worthless in a double sense, as deserving nothing, and, if a care greater than his own save him not, as having nothing.

Add to all this, that the very same diseases, which may be apprehended from often intoxicating ourselves, are the usual attendants not only *of frequently drinking* to the full of what we can conveniently bear, but even of doing it in a large quantity. The only difference is, that such diseases come more speedily on us from the former, than the latter cause; and, perhaps, destroy us sooner. But how desirable it is to be long struggling with any of the distempers, which our excesses occasion, they can best determine, who labour under them.

The inconveniences which attend our more freely using the least hurtful of any spirituous liquors have so evidently appear'd—have shewn themselves so many and so great, as even to call for a remedy from the law itself; which, therefore, punishes both those, who loiter away their

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time at their cups, and those, who suffer it to be done in their houses.

A great part of the world, a much greater than all the parts added together, in which the Christian religion is professed, are forbidden all manner of *liquors*, which can cause *drunkenness*; they are not allowed *the smallest quantity of them*; and it would be an offence, which would receive the most rigorous chastisement, if they were *known* to use *any*; their Lawgiver has, in this particular, been thought to have acted according to the rules of good policy; and the Governors of those countries, in which this law is in force, have, from its first reception amongst them, found it of such benefit, as to allow no relaxation of it. I do not mention such a practice as any rule for us: Difference of climates makes quite different ways of living necessary: I only mention it as a lesson to us, that, if so great a part of mankind submit to a total abstinence from *wine and strong drink*, we should use them sparingly, with caution and moderation; which is, certainly, necessary to *our* welfare, whatever may be the effect of entirely forbearing them on theirs.

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In the most admired of all the western Governments, a strict sobriety was required of their women, ^a under the very severest penalties : the punishment of a departure from it was nothing less than capital : and the custom of saluting women, we are told ^b, was introduced in order to discover whether any spirituous liquor had been drank by them.

In this commonwealth the men were prohibited to drink wine 'til they had attained thirty years ^c.

The whole body of soldiery, among this people, had no other draught to enable them

^a Si vinum bibit, si cum alieno viro probri quid fecit, condemnatur. CATO apud A. Gel. l. 10.

^b Non licebat id (vinum) feminis Romæ bibere.----Cato scripsit ideo propinquos feminis osculum dare, ut scirent an temetum olerent. PLIN. l. 14. To the same purpose, *Athenæus* cites *Polybius*, l. 10.

^c Παρὰ Ρωμαίοις ἕτε οἰκτρῆς, &c. Apud Romanos nec famuli nec ingenuæ mulieres vinum bibunt, atque adeo nec adolecentes ingenui ante trigesimum annum. ATHEN. l. 10. 429.

Ælian says that men of Rank did not drink wine 'til their 35th year. L. 2.

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to bear the greatest fatigue — to raise their courage, and animate them to encounter the most terrifying difficulties and dangers, but water sharpen'd with vinegar^a. And what was the consequence of such strict sobriety, observ'd by both sexes? What was the consequence of being born of parents so exactly temperate, and of being train'd up in a habit of the utmost abstemiousness — What, I say, followed upon this, but the attainment of such a firmness of body and mind — of such an indifference to all the emasculating pleasures — of such vigour and fearlessness, that the people, thus born and educated, soon made all opposition fall before them, experienc'd no enemy a match for them — were conquerors, wherever they carried their arms.

By these *remarks* on the temperance of the antient *Romans*, I am not for recalling

^a Adrianus cibus castrensibus in propatulo utebatur, hoc est, Lardo, Caseo, Posca. SPARTIAN.


Plutarch says of *Cato* the elder, --- ὡς ἐν τῇ ἐκστρατείᾳ, &c. Potabat in expeditionibus aquam, extra quam, si immenso æstu sitiret, tum potabat acetum, aut fatiscentibus viribus postremo loco parum vini sumebat. PLUT. in Cat. maj.

Cassius tota vita aquam bibit. SEN.

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customs so quite the reverse of those, in which we were brought up; but some change in our manners I could heartily wish they might effect: and if not induce us to the same sobriety, which was practised by these heathens, yet to a much greater than is practised by the generality of Christians.


customs so quite the reverse of those in which we were brought up; but some change in our manners I could heartily wish they might effect; and if not induce us to the same sobriety, which was practised by these heathens, yet to a much greater than is practised by the generality of Christians.



O N

P L E A S U R E.

Accipite—veterem orationem Architæ Tarentini, magni in primis, & præclari viri : quæ mihi tradita est, cum essem adolescens Tarenti cum Q. Maximo. Nullam capitaliorem pestem, quam Corporis voluptatem hominibus dicebat à natura datam : cujus voluptatis avidæ libidines, temerè, & effrenatè ad potiundum incitarentur. Hinc patriæ proditiones, hinc rerum publicarum everfiones, hinc cum hostibus clandestina colloquia nasci : nullum denique scelus, nullum malum facinus esse, ad quod suscipiendum non libido voluptatis impelleret : stupra vero, & adulteria, & omne tale flagitium, nullis aliis illecebris excitari, nisi voluptatis. Cumque homini sive natura, sive quis Deus nihil mente præstabilius dedisset ; huic divino muneri ac dono nihil esse tam inimicum, quam voluptatem. TUL. de Senect.



RELEASE

[illegible]



O N

P L E A S U R E.

S E C T. I.

To the Honourable —


WHILE you are constantly engaged in the pursuit of knowledge, or in making what you have acquired of use to your fellow-creatures—while information is *your* amusement, and to become wiser is as much your aim, in all the company you keep, as in all the books you read; May I not justly think it matter of astonishment to you, that such numbers of your species should be quite unmindful of all rational improvement—solely intent on schemes of mirth and diversion—passing their lives in a round of sporting and trifling.

If

If every age has its madness, and one is distinguished by its warlike humour, a second by its Enthusiasm, a third by its party and political rage; the distraction of the present may truly be pronounced, its turn to pleasure, so sadly possessing those of each sex and of all ages—those of every profession and employment—the several ranks and orders of men; that they, who are strangers to the sudden changes in human dispositions, are apt to think, that all seriousness and application—all the valuable attainments, which are the reward only of our pains, must, inevitably, be soon lost among us.

I am not out of hopes, that what thus threatens, in the opinion of some, our speedy ruin, and has its very great mischief denied by none, who give it the least attention, will one day receive as remarkable an opposition from your *pen*, as it now does a discouragement from your *example*.

Let, in the mean time, a sincere well-wisher to his countrymen interpose his mean endeavours to serve them—offer to their consideration some, perhaps, not wholly contemptible, arguments against the pursuit, to which

which they are so blameably attached — shew them pleasure in that true light, in which they are unwilling to see it — teach them, not that it should be always declin'd, but that they should never be enslaved to it—represent the dangers, to which it exposes them, yet point out how far it may be enjoy'd with innocence and safety.

Every man seems to be so far free, as he can dispose of himself — as he can maintain a due subordination in the parts of his frame, use the deliberation proper to acquaint him with what is most for his advantage, and, according to the result thereof, proceed to action. I consider each hindrance to the knowledge of our true happiness, or to its pursuit, as, according to its degree, an abridgment of our liberty ; and I think that he may be truly stiled a slave to pleasure, who follows it, wheresoever directed to it by appetite, passion, or fancy. When we listen to their suggestions in the choice of Good, we allow them an authority, that our Creator never intended they should have ; and when their directions in that choice are actually complied with, a lawless

lawless sway ensues—the use of our nobler faculties becomes obstructed—our ability to deliberate, as we ought, on our conduct, gradually fails, and to alter it, at length, wholly ceases.

Our sensual and rational parts are almost in continual opposition : we add to the power of the former, by a thoughtless, idle, voluptuous life ; and to that of the latter by reflection, industry, continence.

As you cannot give way to appetite, but you increase its restlessness, you multiply its demands, and become less able to resist them ; so the very same holds true of every principle that opposes reason : if capable to influence you in one instance, it will more easily do it in a second, gaining ground, 'til its dominion over you becomes absolute.

When the question concerns our angry passions, all are ready to acknowledge the danger of not restraining them, the terrible subjection to which such remissness exposes us. These falling more under the general notice, from the apparency of the disorder, and extent of the mischief which they occasion, a better judgment is ordinarily

narily made of them, than of affections less tumultuous, less dangerous to our associates : but there can be no reason imaginable why Anger, if less carefully watched and resisted, should exercise, at length, the most unhappy tyranny over us, which will not hold as to any passion or lust whatsoever. And as with respect to violent resentment, we are ready to gratify it, whatever it costs us ; so let what will be the passion or lust that governs us, no prudential considerations are a counterpoise for it.

With regard to Pleasure, the fallacy of our reasoning upon it lies here ; we always look upon the enjoyment of it as a single act, as a compliance with our liking in this or that instance : the repetition of that indulgence is not seen under a dependence on any former, or under the least connexion with any future. That such a pursuit should engage us seems to be wholly from our choice ; and this choice is thought to be as free, at the second time of our making it as at the first, and at the twentieth, as at the second. Inclination is never beheld as possible to become constraint—is, I mean, never regarded as capable of being indulged,

'til it cannot be resisted.* No man ever took the road of Pleasure, but he apprehended that he could easily leave it: had he considered his whole life likely to be passed in its windings, the preference of the ways of Virtue would have been indisputable.

But as sensual pursuits could not engage so many, if something very delightful were not expected in them; it will be proper to shew, how unlikely they are to answer such an expectation—what there is to discourage us from attaching ourselves to them.

Consider sensual pleasure under the highest possible advantages, it will yet be found liable to these objections.

First, That its *Enjoyment* is fleeting, expires soon, extends not beyond a few moments: Our spirits sink instantly un-

* Voluptatibus se immergunt, quibus in consuetudinem adductis carere non possunt; & ob hoc miserrimi sunt, quod eo perveniunt, ut illis quæ supervacanea fuerant, facta sint necessaria. Serviunt itaque voluptatibus suis, non fruuntur: & mala sua, quod malorum ultimum est, amant.

SEN. Ep. 39.

Quædæm autem, &c. Fatentur ultro (Epicurei) voluptatem corporis exiguum esse atque momentaneam. PLUT.

der it, if in a higher degree ; nor are they long without being depressed, when it less powerfully affects them. A review here affords me no comfort : I have here nothing delightful to expect from Reflection. The gratifications, in which I have allowed myself, have made me neither wiser nor better. The fruit was relish'd while upon my tongue, but when passed thence I scarcely retain the idea of its flavour.^a

How transitory our pleasures are, we cannot but acknowledge, when we consider, how many we, in different parts of our lives, eagerly pursue, and then wholly decline.

That, which is the high *entertainment* of our Infancy, doth not afford us the least, when this state is passed : What then delights us much in our Youth, is quite tasteless to us, as we approach Manhood ; and our engagements at this period give way to some others, as we advance in age.

Nor do our pleasures thus pass only with our years, but, really, those which best suit

^a Οὐδὲ τοῖς ἐκπεπληγμένοις, &c. Istis, qui attoniti corporeas mirantur magnique faciunt voluptates, his finitis, non remanet delectatio. PLUT.

our time of life, and on the pursuit of which we are most intent, must be interrupted in order to be enjoyed.

We can no more long bear pleasure, than we can long endure fatigue ; or, rather, what we call pleasure, after some continuance, becomes fatigue.

We want relief in our diversions, as well as in our most serious employments.

When *Socrates* had observed, “ of how unaccountable a nature that thing is, which men call Pleasure, since, though it may appear to be contrary to Pain, as never being with it in the same Person, yet they so closely follow each other, that they may seem linked, as it were, together :” He then adds—“ If *Æsop* had attended to this, he would, I think, have given us a fable, in which the Divinity, willing to reconcile these two enemies, but yet unable to do it, had, nevertheless, so connected them in their extremities, that where the one comes, the other shall be sure to succeed it.”

^a *Αναμεινταί παρ' αλλήλους, &c.* Ubique voluptati mœror adheret, alterumque extemplo imbutum est altero ; ut necesse

From the excess of Joy, how usual is the transition to that of Dejection! Laughter, as well as grief, calls for tears to ease us under it; and it may be even more dangerous to my life to be immoderately delighted, than to be severely afflicted. ^a

Our pleasures then soon pass; and, *secondly*, their repetition certainly cloy.

As the easiness of posture and agreeableness of place wear off by a very short continuance in either; it is the same with any sensual gratifications which we can pursue, and with every enjoyment of that kind, to which we can apply. ^b What so delights our palate, that we should relish it, if it were our constant food? What juice has

fit, alterum si eligas, alterum extemplo quoque contingat tibi. MAXIM. TYR.

^a Τῆς ποτὸς υπομένει μάλλον, &c. Magis perfert (corpus) dolores quam voluptates: præditumque adversus illos robore ac viribus, in his imbecillum est. PLUT.

^b Gustatus, qui est sensus ex omnibus maxime voluptarius, quique dulcitudine præter ceteros sensus commoveatur, quam cito id, quod valde dulce est, aspernatur & respuit? Quis potione uti, aut cibo dulci, diutius potest? ——— Omnibus in rebus voluptatibus maximis fastidium finitimum est. CIC. de Orat.

Nature furnished, that, after being a frequent, continues to be a pleasing, draught? Sounds, how artfully soever blended or successive, tire at length the ear; and odours, at first the most grateful, soon either cease to recreate us, or become offensive to us. The finest prospect gives no entertainment to the eye that has been long accustomed to it. The pile, that strikes with admiration each casual beholder, affords its royal inhabitant no comfort, but what the peasant has in his cottage.

That love of variety and change, to which none of our kind are strangers, might be a lesson to us, where our expectations are ill grounded, where they must necessarily be disappointed; for if no man ever yet lived,

^a Circumspice tot millia hominum inquieta; qui, ut aliquid pestiferi consequantur, per mala nituntur in malum, petuntque mox fugienda, aut etiam fastidienda: Cui enim affecuto satis fuit, quod optanti nimium videbatur?

SEN. Ep. 118.

Οὐδεν τῶν περιλαβε, &c. Nihil horum est, cui fines suos assignarit Deus aut limites, non Divitiæ, non Voluptas, &c. — sed infinita est eorum possessio, ut qui ea sequuntur maxime, voti si fiant compotes, sitiant maxime; minus enim est quicquid consecuti sunt, eo quod expectant.

MAX. TYR. Diff. 7.

who

who could say of any of the pleasures of sense—On this I repose myself^a—it quite answers my hopes from it—my wishes rove not beyond it : if none could ever affirm this, it is most evident, that we in vain search after permanent delight from any of the objects, with which we are now conversant— that the only difference between the satisfactions we pursue, and those we quit, is, that we are already tired of the one, and shall soon be of the other. ^b

Hear the language of him, who had tried the extent of every sensual pleasure, and must have found the uncloying, had any such existed. “ I said in my heart, Go to
“ now, I will prove thee with mirth. I
“ gave myself to wine, I made me great
“ works, I builded me houses, I planted
“ me vineyards, I made me gardens, I
“ planted trees in them of all kinds of
“ fruit. I made me pools of water, I

^a Les Plaisirs ne sont point assez solides pour souffrir qu'on les approfondisse ; il ne faut que les effleurer. Ils ressemblent à ces terres marecageuses sur lesquelles on est obligé de courir légèrement, sans y arrêter jamais le pied. FONT. Dial. des Morts 100.

^b Que les hommes sont à plaindre ! Leur condition naturelle leur fournit peu de choses agréables, et leur raison leur apprend à en goûter encore moins. lb. p. 13.

“ amassed

“ amass’d gold and silver, I had possessions,
 “ above all that were in *Jerusalem* before
 “ me. I tried what love, what music,
 “ what all the delights of the sons of men
 “ could effect : Whatsoever mine eyes de-
 “ fired I kept not from them, I with-held
 “ not my heart from any joy. Then I
 “ looked on all my works, on all my pur-
 “ suits, and behold ! all was vanity and vex-
 “ ation of spirit.” ^a

Tully mentions *Xerxes* as having propos’d
 a reward to the man, who could make
 known to him some new pleasure. ^b The
 Monarch of the East, it seems, met with
 nothing within the bounds of his mighty
 Empire, that could fix his inclinations. The
 most voluptuous people on earth had dis-
 covered no delight, that their Sovereign could
 acknowledge otherwise than superficial.
 Happy ! had it been a lesson to their Prince,

^a See *Eccles.* ii.

^b *Tusc. Quæst.* L. V. *Plutarch*, in his *Symposiasts*, L. I.
 mentions this as done by an *Affyrian* King, but doth not
 name him. *Lampridius* says of *Heliogabalus*, *Nec erat ei ulla*
vita nisi exquirere novas voluptates : and afterwards — *Pro-*
ponebat his quasi thēmata, ut jura nova dapibus condiendis in-
venirent : ejus placuisset inventum, ei dabat maximum præ-
mium.

or could it be one to us, where our good should be sought—what pursuits were likely to bring us blessings certain to improve, as well as endure.

S E C T. II.

A *Third* disadvantage ensuing to us from our attachment to the delights, which appetite and fancy purvey, is, that it indisposes us for useful inquiries, ^a for every endeavour worthy of our nature, and suiting the relations, in which we are placed. ^b

The disappointment, which the *Persian* Emperor met with in all his schemes of the voluptuous kind, did not put him on applying to those of a different one. Experience shew'd him his folly, but could not

^a Εμποδιον τω φρονειν ται ηδοναι, &c. Impedimento est voluptas, quo minus sapias; eoque magis, quo major est, ut Veneris. ARISTOT. Ethic. Lib. VII.

Impedit consilium voluptas, rationi inimica; ac mentis, ut dicam, præstringit oculos. CIC. de Senect.

^b Εκ των Επικουρου λογων, &c. Ex Epicuri decretis non dicam quis tyrannicida, quis eximiam rebus agendis laudem meritus, quis Legumlator exstitit — sed, quisnam sapientum istorum propter patriam navigavit—sumptus fecit?

PLUT. adv. Colot,

teach him wisdom—It could not, when it had convinced him of the vanity of his pursuits, induce him to relinquish them.

We find a *Solomon*, indeed, discovering his error, acknowledging that he had erred, and bearing testimony to religion and virtue as alone productive of true happiness ; but where are we to look for another among the votaries to sensuality, thus affected, thus changed ?

As some have observed of *Courts*, that such, who live in them, are always uneasy there, yet always unwilling to retreat ; the very same holds true of the licentious practice, which they too generally countenance : fully convinced of its vanity and folly, we continue to our last moments attached to it —averse from altering the conduct, which we cannot but disapprove. Our faculties are, indeed, so constituted, that our capacity for many enjoyments extends not beyond such a period in our being : if we will not quit them, they will us—will depart, whatever our eagerness may be for their continuance. But let us not deceive ourselves : when they are gone as to their sense,

sense, they are not as to their power. He who says to his youth, Eat, drink, and be merry—who thinks of nothing else at that season, will hanker after delicacies, when he has neither teeth to chew, nor palate to distinguish them ; will want the cup, which he cannot lift ; and seek for mirth, when he will thereby become the object of it. The habit operates, when none of the inducements for our contracting it remain ; and when the days of pleasure are past, those of wisdom and virtue are not the nearer. Our dispositions do not decay with our strength. The prudence, which should attend grey hairs, doth not necessarily come to us with them. The young rake is a lascivious obscene wretch, when he owes his warmth to his flannel ; delights in the filthy tale, when his hearers are almost poisoned by the breath, with which he utters it ; and when least able to offend in act, he does it in desire.

That the humour for fighting or racing, or whatever inclination governed us in this world, accompanies us to the other, is not an

an entire fiction of the Poet, * but, assuredly, has thus much truth in it, that whatever humour we indulge, it accompanies us to the close of life. There is a time, when our manners are pliant, when the counsels of the sober operate upon us as successfully, as the insinuations of the corrupt; but when that time is passed, our customs are, daily, working themselves into our *constitution*, and want not many years to become scarce distinguishable from it. God, I am persuaded, has formed us all with such apprehensions of what is right, as, if a proper care were taken to preserve and improve them, would have the happiest influence upon our practice; but when the season for extending this care to them has been neglected, they are in most of us greatly impaired, and in some appear almost wholly lost.

Let the *understanding* remain uninformed, 'til half the age of man is past, and what

* ———— ———— ———— ———— ———— *Quæ gratia curram*

*Armorumque fuit vivis, quæ cura nitentes
Pascere equos, eadem sequitur tellure repostos.*

ÆNEID. L. VI.

improve-

improvement is the best then likely to make? how irksom would it seem to be put upon any? It is with our will the very same; turned for half or three parts of our life to sloth and wantonness, to riot and excess, any correction of it, any alteration to the pursuits becoming us, may seem quite hopeless. While we are devoting ourselves to pleasure, we are weakening every principle, whereby virtue can engage us, we are extinguishing within us all sense of true desert—subduing conscience—divesting ourselves of shame—corrupting our natural notions of good and evil; and so indisposing ourselves for consideration, that our constant endeavour will be to decline it. Thus when our *follies* are a *burden* to us, their correction seems a greater; and we try what ease may be found by varying, rather than seek any from quitting, them.

Fourthly, The larger our share is of outward enjoyments, and the dearer they are to us; so much the more afflicting our concern will be to *leave* this *Scene* of them — so much the greater terror and torment shall

we

we receive from the apprehension, how soon we may be obliged to do it.

Let the man of pleasure colour it the most agreeably, place it in the fairest point of view, this objection will remain in its full strength against him : “ You are not master
“ of the continuance of the good, of which
“ you boast ; and can you avoid thinking of
“ its removal, or bear the thoughts thereof,
“ with any calmness and composure ? ” But what kind of happiness is that, which we are in hourly fears of losing, and which, when lost, is gone for ever ?

— If I am here only for a few days, the part I ought to act is, certainly, that of a traveller on his journey, making use, indeed, of such conveniences, as the road affords him, but still regarding himself as upon his road—never so incumbering himself that he shall be unwilling to advance, when he knows he must do it — never so diverting himself at any resting place, that it shall be painful to him to depart thence.

When we are accustomed to derive all our comforts from sense, we come to want the very idea of any other : this momentary
part

part of our existence is the full extent we give to our joys; and we have the mortifying reflection continually before us, that their conclusion is nearer every hour we are here, and may possibly take place the very next. Thus each accession of delight will really be but a new source of affliction, become an additional motive for complaint of the short space allowed for its enjoyment.

The mind of man is so disposed to look forward, so fitted to extend its views, that, as much as it is contracted by sensuality, it cannot be fixed thereby to the instant moment: We can never, like the beasts, be so far engrossed by the satisfaction before us, but the thoughts will occur, how often may we hope to repeat it—how many distant hours is it likely to relieve—how much of our duration can it advantage? and the scanty continuance which our most sanguine hopes can assign it, must, therefore, be in some degree its abatement—must be an ingredient in our draught sure to embitter the many pleasing ones which compound it. And what a wise part are we then acting, when we are taking the

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brutes portion for ours, and cannot have all the benefits even of that ! cannot remove the inconveniences of reason, when we forego its comforts !

These are some of the many disadvantages inseparable from pleasure, and from the expectation of which none of its votaries are exempt. We cannot attach ourselves to any of the delights, which appetite or fancy provides, but we shall be sure to find them quickly passing—when repeated, cloying—indisposing us for worthy pursuits—rendering us averse from quitting the world, and uneasy as often as it occurs to our thoughts, how soon our summons may be to depart.



S E C T. III.

BUT what, you'll say, must all then commence Philosophers? Must every gay amusement be banish'd the world? Must those of each sex and of all ages have their looks ever in form, and their manners under the regulation of the severest wisdom? Has nature given us propensities only to be resisted? Have we ears to distinguish harmony, and are we never to delight them with it? Is the food, which our palate best relishes, to be therefore denied it? Can odours recreate our brain, beauty please our eye, and the design of their structure be, that we should exclude all agreeable sensation from either? Are not natural inclinations nature's commands; are they not its declarations whence we may obtain our good, and its injunctions to seek it thence? Is any thing more evi-

dent, than that serious applications cannot long be sustained—that we must sink under their weight—that they soon stupify or distract us ? The exercise of our intellectual part is the fatigue of our corporeal, and cannot be carried on, but by allowing us intervals of relaxation and mirth. Deny us pleasure, and you unfit us for business ; and destroy the man, while you thus seek to perfect him.

A full answer might, I should think, be given to whatever is here alledged, by enlarging on the following observations.

1. Pleasure is only so far censured, as it costs us more than it is worth—as it brings on a degree of uneasiness, for which it doth not compensate.

2. It is granted, that we are licensed to take all that pleasure, which there is no reason for our declining. So much *true Pleasure*, or so much Pleasure, as is not counterbalanced by any inconveniences attending it, is so much happiness accruing to him who takes it, and a part of that general good, which our Creator design'd us.

3. As

3. As the inclinations, with which Mankind were originally formed, were, certainly, very different from those, which Guilt has since propagated ; *many Restraints* must, therefore, be necessary, which would not have been so, had our primitive Rectitude been preserved.

4. Bad education, bad example, increase greatly our natural depravity, before we come to reason at all upon it ; and give the appearance of good to many things, which would be seen in a quite different light, under a different education and intercourse.

These particulars let it suffice barely to mention ; since, as it is here admitted, that when there is no Reason for our declining any pleasure, there is one for our taking it, I am more especially concerned to shew, when there is a Reason, why pleasure should be declined—what those limits are, which ought to be prescribed to our pleasures, and which when any, in themselves the most innocent, pass, they necessarily become immoral and culpable. A minute discussion of this point is not here proposed : such ob-

servations only will be made upon it, as appear to be of more general use, and of greatest importance.

What I would, first, consider as rendering any pleasure blameable is,

When it raises our Passions.

As our greatest danger is from them, their regulation claims our constant attention and care. *Human Laws* consider them in their effects, but the *Divine Law* in their aim and intention. To render me obnoxious to men, it is necessary that my impure lust be gratified, or an attempt be made to gratify it ; that my anger operate by violence, my covetousness by knavery : but my duty is violated, when my heart is impure, when my rage extends not beyond my looks and my wishes, when I invade my neighbour's property but in desire. The man is guilty the moment his affections become so, the instant that any dishonest thought finds him approving and indulging it.

The enquiry, therefore, what is a fit amusement, should always be preceded by
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the consideration of what is our disposition. For, it is not greater madness to suppose, that equal quantities of food or liquor may be taken by all with equal temperance, than to assert, that the same pleasure may be used by all with the same innocence. As, in the former case, what barely satisfies the stomach of one, would be a load insupportable to that of another ; and the draught, that intoxicates me, may scarcely refresh my companion : so in the latter, an amusement perfectly warrantable to this sort of constitution, will to a different become the most criminal. What liberties are allowable to the calm, that must not be thought of by the choleric ! How securely may the cold and phlegmatic roam, where he, who has greater warmth and sensibility, should not approach ! What safety attends the contemner of gain, where the most fatal snares await the avaritious ! Some *less governable passion* is to be found in them, whose resolution is steadiest, and virtue firmest : upon *that* a constant guard must be kept ; by any relaxation, any indulgence, it may be able to gain that strength, which we shall afterwards fruitlessly oppose. When

all is quiet and compos'd within us, the discharge of our duty puts us to little trouble; the performance thereof is not the heavy task, that so many are willing to represent it : but to restore order and peace is a work very different from preserving them, and is often with the utmost difficulty effected. It is with the natural body, as with the politic ; rebellion in the members is much easier prevented than quell'd ; confusion once enter'd, none can foresee to what lengths it may proceed, or of how wide a ruin it may be productive.

What, likewise, renders any pleasure culpable is its making a large, or an unseasonable, demand upon our Time.

No one is to live to himself, and much less to confine his care to but one, and that the worst, part of himself. Man's proper employment is to cultivate right dispositions in his own breast, and to benefit his species — to perfect himself, and to be of as much use in the world, as his faculties and opportunities will permit. The satisfactions of sense are never to be pursued for their own sake : their enjoyment is none of our
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end ^a, is not the purpose, for which God created us; amuse, refresh us it may, but when it busies, when it chiefly engages us, we act directly contrary to the design, for which we were formed; making that our *care*, which was only intended to be our *relief*.

Some, destitute of the necessaries, others, of the conveniences of life, are called to labour, to commerce, to literary application, in order to obtain them; and any remissness of these persons, in their respective employments or professions, any pursuit inconsistent with a due regard to their maintenance, meets ever with the harshest censure, is universally branded, as a failure in common prudence and discretion: But what is this animal life, in comparison with that to which we are raised by following the dictates of reason and conscience? How despicable may the man continue, when all the affluence, to which his wishes aspire, is obtained?

^a Voluptatem bestiis concedamus, aliud aliquid hominis summum bonum reperiendum est. TUL. de fin.

Voluptas humilis res & pusilla est, & in nullo habenda pretio, communis cum mutis animantibus, ad quam minima & contemptissima advolat. SEN. Ep. 123.

Can it then be so indiscreet a part, to follow *pleasure*, when we should mind our *fortune*? do all so clearly see the blame of this? And may we doubt how guilty that attachment to it is, which lays waste our understanding --- which entails on us ignorance and error --- which renders us even more useless than the beings, whom instinct alone directs? All capacity for improvement is evidently a call to it. The neglect of our powers is their abuse; and the slight of *them* is that of their Giver. Whatever talents we have received, we are to account for: And it is not from revelation alone that we learn this: No moral truth commands more strongly our assent, than that the qualifications bestowed upon us, are afforded us, in order to our cultivating them--- to our obtaining from them the advantages, they can yield us; and that foregoing such advantages, we become obnoxious to him, who designed us them, as we misapply his gift, and knowingly oppose his will. For, the surest token we can have, that any perfections ought to be pursued, is, that they
may

may be attained : our ability to acquire them is the voice of God within us to endeavour after them. And would we but ask ourselves the question, Did the Creator raise us above the herd, and doth he allow us to have no aims nobler than those of the herd---to make its engagements the whole of ours ? We could not possibly mistake in the answer. All, who have reason given them, know that they may and ought to improve it, ought to cultivate it at some seasons, and ever to conform to it.

Greater privileges call us but to more important cares. You are not placed above your fellow-creatures, you have not the leisure, which they want, that you may be more idle and worthless, may devote more of your time to vanity and folly, but that you may become more eminent in the perfections you acquire, and the good you do. He, who has all his hours at command, is to consider himself as favoured with those opportunities to increase in wisdom and virtue, which are vouchsafed to few ; if no good effect follows ; if having them, he only
misapplies

misapplies them ; his guilt is, according to what his advantage might have been.

The dispensations of heaven are not so unequal, as that some are appointed to the heaviest toil for their support, and others left to the free, unconstrained enjoyment of whatever gratifications their fancy suggests. The distinction between us is not that of much business and none at all ; it is not, that I may live as I can, and you as you please ; a different employment constitutes it. The mechanic has his part assigned him, the scholar his, the wealthy and powerful theirs, each has his task to perform, his talent to improve,—has barely so much time for his pleasure, as is necessary for recruiting himself—as is consistent with habitual seriousness, and may rather qualify than interrupt it.

We are furnished with numerous arguments, why the graver occupations should be remitted—why the humour for gaiety and mirth should be allowed its place ; and no man in his right mind ever taught the contrary.

contrary^a. Let the delights of sense have their season, but let them stand confined to it; the same absurdity follows the excess on either side, our never using, and our never quitting them.

Be not *over wise*, is an excellent Rule; but it is a rule full as good, and much more wanted,—That *some wisdom* should be sought—That dress and diversion, should not take up all our hours—That more time should not be spent in adorning our persons, than in improving our minds—That the beautified Sepulchre should not be our exact resemblance, much shew and ornament without, and within nothing but stench and rottenness—That barely to pass our time should not be all the account we make of

^a Παιζειν οπως σπουδαζει κατ' Αναχ. &c. Ludere, ut res serias gerere possis, Anacharsidis sententia æquum est. Quoniam enim ludus requieti & cessationi similis est, quoniamque laborem continenter ferre minime possumus, cessatione & requiete opus est,---Sed beata vita ea est quæ ex virtute degitur, quæ eadem profecto seria est, non in ludo posita. ARISTOT. Eth. l. 10.

Mihi liber non esse videtur, qui non aliquando nihil agit. TULL. de Orat. l. 2.

it, but that some profit should be consulted,
as well as some delight^a.



S E C T. IV.

A GAIN, no pleasure can be innocent,
from which our health is a sufferer.
You are no more to shorten your days, than
with one stroke to end them; and we are sui-
cides but in a different way, if wantonness
and luxury be our gradual destruction, or
despair our instant. It is self-murder, to
take from our continuance here any part of
that term, to which the due care of ourselves
would have extended it; and our life, pro-
bably, falls a more criminal sacrifice to our
voluptuousness, than to our impatience.

^a Παράτηντες τι επιζητεῖς, &c. Observa quid natura tua;
qua es animal, exposcat; & hoc, quicquid est, concede tibi,
nisi natura tua, qua es animal rationale, deterius inde se ha-
bitura sit. M. ANTON. de rebus suis, l. 10. sect. 2.

When we throw off the load, which providence has thought fit to lay upon us, we fail greatly in a proper deference to its wisdom, in a due submission to its will; but then we have to plead, sufferings too grievous to be sustained—a distress too mighty to be contended with; a plea, which can by no means justify us; yet how preferable to any, that he can alledge, who, in the midst of all things that can give a relish to his being, neglects the preservation of it—who abuses the conveniences of life to its waste, and turns its very comforts to its ruin? Or, could we suppose our pleasures disordering our constitution, after a manner not likely to contribute to its decay, they would not even then be exempted from guilt: To preserve your self should not solely be your concern, but to maintain your most perfect state: Every part and every power of your frame claims your regard; and it is great ingratitude towards him, who gave us our faculties, when we *in any wise* obstruct their free use. The proper thankfulness to God for our life is to be expressed by our care about it; both by keeping it, 'til he pleases to require it; and by
so

so preserving it, that it may be fit for all those purposes, to which he has appointed it.

Further, the Pleasure is, undoubtedly, criminal, which is not adapted to our fortune—which either impairs it, or hinders an application of *it* to what has the principal claim upon it.

If actions, otherwise the most commendable, lose their merit, when they disqualify us for continuing them—if generosity changes its name, when it suits not our circumstances; and even alms are culpable, when by bestowing them we come to want them—if the very best uses, to which we can put our wealth, are not so to draw off, as to dry the stream; we can by no means suppose, that our amusements are not to be limited, as by other considerations, so by this in particular---the Expence which they create: We cannot imagine, that the restraints should not lie upon our wantonness, which lie upon our beneficence.

Be our possessions the largest, it is but a very small part of them that we have to dispose of as we think fit, on what conduces solely to our mirth and diversion. Great affluence,

fluence, whatever we may account it, is really but a greater trust ; the means committed to us of a more extensive provision for the necessities of our fellow-creatures ; and when our maintenance — our convenience — an appearance suitable to our rank have been consulted, all that remains is the claim of others, of our family, our friends, our neighbours, of those who are most in need of us, and whom we are most obliged to assist.

In the figure we make, in our attendants, table, habit, there may be a very culpable parsimony ; but in the expence which has nothing but self-gratification in view, our thrift can never transgress : Here our abstinence is the most generous and commendable, as it at once qualifies us to relieve the wants of others, and lessens our own — as it sets us above the world, at the time that it enables us to be a blessing to it.

There is not a nobler quality to distinguish us, than that of an indifference to ourselves — a readiness to forego our own liking for the ease and advantage of our
Q fellow-

fellow-creatures. And it is but justice, indeed, that the conveniences of many should prescribe to those of one : Whatever his fortune may be, as he owes all the service he has from it to the concurrence of numbers, he ought to make it of benefit to them, and by no means conclude, that what they are not to take from him, they are not to share.

Nor should it be unremarked, that the gratifications, best suited to Nature, are of all the cheapest : She, like a wise parent, has not made those things needful to the well-being of any of us, which are prejudicial to the interests of the rest. We have a large field for enjoyment, at little or no charge, and may very allowably exceed the bounds of this ; but we should always remember, that the verge of right is the entrance upon wrong—that the indulgence, which goes to the full extent of a lawful expence, approaches too near a criminal one, to be wholly clear from it.

Again, Care should be taken that our pleasures be in Character.

The

The *station* of some, the *profession* of others, and an *advanced age* in all, require that we should decline many pleasures allowable to those of an inferior rank—of a different profession — of much younger years.

Do your *Decisions* constitute the *Law*—does your *Honour* balance the plebeian's *Oath*? how very fitting is it, that you should never be seen eager on trifles—intent on boyish sports—unbent to the lowest amusements of the populace----solicitous after gratifications, which may shew, that neither your sagacity is greater, nor your scruples fewer than what are found in the very meanest of the community!^a

Am I set apart to recommend a reasonable and useful life—to represent the world as a scene of vanity and folly, and propose

^a Ut pulcritudo corporis apta compositione membrorum movet oculos, & delectat hoc ipso, quod inter se omnes partes cum quodam lepore consentiant: sic hoc Decorum, quod elucet in vita, movet approbationem eorum quibus cum vivitur, ordine, & constantia, & moderatione dictorum omnium atque factorum.——Pertinet ad omnem honestatem hoc, quod dico, Decorum.

TUL. de Off. Lib. I.

the things above as only proper to engage our affections? how ungraceful a figure do I then make, when I join in all the common amusements---when the world seems to delight *me* full as much as my hearers, and the only difference between us is, that their words and actions correspond, and mine are utterly inconsistent!

Have you attained the years, which extinguish the relish of many enjoyments---which bid you expect the speedy conclusion of the few remaining, and ought to instruct you in the emptiness of all those of the sensual kind? We expect you should leave them to such, who can taste them better, and who know them less. The massy vestment ill becomes you, when you sink under its weight: the gay Assembly, when your dim eyes cannot distinguish the persons composing it: Your feet scarcely support you; attend not, therefore, where the contest is, whose motions are the gracefullest: Fly the representation designed to raise the mirth of the spectators, when you can only remind them of their coffins.

Lastly,

Lastly, Every pleasure should be avoided, that is an offence to the scrupulous, or a snare to the indiscreet. I ought to have nothing more at heart than my brother's innocence, except my own ; and when there are so many ways of entertaining ourselves, which admit of no misconstruction, why should I chuse such, as afford occasion for any ?

To be able greatly to benefit our fellow-creatures is the happiness of few, but not to hurt them is in the power of all ; and when we cannot do the world much good, we must be very unthinking indeed, if we endeavour not to do it the least possible mischief.

How this action will appear, to what interpretation it is liable, ought to be our consideration in whatever we engage. We are here so much interested in each other's morals, that, if we looked not beyond our present Being, it should never be a point indifferent to us, what notions our conduct may propagate, and for what corruptions it may be made the plea : But professing the doctrine of *Christ* as our rule, we can

in nothing more directly oppose it, than in taking those liberties, by which the virtue of any is endangered. Which of our pleasures have this pernicious tendency, it will be more proper for my readers to recollect, than for me to describe. To those who are in earnest I have said enough; to the insincere more would be fruitless. What has been said deserves, I think, some consideration, and that it may have a serious one, is the most earnest wish of,

Dear SIR,

Your, &c.

ON



O N

PUBLIC WORSHIP.

Οὐχ ὁρας οἱ τα πολυχρονιωτα και σοφωτατα, &c. Nonne vides quod illæ civitates ac gentes maxime Deos colunt, quæ vetustissimæ sapientissimæque sunt? Ætatum quoque illa piissima, quæ prudentissima etiam est.

XENOPH. de dict. & fact. Socr. L. I.

Haud scio, an pietate erga Deos sublata, fides etiam, & societas humani generis, & una excellentissima virtus justitia tollatur. CIC. de Nat. Deor. Lib. I.

Virum bonum concedas necesse est summæ pietatis erga Deos esse. SEN. Ep. 76.



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ON
PUBLIC WORSHIP.

S I R,

 T was with much concern, that I lately heard what an alteration your gay companions had made in you, and what your neglect now was of all public worship.

This neglect is, really, so *Indecent*,

Is so very *Imprudent*,

Is so *Contrary* to the *maxims* of the *wisest Heathen*,

Is so expressive of direct *Atheism*,

Is so extensively and greatly *mischievous* ; that, I should think, if you duly considered it, you could not suffer it to be any longer your reproach.

I. I may

I. I may well be allow'd to call it---*Indecent,*

As it is by no means consistent with *good manners* ;

As it is an open breach of the *Laws* of your Country ;

As it is an avowed contempt of the *Religion* of your Country.

I. According to the Rules of *good manners*, we should comply with the customary practice, in whatever it is justifiable.

Singularity is mere Perverseness, or foolish Affectation, where it is not founded on what is fitting and right. Every man of sense is willing to *act* with his neighbour, wherever it is not of importance to shew, that he *thinks* for himself. Fashion should always direct us, where it is not contrary to Reason.

In all cases, in which Duty doth not require us to oppose *common Usage*, it should be as much a rule to us for our conduct, as for our language. And if you may not believe, that, to attend the public worship, is
the

the performance of a duty; you, surely, cannot judge any duty to be violated by your attending it: You cannot judge it to be blameable to act herein with the generality; and, therefore, you, in civility, ought to do it.

According to good manners, we should, likewise, express a proper deference to that, which appears to be the sense of the Community.

In things, with which, from our profession or trade, we cannot but be supposed better acquainted, than they are, whose application has been of a different kind, we have just ground to treat a popular opinion, as no rule for ours: but, when in matters of common life, in points, to which the discernment of every man may fitly be thought to extend, we shew an utter disregard to the well-advised determinations of our fellow-citizens, there is plainly an offence against that Decorum, which a liberal education directs us to observe*.

* Adhibenda est quædam reverentia adversus homines, & optimi cujusque & reliquorum. TUL. de Off. L. I.

We very fitly, indeed, endeavour to be *wiser* and *better* than others ; but it is, by no means, *Wisdom*, to behave, as if we were the only wise —— as if we considered the established regulations of a state, to be checks proper enough for others, but not at all necessary to be submitted to by us. Err we often do, as to the proportion of discernment we assign ourselves, but *their* share of discernment the *Generality* may, in many points, justly claim ; and can in none be more unfitly opposed, than in those which respect public order and peace. Not to join in the measures agreed on by them for these purposes, may justly expose us to the reproach of but ill understanding what is decent, or not at all consulting it.

Further, we should, in good manners, carefully avoid whatever would give offence to those, among whom we are conversant. It is this *care*, which distinguishes the civilised, from the savage, — the well-educated, from the undisciplined and uninformed part

^a *Justitiæ partes sunt, non violare homines ; Verecundiæ, non offendere : in quo maxime perspicitur vis Decori.*

TUL. de Off. L. I.

of our species. The more this care appears, so much the more humanity, the better breeding, the more politeness we always ascribe to the person, in whom we see it.

He, who neglects to join with the rest of his District in a homage of the Deity, may well be supposed to regard them as people, who do but ill know how to employ their leisure, and whose *Devotion* doth little credit to their *Capacity*.

A censure, which how it must be taken by the discerning part of those who fall under it, you cannot be at a loss to determine.

And, is it unworthy your Consideration, that, by such an avowed contempt of all public worship, you give the greatest offence to those, whom no one, who has a proper sense of Decorum, would willingly offend? You, hereby, chiefly offend the serious, the well disposed—those, who are most averse from disgusting any—those, who have at heart the cause of Virtue, who, as they are solicitous for the *general Good*, cannot but be much grieved when they see *that irreligion* countenanced, the spreading of which will necessarily obstruct it.

2. How unbecoming it is, to persist in an open breach of the Laws of our Country, cannot be questioned by him, who will not call in question the expediency of having any Laws.

If I will make convenience the Rule of my obedience to the Law, another may as justly take the same Rule for his: and thus, while each pays subjection only in the way he likes, universal disorder must be the necessary consequence.

The plain language of our Statutes is—*All persons, inhabiting within the King's Dominions, shall, having no lawful excuse, endeavour to resort to their Parish-church, or to some usual place where Common-prayer shall be used, every Sunday, &c.*^a —All persons shall, on every Lord's day, apply themselves to the observation of the same, by exercising themselves in Piety and true Religion, *publicly and privately, &c.*^b

3. Your absence from all public worship I cannot, likewise, but style *Indecent*, as it is an avowed contempt of the Religion of

^a 1 ELIZ. Ch. 2. Sect. 4.

^b 29 CHARL. II. Ch. 7. Sect. 1.

your Country. This, whatever your private opinion may be of it, claims from you an outward respect ; since nothing is held more sacred by, nothing is dearer to, All, who are in earnest in the Profession of it ; which may well induce you to forbear so rude an attack upon it, as is made by that part of your conduct, to which I am now objecting.

If an endeavour to introduce a system of Faith and Morals, more perfective of human nature, and more productive of happiness to mankind, than that, which is at present established among us, was your motive to such an insult on what is thus established, I could not desire that Conscience should give place to Civility — it would not be right to expect you should shew any complaisance towards opinions, which your very desire of the welfare of those who received them prompted you to extirpate.

But when you seek to pull down, without the least thought of rebuilding—when you are active in removing the restraints, that our Depravity is under, without a view of substituting any in their stead — when
you

you alike discountenance Communion with the National Church and with every other; what softer Epithet can I give this way of acting, than that of Indecent? And how properly may I recommend to your Consideration, That,

Want of Decency is want of Sense?

POPE.

II. *Imprudence* is what I have next charged you with.

A degree of it there is in every departure from good manners—in all actions out of character---in whatever is improperly done by us, and shews us to be less attentive to what the society, in which we live, may justly expect from us. But our *Imprudence* is great in those omissions, which can scarcely be otherwise than the source of much *inconvenience and uneasiness to us*. And, I believe, it will be difficult to name what is the cause of more to the head of a family, than the irreligion of its members. The bad principles of the husband, the father, the master, where his capacity is not extremely low, too easily insinuate themselves into his wife,

wife, children, servants; and there cannot be a plainer discovery of his principles, than his practice; nor of his having very bad principles, than such a practice, as makes it evident that he is indifferent, how far he contributes to efface, in those, who observe him, all reverence of a Deity.

I know you will say, that you are not unwilling your family should go to Church, and that you even frequently order them to do it. But which will weigh most with them, your orders or your example? Can they suppose you to think it of any moment, that mankind should be influenced by the fear of God; when they see you utterly negligent of what alone will preserve in them the fear of him? Will they see a reason for *their* joining in the public worship, which is not one for *your* doing it?

Your *Children* may obey your *orders*, whilst they dare not do otherwise; but they will be sure not to forget your *unsuitable example*: and when moved by it to slight all the restraints of Religion, they will, probably, when they cease to be under your controul, go all those lengths of guilt, to which their inclinations lead them.

Nor is it to be believed, that the pattern you set your *Servants* will weigh less with them, than your giving them leave, or even enjoining them, not to follow it: You may justly fear, that they will rather mind what you *do*, than what you *say*—that from the irreligion, to which your *Conduct* leads them, they will not be with-held by your *Injunctions*—that they will adopt *principles* fuitable to that disregard of the Deity which you express; and be induced, by those *principles*, to consult their pleasure or profit in such ways, as cannot but be very prejudicial to you.

The Parent and Master, who have much seriousness, have not always an equal discretion; and the depravity of some under their care may be such, as the best both advice and example cannot correct. It is not, therefore, to be imagined, but that great regularity, in the heads of a family, may sometimes fail in influencing those under their government: But I am persuaded, that as you will often see the uniform piety of the One producing the happiest effects on the Other, so it will rarely be found, that

that a neglect of the duties of Religion in the former, is not the cause of great hurt to the Morals of the latter, and of such hurt as deeply affects the present interest of the persons who occasion'd it.

There is nothing more absurd than to think, that a Son or a Servant will go just those lengths of irreligion, which you would connive at in him. When he is advanced as far as your practice will lead him, be assured that he will not stop there, but proceed to all those crimes, which suit his depraved affections, and from which he is not with-held by sense of Shame, or dread of the Law.

As the extensive and great *mischief*, which may ensue from your conduct cannot be shewn, but it must, at the same time, evidence the *Imprudence* of it; I shall *here* insist no longer on *this point*, but refer the additional proofs of it to what will be said on the *other*.

III. That in a neglect of all common worship you act contrary to the maxims of the wisest Heathen, may be made appear—

From the establishments of their Lawgivers—

From the accounts we have of their practice—

From the sentiments, which their writings express.

Did you ever read of the Commonwealth that was founded without any provision for public worship? What history mentions a civilised people, which had not their temples, their altars, their places where the Deity was publicly adored?

Many whimsical things have been enacted by the several *Lawgivers*; but I know not of Any, who have supposed that a *Society* could be kept in order, unless the *members* of it joined in some solemn rites, which might contribute to preserve in them a reverence of the Deity.

When *Lycurgus* was asked, Why he enjoined oblations of little price? his Answer was—That *None* might fail in paying their acknowledgments to the Gods.^a

^a Προς τον πυθομενον, &c. De hostiis ad illum qui percontabatur, quid tam exiguas & viles præscripsisset, Ne unquam, inquit, Deum intermittamus colere. PLUT.

In *Plato's* tenth Book of *Laws*, the assertion of the Existence of a Deity, and of his regard to what is right, having been considered as a proper Introduction to all Laws, it follows—That, from the East to the West, or throughout the extent of the Earth, All men, Barbarians as well as *Greeks*, are seen and heard prostrating themselves, and supplicating the Deity.^a

The *Athenians* are represented, as, in the most flourishing state of their Commonwealth, taking particular care that the religious rites of their Ancestors should be conformed to.^b

As *Tully* says in one place^c — That All men think the Gods they have received

^a Αἰατελλοῖσι τε ἡλυσὶ καὶ σελήνῃ καὶ πρὸς δισμας ἰούλων, προκυλισαῖς ἀμα καὶ προσκυνηταῖς ἀκροῖσι τε καὶ οὐραῖσι Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ Βαρβάρων πάντων, &c. PLAT. de Leg. Lib. X.

^b Τα περὶ τῶν Θεῶν, &c. Quod ad Deos immortales attinet (hinc enim ordiri mihi jure videor) non inæqualiter, non perturbate vel ipsos colebant, vel eorum festa celebrabant :——Illud accurate observabant, ne a patribus acceptum quicquam abrogarent. ISOCR. Or. Areopag.

^c OMNES religione moventur : & Deos patrios, quos a Majoribus acceperunt, colendos sibi diligenter——arbitrantur. TUL. in VER.

Si conferre volumus nostra cum externis, ceteris rebus aut pares, aut etiam inferiores reperiemur ; religione, id est,

from their Ancestors should be diligently worshipped: so he elsewhere remarks, that though the *Romans* might be, in some particulars, excelled by other nations, they were not equalled by any, in a regard to the duties of Religion.

And *Pliny*^a considers it as an *ancient usage* among them, *well and wisely established*, to begin all their Undertakings with Prayers for their success.^b

The most ancient of the Heathen Writers prefaces his account of the first battle he describes, with a relation of the solemn sacrifice, at which the Chiefs of the *Greeks* attended to implore the blessing of Heaven

cultu Deorum, multo superiores. TUL. de Nat. Deor. Lib. II.

The following observation well deserves to be here inserted: Omnia post Religionem ponenda semper nostra civitas duxit, etiam in quibus summæ majestatis conspici decus voluit. Quapropter non dubitaverunt sacris imperia servire: ita se humanarum rerum velut curam gerere existimantia, si divinæ potentiæ bene atque constanter fuissent famulata.

VAL. MAX. Lib. I.

^a Bene ac sapienter—majores instituerunt rerum agendarum initium a precationibus capere. PLIN. Paneg.

^b *Prisco Instituto* rebus divinis opera datur, cum aliquid commendandum est, Precatione; cum exposcendum, Voto; cum solvendum, Gratulatione; &c. VAL. MAX. L. I.

on their Arms: and, throughout the *Iliad*, Prayer is inculcated, as requisite to precede all our undertakings.

It was, as *Plutarch* informs us, the daily practice of *Alexander* the Great, when his leisure admitted of it, the first thing he did, to sacrifice to the Gods.

The same Writer observes of *Julius Cæsar*, that, when it was told him that *Pompey's* forces were coming out of their trenches to give him battle, he order'd his soldiers to stop, and first made supplication to the Gods, then ranged his troops in order of battle.

A like remark I find in this Historian, concerning *Dion's* first offering up prayer to the Gods, and then advancing with his troops against the Enemy.

Tully,^a reasoning on the propriety of having Temples in Cities, quotes *Pythagoras*, as having asserted, that our minds are never in a more pious frame, than when we are employed in the rites of Religion.

^a Illud bene dictum est a Pythagora, doctissimo viro, Tum maxime & pietatem & religionem versari in animis, cum rebus divinis operam daremus. *De Leg. L. II.*

When *Socrates* was accused of not worshipping those Gods, which were worshipped by his fellow-citizens, he doth not seek to justify himself by alledging any worship paid by him in private, but he absolutely denies the fact,* and expressly declares, that he did sacrifice on the public Altars, upon the several Festivals.

They who have the least degree of Reason, says *Plato*, invoke the Deity, whatever they undertake, whether it be an affair of greater or less weight.

* Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον θαυμάζω, &c. Hoc primum admiror, qua ratione Melitus accusator dicat, quos civitas Deos putat, me non putare. Nam in communibus quidem sacris, publicisque altaribus sacrificantem me & alii qui fuerunt obvii viderunt, & ipse Melitus, si voluit, videre potuit.

XENOPH. Apol. pro SOCR.

The same writer elsewhere says, Ἡ γὰρ Πυθία νομῶ, &c. Sicut enim Pythius de immolationibus respondet, quod recte agat si quis consuetudine civitatis utatur, sic etiam Socrates & ipse faciebat, cæterosque admonebat: eos vero qui aliter agebant, curiosos & vanos arbitrabatur.

XEN. de dict. & fact. Soc. L. I.

Ἄλλοι πάντες οὐκ οὐκ καὶ πρὸς θεῶν, &c. Omnes ii qui vel tantillum mentis habent, quum aliquid sive magnum sive parvum aggrediuntur, semper solent Deum invocare.

TIMÆUS.

The

The Rule we have in *Isocrates* is, ^a Worship the Deity, as at other times, so particularly with your fellow-citizens: You thus will be seen, at once, sacrificing to the Gods, and obeying the Laws.

^b It is the part of a wise man, according to *Tully*, to support the appointments of his Ancestors, by retaining their religious rites.

I will worship the Gods, says the Philosopher in *Stobæus*, diligently, and according to the usage of my country.

It becomes men to observe the religious rites of their Country, is the assertion of *Epietetus*; and *Celsus* tells you, That *All* follow the religious rites of their Country; which it seems fit they should do, as what is ratified by common consent ought to be observed. ^c

^a Τιμα το δαιμονιον, &c. Venerare numen cum aliis semper, tum maxime quum sacra publica fiunt. Sic enim apparebit, te simul & Diis immolare, & legibus obtemperare. ISOCR. Orat. ad Demon.

^b Majorum instituta tueri sacris cæremoniisque retinendis, sapientis est. *De Divinat. Lib. II.*

^c ORIG. cont. Cels.

IV. Your practice, in the particular wherein I could wish it reformed, I have further consider'd as expressive of direct Atheism.

For, what construction can possibly be given to a constant neglect of the public worship of God, but that the person, who doth thus neglect it, thinks that there is no need of such worship? And to deny the Deity worship is, in effect, to deny his existence.

On this ground it is, that *Epicurus* and his followers have always been charged with Atheism. They allowed that certain Deities existed; but as they asserted—that these Deities were wholly taken up with the enjoyments, which their abode, at a vast distance from us, furnished—that they were entirely regardless of all human affairs, quite unconcerned whether Man served them or not; it has been truly remarked, that the *Epicureans* in words admitted the being of a God, but in effect denied it.*

* *Epicurus ex animis hominum extraxit radicibus religionem, cum Diis immortalibus & opem & gratiam sustulit: cum enim optimam & præstantissimam naturam Dei*

On this ground it likewise is, That *Aristotle* says, ^a They who doubt, whether we ought to worship the Gods, want punishment; as they who doubt, whether the snow is white, want sense.

It, certainly, is the same thing to mankind, whether there be, or be not, a God, if the supposed God concerns not himself at all with their affairs—leaves them at liberty to act as they please—is indifferent to any homage, which they may be assiduous, or negligent, in paying him.

The plain meaning of my never worshipping God cannot but *appear* to be—that I judge I have nothing to hope or fear, whether I do, or do not, worship him; and such a notion is, by the best both ancient and modern Writers, branded as an Atheistical one.

dicat esse, negat idem esse in Deo gratiam.——Atetiam liber est Epicuri, *de Sanctitate*. Ludimur ab homine non tam faceto, quam ad scribendi licentiam libero. Quæ enim potest esse *sanctitas*, si Dii humana non curant? ——Re tollit, Oratione relinquit Deos. TUL. de Nat. Deor. L. I.

^a Οι απροσηλεις ποτερον δι της θεας τιμαν, η ε, κολασεως δεοιλας· οι δε, ποτερον η χιων λευκη, η ε, αισθησεως. Topic. L. I.

When

When it is the established opinion, that every one, who believes there is a God, will give some public testimony of that belief—be seen associating with some of the community, to which he belongs, in the worship of God ; a judgment will be made of me according to that opinion, and I shall be sure to pass for a man of *no Religion*, if my having any doth not appear from those acts, which are the proper evidences of it.

That the neglect of public worship doth justly bring on us the charge of Atheism, may seem unquestionable to him, who finds that the ablest writers on *Natural Religion* consider public worship as a part of the *Religion of Nature*.

Our Countryman *Cumberland*, whose treatise on this subject deserves, perhaps, as high commendations as can properly be bestowed on any effort of human wit, thus expresses himself.

* “ As in the creation and support of this System, which we inhabit, God willed that

* Quoniam in creatione & conservatione hujus, quod incolimus, Systematis, tot voluit esse suarum perfectionum indicia ; hominesque ea voluit esse conditione, ut, si Intel-
there

there should be so many *evidences* of his perfections, and so framed men, that if they would exert the force of their understanding, they could not but observe those evidences, he willed that they should know and acknowledge what he is : And as he willed men to be *rational*, that is, to be consistent with themselves, and not to run into contradictions, he wills that their words and actions should be consonant to their thoughts of his perfections; that is, he wills them to worship and honour him."

Elsewhere he speaks more particularly to the point in hand: —^a The necessity of the divine Dominion, in order to the com-

lectûs sui vires exerent, non possint non ea observare, voluit eos scire qualis est, & agnoscere. Quoniam autem voluit homines esse rationales, id est, sibi constantes, & omnem contradictionem averfari, vult ipforum dicta ac facta animorum cogitatis de illius perfectionibus consentire; hoc est, vult ipsos eum colere & honorare. *De Lege Nat. C. v. Sect. 21.*

^a Cognita, ex his naturalibus, atque adeo æternis, Dei perfectionibus, hac necessitate Domini Divini, in ordine ad commune, quod summum est, Bonum; cognoscitur Lex naturalis illud ei tribuens, secundum ea quæ antehac explicuimus. Manifestum est enim rationem rectam divinam (quæ Lex quædam est ei naturalis) ab æterno illud sibi in hunc finem assumpturam esse; & rationem rectam humanam,

mon, which is the greatest, Good, being discover'd from the natural, and therefore eternal, perfections of God ; the natural Law giving him that Dominion, as we have already explained it, is likewise discover'd. For it is manifest, that the right reason of the Deity, which is to him a sort of natural Law, would from Eternity assume the exercise of this Dominion, in order to the end assigned ; and that the right reason of Man, as soon as it exists and perceives this, would necessarily approve thereof ; since it cannot, whilst it is right, dissent from the reason of God. But a Law being given to acknowledge the Divine Dominion, Laws are given commanding, with respect to God, the greatest love, trust, hope, gratitude, humility, fear and obedience, and whatever else is expressed in *invoking him, giving him*

cum primum existit & hoc percipit, necessario concensuram esse ; quippe, quamdiu recta est, a ratione divina nequit dissentire. Data autem Lege de agnoscendo hoc Dominio Divino, dantur Leges imperantes summum erga illum amorem, fiduciam, spem, gratitudinem, humilitatem, timorem & obedientiam, & si quid amplius est quod exprimitur in invocatione Divini nominis, & actione gratiarum, & auscultatione verbi Divini, & in devovendo res, loca, tempora & personas, illius solius honori. Cap. ix. Sect. 2.

thanks,

thanks, hearing his word, and consecrating things, places, times, and persons, to the honour of him, and of him only.

There ought to be, says the very judicious writer of the *Religion of Nature delineated*,^a a public worship of the Deity. For a man may be considered as a member of a *Society*, and *as such* he ought to worship God (if he has opportunity of doing it ; if there are proper prayers used *publicly*, which he may resort to, and his health, &c. permit). Or, the *society* may be considered as *one body*, that has common interests and concerns, and *as such* is obliged to worship the Deity, and offer one common prayer. Beside, there are many, who know not of themselves how to pray ; perhaps cannot so much as read. These too must be taken *as they are*, and consequently some time and place *appointed*, where they may have suitable prayers read to them, and be guided in their devotions.

And, further, toward the keeping mankind in order, it is *necessary* there should be some religion professed, and even esta-

^a *Rel. of Nat. delineated*, p. 124.

blished ;

blished ; which cannot be without some public worship. And were it not for that sense of virtue, which is *principally* preserved (so far as it is preserved) by national *forms* and *habits* of religion, men would soon lose it *all*, run wild, prey upon one another, and do what else the worst of savages do.

^a It is a part of Natural Religion, says *Puffendorf*, to worship God, not only in private, but, likewise, openly and publicly. —Public worship both testifies our own Piety, and excites that of others.

^b How can we conceive, as *Barbeyrac* expresses himself, that there is true Piety in the heart, unless it shew itself by some outward acts of Religion ? Men are so made,

^a Propositiones practicæ Religionis naturalis versantur partim circa internum, partim circa externum Cultum Dei. —Externus Dei cultus in hisce potissimum consistit, ut homo Deo gratias agat pro tot bonis ab eo acceptis—ut homo Deum non solum secreto, sed & palam & publice in conspectu hominum colat.—Publicus cultus non solum de nostra devotione testatur, sed & alios exemplo incitat.

^a PUFFEND. *de Offic. Hom. & Civ.* L. I. c. 4.

^b See *Barbeyrac's* Note on Sect. 3. Chap. iv. Book II. of *Puffendorf's Law of Nature and Nations*, done into *English* by *Basil Kennet*.

that

that they do not think, that they shew a sufficient respect one to another, if they do not give some proofs of it by their speech, or some significant action.——We must grant, that an outward worship is absolutely necessary.

In *Burlamaqui's Principles of the Law of Nature* we have the following passage:

* A truly religious man will think it his duty, and find it his pleasure, to confirm himself in sentiments of piety, and excite them in others. Hence is derived outward worship, as well private as public. For, whether we consider this worship, as the chief and almost only means of exciting, cherishing, and perfecting in the heart sentiments of Religion; or whether we con-

* Un homme religieux se fera un devoir & un plaisir de fortifier en lui les sentiments de piété, & de les exciter chez les autres. De-là derive le Culte extérieur, tant particulier que public. Car, soit que l'on envisage ce culte comme étant le premier & presque le seul moyen d'exciter, d'entretenir, & de perfectionner dans le cœur les sentiments de Religion & de Piété; soit qu'on le considère comme un hommage que les hommes, réunis par des Sociétés particulières ou publiques, rendent à Dieu en commun; soit que l'on joigne ces deux vues; la Raison nous en fait un DEVOIR d'une NECESSITE' INDISPENSABLE.

BURLAMAQ. *Principes du Droit Naturel*, C. iv. p. 2.

sider it as an homage, which men united in Society, in common, pay the Deity ; or whether we take these two views of it in conjunction, Reason makes it a DUTY of INDISPENSABLE NECESSITY.

^a It is natural for men, according to *Wilkins*, who are joined together in Civil Societies, to join likewise in Religious Worship. And, in order to this, it is necessary that there should be public places, and solemn times, set apart for such Assemblies : Which hath accordingly been the practice of *All civilized Nations*. And in the manner of performing their public Worship, it was still required to be done, with all imaginable submission and reverence. This the *Stoic* commends, and cites *Aristotle* for it ; — “ Men are never more concerned to be
 “ humble and modest, than when they
 “ have to do about God. We should enter the Temples with an humble and
 “ composed demeanour. When we approach to sacrifice, it should be with all
 “ imaginable expressions of reverence and
 “ modesty, in our countenance and carriage.”

^a *Principles of Natural Religion*, by *Wilkins*, B. I. Ch. 12.

^a If you will be pleased to lay together what is here quoted from the best Writers on Natural Religion, and what was before related concerning the Practice and Sentiments of the most eminent persons in the Heathen World ; the neglect of all public worship must, I should think, appear to you not harshly censured, when consider'd as an evidence of absolute Atheism.

V. I have now only to add, That the great and extensive mischief, which may proceed from your absenting yourself from the public worship, well merits your most serious consideration.

A very little knowledge of mankind may suffice for our fullest conviction what terrible disorder must ensue, were we, generally, without any apprehensions of a Superintending Providence.

^a In a writer, by no means fit to be placed among those above cited, and only taken notice of here, as he was most unlikely to have made public worship a part of Natural Religion, could he have found any tolerable plea for denying it to be so, we meet with this observation——

“ It is the voice of Nature, that God should be publicly worshipped.” *Christianity as old as the Creation.*

It is highly honourable to Religion, that the Atheistical writers endeavour to account for its introduction, by supposing it to be a political measure, to restrain man's propensity to mischief — to keep him innocent, when he might think his guilt could never come under the cognisance of any of his species. How many crimes are there, on which human Laws do not at all animadvert! How many of the crimes, for which they appoint a punishment, never receive it, either from the timorousness, or indolence, or corruption of those, who should see it inflicted! Offenders, high in rank, defy justice — the wealth of others protects them from it — the very poorest often escape it, by the secrecy with which they act; and, using more cunning than their Betters, they transgress with equal impunity.

Let the severest Laws be enacted and duly executed, what numbers shall we find despising them! How unheeded is the Executioner by a bold necessitous villain! In what shape can death scare us, when inflamed with rage — when intent on revenge? Civil regulations extending thus but to a
part

part of our duty, and so feebly enforcing the discharge even of that part of it, Society must necessarily want some further support. I should add, with respect to human Laws, that as they take notice only of the outward act, they leave us at liberty to allow in ourselves those inclinations, which, if we do not endeavour to suppress, we shall at length be but ill able to resist. The robber, the murderer, the adulterer, do not at once throw off the restraints of conscience : they gradually fall ; and, by long offending in desire, proceed to do it in act.

How far the defects of human Laws are supplied by the belief of a God, is obvious — It induces us to forbear treating any other person, as we would not have him to treat us — It takes away all hope of secret guilt — It assures us, that, whatever our rank or fortune may be, our crimes shall not fail to receive the punishment they deserve — It prevents not only the birth, but even the conception, of sin ; and secures regularity in our actions, by preserving it in our inclinations.

These are the proper effects of a firm persuasion, that we are under the government of an all-knowing and all-powerful, a perfectly wise and just God. Nor doth there seem to be any way so likely to fix this persuasion on the mind of man, and to make it general, as that of a public worship—as the members of the community assembling to pay their joint homage to this infinitely perfect Being.

Care for the necessities of life is apt to operate so strongly on one part of our species, and the pursuit of pleasure so much engages the other, that were we severally left to our choice, whether we would pay any acknowledgment to our Creator, it is greatly to be feared, that an entire forgetfulness of him would be widely spread.

Times and places, set apart for his service, are the only calls that many know to a remembrance of his existence: They would never think of him, if they were never required to join in his worship; and it is the weekly repetition of this act, which alone keeps up in them a sense of him, as sure
to

to reward every virtuous man, and punish every wicked.

When we are accustomed, from our childhood, to meet our neighbours one day in seven, in order that we may in common beg of our Creator to preserve and bless us, to deliver us from sin and all other evil, to make us happy here and continue us so ever ; it is not to be supposed, but that we shall more frequently think of a God, than we should do, were no such religious assemblies held ; and that we shall be under a greater fear of acting wrong, than would otherwise influence us.

I do not say, that by such outward homage, the most punctually paid, any of us are likely to be made as good, as we ought to be.

We have sad experience to the contrary. But this, I think, may truly be said of it, That it is some check to the progress of Vice, and that our Morals would become much worse, were this homage wholly neglected. It is a fact, which comes under every one's observation, that where the lower people absent themselves from all

public worship, they contract a savageness and brutality of manners, and are too apt to go the greatest lengths of guilt.

When a seventh part of our time is set apart for that employment, which will make us more considerate—which teaches us to act as reasonable creatures, great advantages may well be expected from it; and, certainly, as great hurt must ensue, when, for so large a portion of their time, the generality encounter all the temptations, to which absolute idleness can expose them,

If, as they think that they have no concern with matters of Religion on their days of *Labour*, they judge the same of the day on which they are exempted from it, and pass *this day* without any Act, which can make a serious impression upon them; it is very probable that they will, ordinarily, run into great irregularities upon it—into irregularities, which, exhausting their own small stock of money, will strongly entice them to such violence or fraud, as may afford them the supply they want.

The leisure of the wealthy too frequently engages them in ruinous pleasures, notwithstanding the many innocent ways of amusing themselves, which the advantages of their education and fortune afford: But to what licentiousness must we, then, think the poor will proceed, when they are to have a whole day, in every week, for mere diversions, and are too apt to relish those most, which are most dangerous to their Virtue?

Set aside all considerations of Religion—Are not Churches the only morality-schools of considerable numbers, the only places where they hear any thing of their obligations to avoid what may be mischievous to themselves or others? And when those obligations are not thoroughly understood, or when they are very seldom reflected upon, or when the motives enforcing a conformity to them are not sufficiently known; can the consequence but be, a misconduct more or less hurtful, as our dispositions are better or worse, as we are under stronger or weaker temptations to offend?

It may be, as you do not desire, that the example you set in absenting yourself from all public worship, should be follow'd, so you do not suppose that it will be.—You will, perhaps, tell me, that you are but one, and that there is little to be feared from the omissions of one private person.—But surely, Sir, the practice of a whole Nation is no more than the practice of many particulars; and whosoever plea it is—What signifies my behaviour; I am but one? he ought to be reminded, that every man may excuse himself in the same manner; and thus, what each allows only in himself, may become the general guilt.

In those parts of duty, which arise not from our respective states and circumstances, but from considerations equally applicable to persons of all conditions, we should never suppose that *our failure* will be confined to ourselves; we should regard *it* as influencing others to a like *failure*, and *this* as capable of very widely extending itself.

My

My example, in any departure from duty, is an advice to my neighbour to do the same thing; and it is advice, which may so far appear more weighty than what my tongue can give him, because there is seldom reason to think, that a man's actions belie his heart, but often the greatest to think so of his professions.

If our wrong behaviour, being publicly known, doth not all the mischief, which might justly be feared from it; or if, from the mean opinion entertained of us, it doth very little hurt; this will be but a poor defence of it. We are, certainly, render'd criminal by those actions, the natural consequences of which are mischievous; though it should so happen, that the evil, which they have a tendency to produce, did not ensue.

I am got to a length, for which I would apologize, were it on a less important subject.

I am sure, that I have offered you some things well deserving your consideration, as I have furnished you with so many extracts,
from

from the best both antient and modern Writers ; and if they can but engage your attention, they will, I should hope, contribute not a little towards producing that change in your conduct, so much wished for by

Your, &c.

A LET-



A
L E T T E R
T O A
Y O U N G N O B L E M A N ,

Soon after his leaving SCHOOL.

Majorum Gloria posteris lumen est, neque bona neque mala in occulto patitur. SALLUST.

————— Sanctus haberi,
Justitiæque tenax, factis dictisque mereris?
Agnosco PROCEREM. ————— JUVEN.



THE

LETTER

TO A

YOUNG NOBLEMAN

Soon after his leaving school.

Written by Thomas Hobbes, Esq. in his private
hand, & is now in the possession of
the Hon. the Earl of Pembroke, &c.
As a valuable manuscript.

THE



A

L E T T E R

T O A

Y O U N G N O B L E M A N .

S I R,

THE obligations I have to your family cannot but make me solicitous for the Welfare of every member of it, and for that of yourself in particular, on whom its Honours are to descend.

Such instructions and such examples, as it has been your happiness to find, must, necessarily, raise great expectations of you, and will not allow you any praise for a common degree of merit. You will not be thought to have worth, if you have not
a di-

a distinguished worth, and what may suit the concurrence of so many extraordinary advantages.

In low life, our good or bad qualities are known to few—to those only who are related to us, who converse with, or live near, us. In your station, you are exposed to the notice of a Kingdom. The excellencies or defects of a Youth of Quality make a part of polite conversation—are a topic agreeable to all who have been liberally educated; to all who are not amongst the meanest of the people.

Should I, in any company, begin a character of my friend with the hard name, whom I hope you left well at——they would naturally ask me, What relation he bore to the Emperor's Minister? When I answer'd, That I had never heard of his bearing any; that all I knew of him was, his being the son of a *German* Merchant, sent into this Kingdom for education; I, probably, should be thought impertinent, for introducing such a subject; and I, certainly, should soon be obliged to drop it,

or be wholly disregarded, were I unwise enough to continue it.

But if, upon a proper occasion, I mentioned, that I had known the Honourable ——— from his infancy, and that I had made such observations on his capacity, his application, his attainments, and his general conduct, as induced me to conclude, he would one day be an eminent ornament, and a very great blessing, to his Country, I should have an hundred questions asked me about him—my narrative would appear of consequence to all who heard it, and would not fail to engage their attention.

I have, I must own, often wonder'd, that the consideration of the numbers, who are continually remarking the behaviour of the persons of Rank among us, has had so little influence upon them—has not produced a quite different effect from what, alas! we every where sadly experience.

Negligere quid de se quisque sentiat, non solum arrogantis est, sed etiam omnino dissoluti. I need not tell you where the remark is: It has, indeed, so much obvious truth, that it wants no support from authority.

T

Every

Every generous principle must be extinct in him, who knows that it is said of him, or that it justly may be said of him—How different is this young man from his noble Father ! The latter took every course that could engage the public esteem : the former is as industrious to forfeit it. The Sire was a pattern of Religion, Virtue, and every commendable quality : his descendant is an impious, ignorant, profligate wretch ; raised above others, but to have his folly more public—high in his rank, only to extend his infamy.

A thirst after fame may have its inconveniences, but which are by no means equal to those that attend a contempt of it. Our earnestness in its pursuit may possibly slacken our pursuit of true desert ; but indifferent we cannot be to Reputation, without being so to Virtue.

In these remarks you, Sir, are no farther concern'd, than as you must, sometimes, converse with the persons to whom they may be applied, and your detestation of whom one cannot do too much to increase. *Bad examples* may justly raise our fears even
for

for him, who has been the most wisely educated, and is the most happily disposed : No caution against them is superfluous : In the place, in which you are at present, you will meet with them in all shapes.

Under whatever disadvantages I offer you my advice, I am thus far qualified for giving it, that I have *experienced* some of the dangers which will be your trial, and had sufficient *opportunity* of observing others. The observations I have made, that are at all likely to be of service to you, either from their own weight, or the hints they may afford for your improving upon them, I cannot conceal from you. What comes from him who wishes you so well, and so much esteems you, will be sufficiently recommended by its motives ; and may, therefore, possibly be read with a partiality in its favour, that shall make it of more use than it could be of from any intrinsic worth.

But, without farther preface or apology, let me proceed to the points that I think deserving your more particular consideration ; and begin with what, certainly, should, above all other things, be consider'd—RE-

LIGION. It is, indeed, what every man says he has more or less consider'd; and by this, every man acknowledges its importance: yet, when we enquire into the consideration that has been given it, we can hardly persuade ourselves, that a point of the least consequence could be so treated. To our examination here we usually sit down *resolved*, how far our *conviction* shall extend.

In the pursuit of natural or mathematical knowledge we engage, disposed to take things as we find them—to let our assent be directed by the evidence we meet with: but the doctrines of Religion each inspects, not in order to inform himself what he ought to believe and practise; but to reconcile them with his present faith and way of life—with the passions he favours—with the habits he has contracted.

And that this is, really, the case, is evident, from the little alteration there is in the manners of any, when they know as much of Religion as they ever intend to know. You see them the same persons as formerly; they are only furnished with arguments, or
excuses,

excuses, they had not before thought of; or with objections to any rules of life differing from those by which they guide themselves; which objections they often judge the only defence their own practice stands in need of.

I am sure, Sir, that to one of your understanding the absurdity of such a way of proceeding can want no proof; and that your bare attention to it is your sufficient guard against it.

Religion is either wholly founded on the fears or fancies of mankind, or it is, of all matters, the most serious, the weightiest, the most worthy of our regard. There is no mean. Is it a dream, and no more? Let the human race abandon, then, all pretences to Reason. What we call such is but the more exquisite sense of upright, unclad, two-legged Brutes; and that is the best you can say of us. We then are Brutes, and so much more wretched than other Brutes, as destined to the miseries they feel not, and deprived of the happiness they enjoy; by our foresight anticipating our calamities, by our reflection recalling them. Our Being is without an aim; we can have

no purpose, no design, but what we ourselves must sooner or later despise. We are formed, either to drudge for a life, that, upon such a condition, is not worth our preserving; or to run a circle of enjoyments, the censure of *all* which is, that we cannot long be pleased with *any one of them*. Disinterestedness, Generosity, Public Spirit, are idle, empty sounds; terms, which imply no more, than that we should neglect our own happiness to promote that of others.

What *Tully* has observed on the connexion there is between Religion, and the Virtues which are the chief support of Society, is, I am persuaded, well known to you.

A proper regard to social duties wholly depends on the influence that Religion has upon us. Destroy, in mankind, all hopes and fears, respecting any future state; you instantly let them loose to all the methods likely to promote their immediate convenience. They, who think they have only the present hour to trust to, will not be withheld, by any refined considerations, from

from doing what appears to them certain to make it pass with greater satisfaction.

Now, methinks, a calm and impartial enquirer could never determine that to be a visionary scheme, the full persuasion of the truth of which approves our existence a wise design—gives order and regularity to our life—places an end in our view, confessedly the noblest that can engage it—raises our nature—exempts us from a servitude to our passions, equally debasing and tormenting us—affords us the truest enjoyment of ourselves—puts us on the due improvement of our faculties—corrects our selfishness—calls us to be of use to our fellow-creatures, to become public blessings—inspires us with true courage, with sentiments of real honour and generosity—inclines us to be such, in every relation, as suits the peace and prosperity of Society—derives an uniformity to our whole conduct, and makes satisfaction its inseparable attendant—directs us to a course of action pleasing when it employs us, and equally pleasing when we either look back upon it, or attend to the expectations we entertain from it.

If the source of so many and such vast advantages can be supposed a dream of the superstitious, or an invention of the crafty, we may take our leave of certainty ; we may suppose every thing, within and without us, conspiring to deceive us.

That there should be difficulties in any scheme of Religion which can be offer'd us, is no more than what a thorough acquaintance with our limited capacities would induce us to expect, were we strangers to the several religions that prevailed in the world, and proposed, upon enquiry into their respective merits, to embrace that which came best recommended to our belief.

But all objections of difficulties must be highly absurd in either of these cases——

When the creed you oppose, on account of its difficulties, is attended with fewer than that which you would advance in its stead ; or——

When the whole of the practical doctrines of a Religion are such, as, undeniably, contribute to the happiness of mankind, in what-

whatever state, or under whatsoever relations, you can consider them.

To reject a Religion thus circumstanced, for some points in its scheme less level to our apprehension, appears to me, I confess, quite as unreasonable, as it would be to abstain from our food, till we could be satisfied about the origin, insertion, and action of the muscles that enable us to swallow it.

I would, in no case, have you rest upon mere authority ; yet as authority will have its weight, allow me to take notice, that Men of the greatest penetration, the acutest reasoning, and the most solid judgment, have been on the side of Christianity—have expressed the firmest persuasion of its truth.

I cannot forgive myself, for having so long overlook'd Lord *Bacon's* Philosophical Works. It was but lately I began to read them ; and one part of them I laid down, when I took my pen to write this. The more I know of that extraordinary Man, the more I admire him ; and cannot but think his understanding as much of a size beyond that of the rest of mankind, as *Virgil* makes the stature of *Musæus*, with respect

spect to that of the multitude surrounding him——

—— ——— *Medium nam plurima turba*

Hunc habet, atque bumeris extantem suspicit altis.

ÆN. L. VI. 667, 8.

or as *Homer* represents *Diana's* height, among the Nymphs sporting with her——

Πασάων δ' ὑπερ ἥγε καὶ ἐχέει ἡδὲ μέτωπα. OD. L. VI. 107.

Throughout his writings there runs a vein of piety: you can hardly open them, but you find some or other testimony of the full conviction entertained by him, that Christianity had an especial claim to our regard. He, who so clearly saw the defects in every science——saw from whence they proceeded, and had such amazing sagacity, as to discover how they might be remedied, and to point out those very methods, the pursuit of which has been the remedy of many of them——He, who could discern thus much, left it to the Witlings of the following age, to discover any weakness in the foundation of Religion.

To him and Sir *Isaac Newton* I might add many others, of eminent both natural and acquired endowments, the most unsuspected favourers of the Christian Religion ;

gion ; but these two, as they may be consider'd standing at the head of mankind, would really be dishonoured, were we to seek for any weight, from mere authority, to the opinions they had jointly patronised, to the opinions they had maintained, after the strictest enquiry what ground there was for them.

That the grounds of Christianity were thus enquired into by them, is certain : for the One appears, by the quotations from the *Bible* interspersed throughout his works, to have read *it* with an uncommon care ; and it is well known, that the Other made *it* his chief study, in the latter part of his life.

It may, indeed, appear very idle, to produce authorities on one side, when there are none who deserve the name of such on the other. Whatever else may have rendered the Writers in favour of Infidelity remarkable, they, certainly, have not been so for their sagacity, or science—for any superiorem either natural, or acquired, Endowments. And I cannot but think, that he who takes up his pen, in order to deprive the world of the advantages which would
accrue

accrue to it were the Christian Religion generally received, shews so wrong a head in the very design of his work, as would leave no room for doubt, how little credit he could gain by the conduct of it.

Is there a just foundation for our assent to the Christian doctrine? Nothing should then be more carefully considered by us, or have a more immediate and extensive influence upon our practice.

Shall I be told, that if this were a right consequence, there is a Profession, in which quite different persons would be found, than we at present meet with?

I have too many failings myself, to be willing to censure others; and too much love for truth, to attempt an excuse for what admits of none. But let me say, that consequences are not the less true, for their truth being disregarded. *Lucian's* description of the Philosophers of his age is more odious, than can belong to any set of men in our time: and as it was never thought, that the precepts of Philosophy ought to be slighted, because they who inculcated, disgraced them; nither can it be any reflection

fection on nobler rules, that they are recommended by persons who do not observe them.

Of this I am as certain as I can be of any thing, That our practice is no infallible test of our principles; and that we may do Religion no injury by our speculations, when we do it a great deal by our manners. I should be very unwilling to rely on the strength of my own virtue in so many instances, that it exceedingly mortifies me to reflect on their number: yet, in whichsoever of them I offended, it would not be for want of conviction, how excellent a precept, or precepts, I had transgressed—it would not be because I did not think, that a life throughout agreeable to the commands of the Religion I profess, ought to be constantly my care.

How frequently we act contrary to the obligations, which we readily admit ourselves to be under, can scarcely be otherwise than matter of every one's notice; and if none of us infer from those pursuits, which tend to destroy our health, or our understanding, or our reputation, that he, who engages in them, is persuaded that Disease, or
Infamy,

Infamy, or a second Childhood, deserves his choice; neither should it be taken for granted, that *he* is not inwardly convinced of the worth of Religion, who appears, at some times, very different from what a due regard thereto ought to make him.

Inconsistency is, thro' the whole compass of our acting, so much our reproach, that it would be great injustice towards us, to charge each defect in our morals, upon corrupt and bad principles. For a proof of the injustice of such a charge, I am confident, none need look beyond themselves. Each will find the complaint of *Medea* in the Poet, very proper to be made his own—*I see and approve of what is right, at the same time that I do what is wrong.*

Don't think, that I would justify the faults of any, and much less theirs, who, professing themselves set apart to promote the Interests of Religion and Virtue, and having a large revenue assigned them, both that they may be more at leisure for so noble a work, and that their pains in it may be properly recompensed, are, certainly, extremely blameable, not only when they countenance the immoral and irreligious; but

but even, when they take no care to reform them.

All I aim at, is, That the cause may not suffer by its Advocates.—That you may be just to *it*, whatever you may dislike in *them*—That their failures may have the allowance, to which the frailty of human nature is entitled—That you may not, by their *manners*, when worst, be prejudiced against their *Doctrine*; as you would not censure Philosophy, for the faults of Philosophers.

The prevalency of any practice cannot make it to be either safe, or prudent; and I would fain have your's and mine such, as may alike credit our religion, and understanding: without the great reproach of both, we cannot profess to believe that rule of life, to be from God, which, yet, we model to our passions and interests.

Whether such a particular is my duty, ought to be the *first consideration*; and when it is found so, common sense suggests the *next*—How it may be performed.

But I must not proceed. A letter of two sheets! How can I expect, that you should
give

give it the reading? If you can persuade yourself to do it, from the conviction of the sincere affection towards you, that has drawn me into this length; I promise you, never again to make such a demand on your patience.—I will never again give you so troublesome a proof of my friendship. I have here begun a subject, which I am very desirous to prosecute; and every letter, you may hereafter receive from me upon it, whatever other recommendation it may want, shall, certainly, not be without that of brevity.



A P P E N D I X.

SINCE the *Letters on the choice of* company were written, the Continuation of Lord *Clarendon's* History has been publish'd : and, as it in some parts more distinctly and strongly represents the hurt accruing from bad company, than any piece of that kind which, I think, I ever met with ; I have been hereby induced to make the following extracts from it.

They are of three kinds——

The first kind shews what King *Charles* the Second was, in his own nature.

The second describes his Companions.

The third represents what an unhappy influence such Companions had upon him—how bad, how horribly bad, a man they made him.

But as Lord *Clarendon* did not live to see the height of wickedness, to which this

U

Monarch

Monarch proceeded, and has expressed himself as favourably, as with any regard to truth he could do, of what he did see; I have added to his account some few particulars from other writers.

I. At *Cologne*, he, with a marvellous contentedness, prescribed so many hours in the day to his retirement in his Closet—— and, in the whole, spent his time very well. *Hist. of Rebel.* B. xiv.

That his Majesty had the *firm Resolution* to contain himself when married within the strictest bounds of Virtue and Conscience, there want not many Arguments, as well from the *excellent temper and justice of his own nature*, as from the professions he had made, with some solemnity, to persons who were believed to have much credit, and who had not failed to do their duty in putting him in mind of the infinite obligations he had to God Almighty—— of which his Majesty was piously sensible. *Contin. of CLAR. Life*, Vol. II. p. 318.

His princely breast always entertained the most tender affections; nor was ever any man's nature more remote from
thoughts

thoughts of roughness and hardheartedness. *Ibid.* 321.

He (the Chancellor) put the King in mind of what he heard his Majesty himself say, upon the like excess which a neighbour King had lately used, in making his Mistress to live in the Court, and in the Presence of the Queen : That his Majesty had then said, “ that it was such a piece
“ of ill-nature, that he could never be
“ guilty of; and if ever he should be guilty
“ of having a Mistress after he had a Wife,
“ which *he hoped he never should be*, she
“ should never come where his Wife was :
“ He would never add that to the vexation,
“ of which she would have enough without
“ it.” *Ib.* 326.

The King replied, that if it should please God ever to give him a Wife and Children, he would make choice of such people to be about Both, in all places of near trust, who in their Natures and Manners, and, if it were possible, in their very Humours, were such as he wished his Wife and Children should be : for he did believe, that MOST YOUNG PEOPLE (and, it may be, ELDER) were, upon the matter, FORM'D by those

whom they SAW CONTINUALLY, and could not but OBSERVE. *Ib.* 336.

He was the best-natur'd Master in the world. Vol. III. p. 86.

He had an excellent nature and understanding. Vol. II. 86.

Lord *Clarendon* observes, that impious discourse was not (at first) grateful to him (the King) and therefore warily and accidentally used by those who had pleasant wit, and in whose company he took too much delight. Vol. II. 318.

II. Take, next, the description of the King's companions.

He spent much of his time with confident young men, who abhorred all discourse that was serious, and, in the liberty they assumed in drollery and raillery, preserved no reverence towards God or Man, but laugh'd at all sober men, and even at Religion itself. *CLAR. Contin.* Vol. II. p. 85.

There was all possible pains taken by that company which were admitted to the King's hours of pleasure, to divert and corrupt all those impressions and principles, which

which his own conscience and reverent esteem of Providence did suggest to him, turning all discourse and mention of Religion into Ridicule. *Ib.* 318.

The nightly meetings had of late made him (the Chancellor) more the subject of the discourse ; and since the time of the new Secretary they had taken more liberty to talk of what was done in Council, than they had done formerly : And the Duke of *Buckingham* pleased himself and all the company in acting all the persons who spake there in their looks and motions, in which piece of Mimickry he had an especial faculty ; and in this exercise the Chancellor had a full part. In the height of mirth, if the King said “ he would go such a journey, “ or do such a trivial thing to-morrow,” somebody would lay a wager he would not do it ; and when he ask’d why, it was answered, “ that the Chancellor would not “ let him :” And then another would protest, “ that he thought there was no ground “ for that Imputation ; however, he could “ not deny that it was generally believed “ abroad, that his Majesty was entirely and

“ implicitly governed by the Chancellor.”

Ib. 467.

What was preached in the Pulpit was commented upon and derided in the Chamber, and Preachers acted, and Sermons vivified as labour'd Discourses, which the Preachers made only to shew their own parts and wit, without any other design than to be commended and preferred. *Ib.*

475.

No sorrow was equal, at least none so remarkable, as the King's was for the Earl of *Falmouth*. They who knew his Majesty best, and had seen how unshaken he had stood in other very terrible assaults, were amazed at the flood of Tears he shed for the loss of this young Favourite, in whom few other men had ever observed any Virtue or Quality, which they did not wish their best friends without. *Ib.* 512.

His Majesty had been heard during that time [of the fire of *London* in 1666] to speak with great piety and devotion of the displeasure that God was provoked to : And no doubt the deep sense of it did raise many good thoughts and purposes in his Royal breast,

breast. But he was narrowly watched and looked into, that such melancholic thoughts might not long possess him, the consequence and effect whereof was like to be more grievous than that of the Fire itself; of which, that loose company that was too much cherished, even before it was extinguished, discoursed, as of an argument for Mirth and Wit to describe the wildness of the confusion all people were in; in which the Scripture itself was used with equal liberty, when they could apply it to their profane purposes. And Mr. *May* presumed to assure the King, “ that this was the
“ greatest Blessing that God had ever conferred upon him, his Restoration only excepted: For the Walls and Gates being
“ now burn’d and thrown down of that rebellious City, which was always an Enemy to the Crown, his Majesty would
“ never suffer them to repair and build them up again, to be a Bit in his mouth
“ and a Bridle upon his neck; but would
“ keep all open, that his Troops might enter upon them whenever he thought necessary for his service, there being no

“ other way to govern that rude multitude
 “ but by Force. *Ib.* 675.

III. It is now to be shewn—What an unhappy influence the Companions thus describ'd had on the King—how bad, how horribly bad, a man they made him.

The King, every day, took less care of his affairs, and affected those pleasures most, which made him averse from the other.
Cont. of CLAR. 85.

The King was far from observing the Rules he had prescrib'd to himself before he came from beyond the Seas, and was so totally unbent from his business, and addicted to pleasures, that the People generally began to take notice of it. *Ib.* 88.

By liberties, which at first only raised laughter, they (the King's Companions) by degrees got the hardiness to censure both the Persons, Counsels, and Actions of those who were nearest his Majesty's trust, with the highest malice and presumption; and too often suspended, or totally disappointed, some resolutions, which had been taken upon very mature deliberation; and which
 ought

ought to have been pursued : but this presumption had not yet come to this length.
Ib. 324.

The Chancellor told the King, Lord *Arlington* and he were speaking of his Majesty, and, as they did frequently, were bewailing the unhappy life he lived, both with respect to himself, who, by the excess of Pleasures which he indulged to himself, was, indeed, without the true delight and relish of any ; and in respect to his Government, which he totally neglected, and of which the Kingdom was so sensible, that it could not be long before he felt the ill effects of it.—It was too evident and visible, that he had already lost very much of the affection and reverence the Nation had for him.
Ib. Vol. III. 681.

Those very men (who in private did the Chancellor the worst offices) would often profess to him (the Chancellor) that they were so much afflicted at the King's course of life, that they even despaired that he would be able to master those difficulties which would still press him. *Ib.* 680.

The

The Duke of *Buckingham*—reported all the licence and debauchery of the Court in the most lively colours, being himself a frequent eye and ear witness of it. *Ib.* 701.

The House of Commons—appeared every day more out of humour, and expressed less reverence towards the Court. And some expressions were frequently used, which seemed to glance at the licence and disorders—of that place. *Ib.* 709.

He (Earl of *Southampton*) saw irregularities and excesses to abound (in the Court) and to overflow all the Banks which should restrain them. *Ib.* 788.

The people opened their mouths wide against the licence of the Court. *Ib.* 788.

The Earl of *Bristol* told the King, that the Chancellor governed him, and managed all his affairs, whilst himself spent his time only in pleasures and debauchery. *Ib.* 396.

The Duke of *Buckingham* says of this Prince—That his unnecessary wars—were made chiefly to comply with those persons whose dissatisfaction would have proved more uneasy to one of his humour, than all that distant noise of Cannon, which he would
often

often listen to with a great deal of tranquillity.——

In his pleasures he was rather abandoned than luxurious; and, like our female Libertines, apter to be debauched for the satisfaction of others, than to seek with choice, where most to please himself.——He sacrificed all things to his Mistresses.

According to Bishop *Burnet*: This Prince delivered himself up to a most enormous course of vice, without any sort of restraint, even from the consideration of the nearest relations: the most studied extravagances that way seemed, to the very last, to be much delighted in, and pursued by him.

When he saw young men of quality, who had something more than ordinary in them, he drew them about him, and set himself to corrupt them both in Religion and Morality; in which he proved so unhappily successful, that he left *England* much changed at his death, from what he found it at his restoration.

The following extracts will prove, to what an utter disregard to Honour, Truth, Justice,

Justice, in Lord *Clarendon's* case, the iniquitous companions of *Charles* the Second insensibly led him.

I. The King told him, (the Chancellor) he had not any thing to object again him, but must always acknowledge, that he had always served him honestly and faithfully ; and that he did believe, that never King had a BETTER Servant. Vol. III. 228.

The Duke put his Majesty in mind of MANY discourses his Majesty had formerly held with him of the Chancellor's honesty and discretion, conjuring him to love and esteem him accordingly, when his Highness had not so good an opinion of him. *Ibid.* 834.

When some asked his Majesty, whether their visiting the Chancellor would offend his Majesty, he answered, No. *Ib.* 836.

When the Lords and Commons had thank'd the King for turning out the Chancellor, he said to his Brother and many of the Lords—That he had now all he desired, and that there should be no more done to the Chancellor. *Ib.* 843.

The

The King gave to VERY MANY Persons of honour as great a testimony of the Chancellor's Integrity, and the services he had done him, as could be given. 852.

II. Let it now be seen, what the insinuations of bad men and women, continually with their Prince, could effect with regard to his treatment of this, even by his own public acknowledgment, so well deserving a Minister.

It appeared every day, that they were best look'd on, who forbore going to the Chancellor; and that they who did go to him, found themselves upon much disadvantage. Vol. III. 836.

The King expressed great displeasure towards the Chancellor, and declared—That he had misbehaved, That he had given him very ill advice, &c. 838.

The King insinuated in his Speech to the Parliament—That what had been formerly done *amiss*, had been by the *advice* of the *Person* (the Chancellor) whom he had *removed* from his counsels. 840.

The King declared himself much offended, that the proposition in the House
of

of Commons for returning him thanks (for having removed the Chancellor) had not succeeded, and COMMANDED his own Servants to press and renew the motion. 841.

When it had succeeded in the House of Commons, but the Lords declined to concur in it — The King sent to the Archbishop of *Canterbury*, that he should in his Majesty's name command all the Bishops Bench to concur in it. 842.

The Duke asked the King, Whether the Chancellor had ever given him counsel to govern by an Army, or any thing like it? The King answered, That he had never given him such counsel in his life; but, on the contrary, his fault was—That he had always *insisted* too much upon the Law. Whereupon his Royal Highness ask'd him —Whether he would give him leave to *say so to others*? His Majesty replied, *With all his heart*. The Duke told this to his Secretary Mr. *Wren* and others, and wished them to *publish it*. When the King expostulated with the Duke for Mr. *Wren's* having *published it*, the Duke declared, that Mr. *Wren* had pursued his order, his Majesty having not only said all that was reported,
but

but having given him leave to divulge it. To which the King made no other answer, but that he should be hereafter more careful of what he said to him. 847, 8.

They who had, at first, wrought upon the King, only by persuading him, that the removing the Chancellor from his office was the only way to preserve him, now importuned the King to prosecute with all his power. This prevailed so far, that they resumed their former courage, and pressed that he might be accused by the House of Commons of High-Treason. 852.

The General (*Monk*) made it his business to solicit and dispose the Members of both Houses—no longer to adhere to the Chancellor, since the King was resolved to RUIN him, and would look upon all who were his Friends, as Enemies to his Majesty. Notwithstanding which, the major Part, by much, of the House of Peers continued firm against his commitment: With which the King was so *offended*, that there were secret consultations of sending a guard of Soldiers to take the Chancellor out of his house, and send him to the *Tower*. 857.

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